A Portfolio of Academic, Therapeutic Practice and Research Work Including Investigations of The Construction of Self-Blame by Psychotherapists During Interviews and The Co-Construction of Self-Blame in Psychotherapy Sessions. by Lewis, Yvette.
A Portfolio of Academic, Therapeutic Practice 
And Research Work
Including investigations of the construction of 
self-blame by psychotherapists during interviews, 
and the co-construction of self-blame in 
psychotherapy sessions
By
Yvette Lewis
Submitted for the degree of PsychD 
in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology 
University of Surrey 
August 2002
ProQuest N um ber: 27606629
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 27606629
Published by ProQuest LLO (2019). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
Copyright statement
No part o f this portfolio may be reproduced without the prior 
permission o f the author, unless authorised by the librarian o f the 
University o f Surrey
© Yvette Lewis, 2002
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my thanks to the course team: Dr. Adrian Coyle, Dr. 
Martin Milton Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz, Margaret Tholstrup, Wendy 
Gairdner, Dr. Jill Owen, Kay Hambleton, Marion Steed, and to Dr. Jill 
Wilkinson and Dr. Ruth Jordan who have both moved on from the 
department since I began training. I would particularly like to thank my 
research supervisor Dr. Adrian Coyle and Dr. Riccardo Draghi-Lorenz for 
their enthusiastic and attentive support -  great sources of inspiration to me 
when my energy was flagging.
I am grateful to my placement supervisors Dr. Chris Stevens, Dr. Elizabeth 
Edwards and Dr. Pat Devenport for their invaluable contributions to my 
personal and professional development.
Without the very generous help of my research participants my research 
would not have been possible, and I would like to extend my thanks to them. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Gilhan Hardy for her kind help in assisting me 
to secure research materials.
My colleagues, friends, and therapist have aU been veiy important in 
providing inspiration, fim, challenge and support to me, and I would like to 
thank each of them.
Finally, I would like to thank my mother and sister for their enduring love, 
and my husband Keith for his unremitting support, patience and fiiendship.
Ill
Contents
Introduction to the portfolio
Academic Dossier
Essay: Discuss the role of social relationships in the formation 6
of identity during adolescence and the implications for 
therapeutic practice
Essay: Discuss an aspect of the therapeutic relationship in 15
relation to psychoanalytic ideas:
The capacity to think
Essay: In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not dependent 24
upon the therapeutic system of delivery but on the active 
components which directly challenge the client’s faulty 
appraisals. Discuss
Essay: How social constructionism can assist efforts to work 34
integratively
IV
Therapeutic Practice Dossier
Description of Clinical Placements
First year placement summary 43
Second year placement summary 44
Third year placement summary 45
Essay: Final clinical paper 47
Research Dossier
Year One: The self as a moral concept -  a review of the literature
Abstract 64
Paper 65
References 82
Appendices 88
Year Two: Psychotherapists’ accounts of client self-blame:
A discourse analytic study
Abstract 90
Introduction 91
Method 93
Analysis 94
Conclusion and ‘contextual issues’ 114
References 117
Appendices 120
Year Three: A discourse analysis of client self-blame in 
Psychotherapy sessions
Abstract 151
Introduction 152
Method 154
Analysis 156
Conclusion and ‘reflexive reflections’ 175
References 177
Appendices 182
Publications 188
VI
Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio represents a selection of work in partial fiilfilment of the PsychD 
in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. It 
incorporates three dossiers: Academic, Therapeutic Practice and Research.
The Academic Dossier contains papers that were submitted for the following 
courses: ‘Life-span Development’, ‘Advanced Theory and Therapy’ and 
‘Clinical Workshops’.
The Therapeutic Dossier contains descriptions of the three one-year clinical 
placements as well as the final clinical paper.
The Research Dossier comprises three research papers: a literature review and 
two empirical investigations, and a list and copies of published papers.
Throughout the portfolio, confidentiality of the clients and research participants 
has been protected. In all cases names of people and places have been changed 
and any other potentially identifying information has been altered or omitted. 
Client studies, process reports, placement logbooks and supervisors’ reports are 
not included here but are available in the confidential appendix, submitted 
separately and not pubhcly accessible.
The work in this portfolio draws heavily upon social constructionism -  a 
theoretical and practical position that I have increasingly attempted to use to 
inform my therapeutic practice. It is one that functions usefully for me in many 
ways, not least of which it allows me to some ‘fi'eedom of movement’ between 
the multiple and diverse therapeutic orientations that comprised this training. 
One of the challenges and struggles of developing within an integrative training 
is to work within models offering very different accounts of: the person, the 
nature of psychological difficulty and distress, and the therapeutic process. I 
found that I had ‘affinities’ with many of these models, in that they resonated
with my experiences and touched upon theories with which I felt familiar and 
comfortable. This comfort and familiarity became ‘problematised’ by my need 
to more rigorously account for my own practice decisions, and the requirement 
to work within the guideliues of the British Psychological Society and the NHS 
settings in which I practised. For instance, an important (as I saw it 
‘humanistic’) tenet for me prior to beginning the training was that individuals 
have a right to make decisions for themselves, and that suicidal intent was not 
sufficient justification for incarcerating a person. This view was difficult to 
reconcile with my professional obhgations, though was never tested in practice. 
My position now is of discomfort with generalisations -  and a suspicion of the 
‘un-thinking’ use o f ‘tenets’.
I ‘brought with me’ to the training a history of struggling with epistemological 
issues (my undergraduate degree having been in psychology and philosophy) 
and a relatively undeveloped interest in Wittgenstein’s linguistic philosophy. I 
had also been in individual psycho-dynamic therapy and had intensive group 
therapy in a therapeutic community, afl;er which I worked in ‘miheu’ therapeutic 
settings (as a support worker in a pre-discharge unit for people with enduring 
mental health problems, and then as a project worker/group facilitator in a 
residential therapeutic community for people with social and emotional 
difficulties). During this time I trained as a volunteer counsellor fi-om a client- 
centred (Rogerian) perspective with an emphasis upon experiential learning.
I mention these contexts because they have been highly influential in my 
development (personally and professionally) and have provided the basis for 
what feels theoretically and practically familiar and acceptable to me. Of course 
there are many other features of my histoiy and identity that also influence my 
preferences, including veiy broad factors such as my race and colour (white 
European), gender (female), and cultural and educational histoiy (middle class, 
university educated).
For some time prior to training, then, I had been immersed in struggles to find 
ways of being therapeutic for others largely based upon my own developmental 
experiences and upon the ways that I had found of being therapeutic towards
myself. Issues of the self-in-relation became veiy important for me, especially 
since my sense of my own psychological change was one of having moved from 
a state of fragihty, and dependence/merger to a more boundaried, manageable 
and distinct sense of myself (with the potential to be aware of the historical and 
momentary impacts of my environment upon me, and the impacts of me upon 
others).
The questions of who am I now? and why am I this way? are ones that I found 
rich and varied responses to in humanistic-phenomenological, and 
psychodynamic theories (as well as finding powerfid accounts of remedying 
problems of the self and the self-in-relation) and these therapeutic models are 
variously referred to and used in the dossiers.
My sense of the (my-) self, then, is infused with individualistic and social 
perspectives, and a question for me has been whether to adopt a particular 
theory and model of practice as the most adequate to ‘capture’ these 
dimensions, whether to move between theories and models, or whether to tiy to 
integrate them by extracting commonalities. In practice I have probably used all 
three strategies, since my adoption of social constructionism could be described 
in all these ways.
The appeal of this orientation for me is that it makes refiexivity its central 
construct and this accords with my sense of psychological development as an 
ever-widening reflexive ‘layering’ -  such that what was previously seen as 
concrete, true and unquestionable becomes conceptualised as contextually 
produced. The relativism of social constructionism allows me to approach 
psychological issues (theoretical and practical) from a functional perspective -  
releasing me from the concerns about ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ that can cripple 
development and stifle the creativity needed to interact meaningfully with 
clients. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy provides the ground-breaking exposition 
of this epistemological shift, captured in his statement that ‘the meaning of a 
word is it’s use iu the language. That is, our conceptual worlds/understandings 
are socially produced rather than ‘objectively grounded’.
My research reflects these interests -  exploring the self-in-relation from a social 
constructionist perspective and using discourse analysis to de-construct self­
blame as a topic and practice. In my practice and academic dossiers I attempt to 
explore the potentials of social constructionist epistemology and to relate it to 
the core therapeutic models in theory and practice. The essay entitled ‘The 
capacity to think’ (p. 15) was written during my second year of training as part 
of the academic component of the psycho-dynamic training, and forms an 
attempt to conceptualise reflexive processes from Khenian theory -  a project 
that felt important to me as a way of developing a coherent working position, 
since both my practice supervisor and theory lecturer were Kleinian 
practitioners. It considerably enriched my theory and practice through helping 
me to conceptualise symbolic systems non-verbally, an extension of my 
understanding of semiotic practices that allows for a more subtle 
conceptuahsation of social constructionism in therapeutic practice (see ‘How 
social constructionism can assist efforts to work integratively’, and the ‘Final 
clinical paper’).
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Discuss the role of social relationships in the formation of identity during 
adolescence and the implications for therapeutic practice.
In addressing the issue of identity during adolescence, the role of social 
relationships can be viewed as central. Not only does this centrality pertain to the 
specific issues and experiences of adolescence (characterised by various stage- 
models of development), but also to the processes underlying identity formation. It 
is suggested here that social relationships are the ‘driving force’ behind identity 
construction and change, as Breakwell proposed in her Identity Process Theory; 
moreover, that the traditional dichotomy between social and personal identity is 
spurious. The centrality of relationships can be extended further by taking the 
Social Constructionist position that it is from within our social ‘frame’ that we 
construct and understand the world, such that embeddedness within relationships is 
our inescapable context as humans. Shotter’s definition of identity as knowledge of 
“what my doings are doing” (Shotter, 1998, p.272) is useful, in that it captures the 
relational core that generates meanings and values -  the agreements we must come 
to in order to be who we are collectively and individually.
The problem in examining identity during adolescence from the Social 
Constructionist perspective or from Identity Process Theory is that they, being 
content-free, cannot provide a characterisation of what it is to be an adolescent in a 
particular context -  they explain but do not describe our various experiences of 
adolescence. The problem for the biological, psychological and social models which 
attempt to make specific claims about adolescent experience is the opposite -  they 
are context-dependent, even to the extent that they make the ontological claim that 
there is an adolescence to describe. In regard to this question -  the status of the 
concept of adolescence -  it has been widely acknowledged that it is by no means a 
universally valid concept, but is bound to Western affluent cultures of the Twentieth 
Century (e.g. Lapsley et al., 1985). The psychological theories and models of 
identity during adolescence are therefore (unsurprisingly) also limited in their
applicability. Nevertheless, if  they make accurate formulations of adolescence they 
can be useful in helping us to devise context-based solutions to individual 
difficulties -  in this case, therapeutic interventions in psychotherapy settings. 
Before these applications are addressed, a range of theories and models of identity 
formation during adolescence will be evaluated in terms of the proposal that social 
relationships are central.
What the developmental theories have in common is their commitment to the 
Epigenetic Principle -  that each stage of development depends, and builds, upon the 
resolutions of the previous stages, such that failure to adequately achieve such 
resolutions arrests the individual’s development or renders it sub-optimal at 
succeeding stages. Moreover, being qualitatively different, it is impossible to go 
back to an earlier stage. None of the developmental models assert any definite ages 
or temporal boundaries delimiting the stages.
Erikson (1959) significantly extended Psychoanalytic theory by devising a 
‘Psychosocial’ model of development, the stage principally devoted to identity 
formation being during adolescence. In this stage, he claimed, the individual must 
achieve Fidelity -  that is, become faithful and committed to causes reflecting his or 
her values, from which he/she is socially affirmed. The opposite ends of the 
spectrum of identity possibilities at this stage are Identity and Role Confusion. What 
makes it crucial for identity development is that intra-psychic reorganisation occurs: 
the identity of the child prior to adolescence was based upon ‘introjections’ then 
‘identifications’, and during adolescence these identifications are ‘synthesised’ into 
a new and unique identity configuration. Bios (1967), another psychodynamic 
theorist, also viewed adolescence as a time when intra-psychic reorganisation 
occurs, but focussed upon the need of the individual to separate from childhood 
identifications and complete a Second Individuation Process -  that is, just as an 
infant must differentiate itself from its surroundings and caregivers, so an 
adolescent must differentiate and separate from the ‘internal objects’ (introjections 
and identifications) of childhood. Marcia (1980) devised what he called the Identity
Status Approach to establish the construct validity of Erikson’s Identity stage and 
his concept of Identity Diffusion -  where the individual remains uncommitted to any 
world views or personal values. An optimal developmental path would consist of 
the child moving from Foreclosure (commitment to childhood values) or Diffusion, 
through Moratorium (exploration) to Identity Achievement (a well defined 
commitment to chosen identity components).
Such psychodynamic approaches provide rich sources of understanding of the 
phenomena associated with identity formation during adolescence, but have been 
challenged on many fronts. The issue of their context-dependence has been 
addressed, but many also object that they involve elaborate intra-psychic ontologies 
(Id, Ego, internal objects etc.) with spurious justification or relevance; moreover, 
that they are unacceptable in being biased towards male experience. The latter 
objection was made forcefully by Gilligan (1982), who claimed that definitions of 
identity stressing a movement towards separateness from others and commitment to 
abstractions does not accord with the interpersonal values of women. From a Post- 
Modern perspective, then, the concepts of identity which invalidate the experiences 
of females should be re-constructed, our relationships with each other and ourselves 
(our social milieu) being the arbiters of validity and meaning. This is a matter of 
giving individuals their ‘voices’ (op.cit.) rather than constructing (interpreting) what 
they say from (to accord with) pre-established theories.
The cognitive-developmental theories of Piaget (1953) and Kohlberg (1984) have 
been incorporated with an Object-Relations approach by Kegan (1982), in an 
attempt to show how these models are each concerned with different facets of a 
unitary developmental process. Kegan proposes a Constructivist Developmental 
Theory in which he characterises identity as meaning-making. Cognition and affect 
are, he says, “inseparable ... aspects of a common process [in which] the organism 
and the environment in which it is embedded keep re-structuring their relationship” 
(op.cit. p. 105). The boundary between self (subject) and other (object) progressively 
moves, changing the very world the person lives in -  since meaning-making is
constrained by this boundary. Times when a person is able to make sense of the 
world Kegan terms Developmental Truces or Balances, but says that for much of 
our lives we are actually in transition between Truces.
Kegan’s theory seems to provide an understanding of adolescence which makes 
sense of the observations variously characterised by Erikson, Bios, Marcia and 
Piaget. He aligns their stages (respectively: Identity versus Role Confusion, 
Symbiosis to Differentiation, Foreclosure/Diffusion to Moratorium, Formal 
Operations) with his Truce of Interpersonal Balance. He appends Erikson’s 
scheme, however, by adding a stage of Affiliation versus Abandonment (Mutuality) 
prior to the Identity stage. This accords with his own view that relationships become 
the context of meaning-making during adolescence, such that the individual’s 
identity has passed from being defined by his/her needs to embeddedness within 
his/her relationships. Put another way, the adolescent now has his/her needs, but is 
his/her relationships.
The attractive features of Kegan’s model include his focus not only upon Truces 
(when the world makes sense) but also upon Transitions, and his focus upon the 
social and relational dimensions of the person -  identity being bound up with the 
relationship between self and other. In this, Kegan avoids the placing of identity 
formation during any particular phase of life -  seeing identity as constantly 
evolving. The process driving this evolution through widening subject-object 
boundaries is, he maintains, the inability of the person to satisfy him/her-self, and 
this arises when the individual comes across discrepant experiences, stimulating the 
attempt to create a more complex self.
What makes the transitions of adolescence interesting is the state of Interpersonal 
Balance, in which relationships are crucial to the adolescent’s sense of self. 
Research into familial, peer and wider social relationships during adolescence bears 
out the importance of this contention, though does not, of course, prove Kegan’s 
thesis. For example, Brian Little (1987) found, using Personal Projects Analysis
(based upon content analysis) that adolescents find projects involving 
interpersonally intimate or nurturant themes to be the most self-prototypical, and the 
projects scoring lowest on self-identity to be related to school work.
Little’s findings could be taken to provide an explanation for Gilligan’s findings - 
that there are disadvantages for females in the way society constructs identity and 
femininity -  in that he found adolescents with few self-prototypical projects are at 
risk from alienation (depression) and have low life-satisfaction scores. In fact, 
adolescent females have been found to suffer greater depressive symptoms than 
males (for example. Gore et.al., 1993). Gilligan claimed that females are at risk from 
‘relational crisis’, that is, abandonment of themselves (their talents, strengths and 
accomplishments) to conform to cultural expectations about femininity: they suffer 
a ‘loss of voice’, resulting from the internalisation of sexist messages (Brown & 
Gilligan. 1992). From Kegan’s theory, the power of such a process becomes clear: 
if the girl defines herself by relationship to others (Interpersonal Balance) then she 
will be unable to maintain a sense of herself that conflicts with society’s 
construction of her. Likewise, adolescent males will be constrained by such forces, 
but constructions of masculinity might conflict less with the male experience of 
self. One might expect, however, that Kegan’s Interpersonal stage might be 
problematic for young men, given Bush’s contention that male identity is threatened 
by intimacy (see Bush & Simmons, 1990).
Peer relationships appear to have an extremely important bearing upon adolescents 
in terms of the type of social inclusion/exclusion. Individuals who are rejected 
experience the greatest problems (are more aggressive, disruptive, lonely, 
dissatisfied and have academic difficulties). The interesting point in terms of this 
discussion is that rejection appears to have a greater negative outcome than neglect 
(see Asher et. al., 1993). It might be that the rejected individual is not able to 
conform to the demands of interpersonal meaning, or has a perception of self and 
other that significantly varies from that of his/her peers. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that these rejected individuals misconstrue social interactions as hostile.
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and behave accordingly. The experience of rejection might further hinder identity 
development into or through this Interpersonal state.
Kegan advocates that in delivering therapy we observe ‘the wisdom of nature’ 
through using as therapeutic models the ‘cultures of embeddedness’ or ‘holding 
environments’ that people actually develop within. The important features of these 
are that they:
(1) hold securely,
(2) let go at an appropriate time, and
(3) remain in place to support the individual through the transition.
The “first order of business” in therapy in Kegan’s view is to “join the other in their 
self-other meaning making” (Kroger, 1996.p.l71). He considers Carl Rogers to 
have been pre-eminent in this, though criticises him, along with other 
therapists/schools for assuming a very sophisticated meaning-making ability. That 
is, in requiring that the client is self-supporting and self-directing. Kegan says that 
teenagers are likely to feel “in over their heads”(1994), but that this need not be a 
problem so long as they are supported.
A useful clue in assessing the meaning-making stage of the client is, according to 
Kegan, the manner of interaction with the therapist. If the client is in Interpersonal 
Balance the therapist is likely to feel ‘devoured’, and the task of therapy is to move 
from acknowledgement of the client’s capacity for mutually self-sacrificing 
relationships (sharing of the client’s meaning-making) towards stimulating a sense 
of distinctiveness. Whilst maintaining emotional availability the therapist should 
gradually insist upon the client as a distinct, independent and responsible agent. 
This is necessary because the evolution of identity is driven by contradiction that 
cannot be integrated into the present balance. Kegan notes that the client in this 
stage is veiy vulnerable to the attitudes of others so care must be taken. There are 
dangers of abusive use of power also, since the client might find it very difficult to 
contradict or feel/express anger towards the other. Thus they can be trapped in 
victimising relationships. Often they are inappropriately given assertiveness
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training, which is useless since the person is unable to conceive of his/her-self as 
other than the relationship -  as Kegan points out, there is no self to do the asserting. 
Kroger (1996) maintains that the production of ‘disequilibrium’ in the service of 
identity formation is a therapeutic endeavour common to all these identity theorists: 
e.g. Kohlberg advocates ‘exposure’ to reasoning at the next level, Kegan advocates 
experiences which refuse to confirm the present balance, Marcia advocates 
promoting degrees of unstructuredness for foreclosures and moratoriums. But all 
also stress that the person needs to be developmentally ready to use such 
experiences, moreover that the consequences of identity change include feelings of 
loss and processes of mourning.
Social constructionists would point out that such ‘shaping’ of the client, in 
accordance with these models, are political acts. In this, therapeutic action is like all 
other action -  promoting the meanings and values of its progenitors, but the aspect 
to be aware of in the therapeutic relationship is the inequality of power. It is 
important, therefore, that curiosity and interest in the client rather than adherence to 
a dogma or a theory, should be the basic stance of the therapist, who must also be 
attentive to the language he or she uses and what this conveys. From a Post-Modern 
view there is no objective truth about identity, only the stories we tell about it that 
help us to generate explanations of ourselves. Psychotherapy in this spirit is 
concerned with helping people find, develop and change their ‘voices’ in order to 
play an active part in the creation of their own meanings. The theories described 
above contribute to the social construction of identity, but we should not regard 
them as affording ‘truth’, instead judge them according to the criterion of usefulness 
for the client.
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Discuss an aspect of the therapeutic relationship in relation to 
psychoanalytic ideas.
The capacity to think.
A precondition for the establishment and maintenance of a therapeutic 
relationship is the capacity of the therapist and client to think. That this 
statement is obvious does not diminish its importance since there are numerous 
processes at work in and between therapist and chent (intra and inter-psychic 
processes) affecting the manner and scope of their thinking. Psychoanalytic 
therapy aims, through the therapeutic relationship, to bring about psychical 
transformations (in feelings, experiences and ideas etc.) and does so largely 
through verbal exchanges (that is, throuÿi a sophisticated, indeed the most 
sophisticated, symbolisation system). These verbal exchanges are understood to 
tap into, and work in concert with, more primitive material - for example pre­
verbal phantasy - rendering it more available to conscious processing (or, 
according to Freud’s structural model of the mind, to the functions of the reahty- 
orientated ego, see Freud, 1923). In order to make sense of the client’s 
difficulties the therapist must discover the nature and contribution of this 
unconscious material -  doing so by, as far as possible, attending to eveiy detail 
and its associative context (Isaacs, 1948, p.77). Thus, whilst cognitively based 
therapies explicitly differentiate between thoughts and feelings and focus upon 
the alteration of affect (feeling) through cognition (thinking processes and 
styles), psychoanalytic therapies tend to preserve the complexity of experience 
and focus upon the phenomenal world emergent within the therapeutic dyad. The 
reason that no clear delineation can be made between affect and cognition for the 
purposes of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is because the unconscious, preverbal 
psychic world (the developmentally earhest and most primitive form of mental 
life) is not organised in terms of this distinction. Since this primitive psychic 
world is taken to motivate and structure much of our conscious hfe, the 
theoretical separation of affect and cognition is a distortion of that life.
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‘Thinking’, it is suggested here, is the process of generating coherence from 
chaotic or disorganised material such that it can be brought into creative use by 
the client -  involving the abilities to discriminate between items/objects and 
‘move’ them (compare them, separate them or bring them together), abihties that 
have their genesis in the pre-verbal and pre-symbohc life of the infant. The 
challenge facing the psychotherapist is, therefore, considerable. Using a 
sophisticated symbolic system (verbalisations) the attempt is made to understand 
pre-verbal phenomena and effect the changes necessary to enable greater 
diversity and flexibility of thought -  that is, more elaborate and adequate 
symbolisation processes. According to Isaacs ‘meanings’ are far older than 
speech, and “we live and feel, phantasy and act far beyond our verbal meanings” 
(Isaacs, 1948, p.89). This inevitably entails that much of what is attended to in 
the therapy underhes the surface content (in that it is not communicated nor 
understood verbally) but must somehow be processed and used therapeutically - 
ultimately, be put into words (Hinshelwood, 1994, p.l71). To understand how 
the therapeutic relationship might be used this way involves conceptuahsing the 
experiences of the infant in the pre-verbal states, and understanding how 
symbohsation evolves to the level that verbal processes can occur. This question 
is at the core of psychology, concerning the derivation of human consciousness 
(reflexive awareness), and attends to processes at the very edge of what can be 
thought about.
The starting point is the biological organism, possessed of innate, instinctual 
drives (see Freud 1900, p.562 & Klein 1959) that serve to meet its ‘organismic’ 
needs. For example, the infant, says Klein, has “instinctual knowledge” of the 
mother (Ibid, p.248), as can be seen by the child’s instinctual rooting and 
suckling behaviour. Klein, like Freud, took ‘drive reduction’ to be the motivation 
for the infant. Other ‘object relations’ analysts take contact and communication 
with others to be a primary rather than secondary motivation and stress the role 
of early relationships to a greater degree. Bridging the gap between instinct and 
thought/symbohsation systems are, according to Kleinians unconscious 
phantasies (see Segal 1957, and Isaacs, 1948). These phantasies are primitive
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amalgams of instincts and part objects (bodily fimctions and sensations) -  and 
are the earliest meaning systems.
How and why, then, do phantasies come into being, how do they function and 
what are their enduring effects? These are questions whose answers have not 
only furnished insights into ‘pathologies’ of thinking, but also provided tools for 
‘decoding’ the emergent phenomena in the therapeutic relationship (with the 
purpose of using that relationship to enhance adaptive thinking). The ‘source 
models’ for the juxtaposition of symbols (inherent in thinking), according to the 
psychoanalytic theory sketched here, are more concrete (less abstract) kinds of 
juxtapositions -  of objects in external and internal space.
The infant begins life, according to Freud, in a state of primitive narcissism, in 
which he/she is unaware of the external world and so feels him/her-self to be the 
source of all experience/sensation (omnipotent phantasy). The infant must 
progress from ‘primary identification’, in which the mother’s existence is felt by 
the baby as part of it’s own identity, through a process of separation and 
differentiation from her (see Mahler et. al., 1975). Klein, by contrast, believed 
that object relations exist from the beginning of life, but they are, initially, in the 
form of part objects - the infant relates to the breast, hands, voice etc., rather 
than to the mother as a whole (Klein, 1946, p.2). Pleasurable sensations bring 
about loving feelings and pain brings about hateful feelings. Driven by the 
‘pleasure principle’ (an instinctual drive, see Freud, 1900), the infant 
hallucinates the good object and pleasurable sensations. This carmot remain the 
case for long, however, since the world breaks down the hallucinations by 
painfirlly impinging upon the infant, intensifying its destructive instincts. 
According to Rivière (1936, p.46), this brings about a state of helplessness 
against, what are felt to be, destructive forces entirely within the infant -  there 
being, as yet, no realistic apprehension of the external world (this relying upon 
further development of the perceptual apparatus).
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Here are the ‘ingredients’ for the development of symbolisation -  instincts, and 
instinctual responses to the impingement of the environment. The instinct to 
identify the ego/self with pleasure/goodness (as a defence against anxiety; 
especially, thought Klein, the anxiety generated from the self-destructive ‘death 
instinct’), and the actual impossibility of avoiding pain and destructive feelings, 
require that the infant develops a ‘space’ outside itself into which pain can be 
discharged (that it achieves a psychical separation between self and other, and 
doing and being ‘done to’). Thus, narcissistic phantasy leads to object relations 
(Rivière, 1936). The psychic mechanisms the infant develops for this purpose 
are introjection and projection, which are initially felt to be the concrete bodily 
incorporation or expulsion of material: this is because the only materials 
available to the infant from which to represent the ‘moving’ of psychic contents 
around in this way, and to develop the phantasies of incorporation and expulsion, 
are bodily functions - especially the movement of material into and out of the 
self (the taking in of milk and defaecation). The earhest phantasies, are, 
therefore of incorporating or expelling good and bad -  in Rivière’s terms they 
are “psychic representatives” of libidinal and destructive instincts (broadly, love 
and hate) (Rivière, 1936, p.83) - and are expressed in terms of bodily fimctions.
Klein’s developmental model traces the emergence of these phantasies, 
specifying how the defence mechanisms are manifested at different stages of 
psychic and somatic development, and for what purposes. In the earliest stage of 
development the infant uses projection and introjection extensively -  splitting its 
internal and external world into good and bad and tending to externalise badness 
in an effort to feel good and be protected from destruction. (The phantasies 
operative in this stage will, therefore, include having the good object inside 
through oral incorporation -  the representation of an oral impulse, and having 
expelled the bad by, for example, having put faeces inside the mother -  the 
representation of an anal impulse). She termed this state the paranoid-schizoid 
position -  ‘schizoid’ because split, and ‘paranoid’ because once the destructive 
impulse is felt to be external the infant fears attack from outside. The introjection 
of bad as well as good objects may then occur, in order that the individual gains 
control over the persecutory object. Klein introduced the concept of projective
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identification to describe the mechanism of ridding the self of hated parts. 
Instead of merely dissociating fi-om or denying the destructive impulses, the 
infant uses the external object as a location for them. The excessive use of 
projective identification weakens the self because large parts of the self are split 
off and expelled. The distortions in thinking exhibited by schizophrenic clients 
have been interpreted as stemming fi-om an arrest in this stage of psychical 
development. Segal (1957) suggested that true symbolism is linked with the 
depressive position, arising when there is more integration of loved and hated 
objects such that, for example, the mother is related to as a whole object. There 
is more ego integration and less use of defensive projection, such that the 
individual can be aware of his or her own destructive feelings. This awareness 
leads to feelings of guilt and mourning, and fears of losing the love of the object 
-  hence the term ‘depressive position’. Without the ego integration of the 
depressive position, and with the violent use of projective identification in the 
paranoid-schizoid position, symbolism is limited.
For a symbol to function as a representation of something it must be understood 
as separate from that thing, and this, thought Segal, was the problem limiting 
symbohsation in paranoid-schizoid states. When projective identification is used 
violently, large parts of the self are projected into the object and the boundaries 
between self and other become confiised. Since the symbol is a creation of the 
ego (self) it also becomes confused with the object, and so instead of becoming a 
representative of the thing symbolised, the object is felt to be that thing -  termed 
by Segal ‘symbolic equation’. The symbolism Segal refers to is the use of 
objects to represent unconscious phantasies, such that these phantasies can be 
satisfied or expressed outside of awareness. The first use of symbohsm then, as 
discussed above, requires some capacity in the subject to differentiate self and 
other in a stable way, and deals with primitive, unconscious material kept out of 
awareness for defensive purposes. According to Segal, the investment of affect 
in external objects due to the displacement of phantasies is the basis of all 
interest in the world, creativity, communication and ego development. It is, she 
says, the onset of the depressive position that is the greatest stimulus for the 
creation of symbols. Aggression is displaced onto symbols rather than onto the
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original object, and instinctual aims to possess or annihilate the object can be 
modified. The symbolisation achieved pre-verbally can be seen as the prototype 
for abstract, verbal thinking, as well as an unconscious source of some of that 
thinking.
Subsequent work has developed and modified the framework provided by Klein. 
Esther Bick concurred with Klein that the bodily sensations and fimctions are the 
foundation of psychic life, but stressed that the basic experience of the infant is 
one of unintegration (Bick, 1968). Klein, citing Winnicott, had earlier discussed 
the lack of cohesion of the early ego and linked this with the feelings of 
persecution in the paranoid-schizoid position (dominating in the first few months 
of life) -  the feelings of annihilation being expelled through projective 
identification (Klein, 1946). In Bick’s view the infant has the passive experience 
of being held together for periods of time (for example during feeding, when the 
attention becomes focussed on an external sensual object), but before it is able to 
introject this integrating fimction and gain an internal ‘good object’ it must 
introject the capacity to introject. She claims that skin sensations can arouse the 
phantasy of a containing object, especially the experience of holding the nipple 
in the mouth. The infant is then able to generate the phantasy of internal and 
external spaces into which things can be put. If such containing phantasies are 
insufficient then introjection and projection are impaired, and the individual will 
suffer the confusions between self and other characteristic of the early infant’s 
world. Bick offered this as an account of the veiy earliest condition of the baby, 
and so as a precursor to the primitive states of the paranoid-schizoid position 
described by Klein.
Bick’s theory, in stressing the importance of ‘containing’ is similar to Bion’s 
theory that the infant must be assisted in converting sensations to thinkable 
forms (symbols) by the ‘containing’ function of the mother (Bion, 1959, 1962a 
& 1962b). He suggested that the infant’s use of projective identification to 
externalise intolerable feehngs enables the recipient of the projections to make 
those experiences meaningfid and ‘thinkable’, doing so by transforming the
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feelings elicited by the baby into something the baby can re-introject. The 
mother is thus the ‘container’ for the projections which she then transforms (the 
infant arouses distress/disturbance in her, which she jSnds ways of coping with), 
allowing the infant firstly to re-introject the less toxic form of the experience and 
ultimately to introject the transforming fimction (the ‘alpha-fimction’). Thus, in 
Bion’s view, thinking originates in a kind of dialogue between infant and 
mother, in which shape is given to the infant’s chaotic and fiightening 
experiences. If the mother is incapable of containing the powerful emotions 
projected into her, then forceful re-introjection of unmodified states occurs -  
leading to problems in the development of symbolisation and thinking. Alpha- 
fimction is also disturbed by powerful envy or intolerance towards the mother, 
such that the infant does not ‘take in’/introject the mother’s ‘version of events’ 
so to speak. Segal has modified her theory of symbol formation in the light of 
Bion’s container-contained model (Segal, 1957, pp.60-65), saying that in 
addition to the mechanism of projective identification the nature of the 
relationship between the container and contained is important in determining the 
fate of the projections and the nature of symbohsation. She also suggests that 
verbal symbols arise from a similar ‘binding’ (containing) of experiences by the 
words or phrases given by the mother in response to the baby.
The motivation for the child to know and think about the external world, (seen 
by Freud and Klein as instinctual) i.e. it’s curiosity in its surroundings (initially 
in the mother’s body), is fraught with the anxieties aroused by the aggressive and 
loving instincts (experienced as phantasies) and can only be sustained so long as 
the object of its curiosity (the mother) is experienced as loving and containing. 
The Oedipus-complex (in which curiosity about the parental couple is 
paramount) can therefore be seen as a crucially important nexus of phantasy 
from which a reahty-orientated organisation of internal and external objects can 
emerge (see Hinshelwood, 1994 pp. 179-87).
If these accounts of the development of ‘thinking’ are accurate, a concern for 
psychotherapists is how they are manifest, effect and can be utilised within the 
therapeutic relationship. Kleinian technique has come to reflect the importance
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of projective identification, firstiy with the recommendation by Heimann (1950) 
that the counter-transference (the experiences and feelings aroused in the 
therapist by the client) be used as a way of discovering unconscious processes 
and phantasies in the patient. Money-Kyrle (1956) went further in suggesting 
that psychotherapy is effected by the therapist receiving the chent’s projective 
identifications, then modifying and re-projecting them in the form of 
interpretations -  that is, it seems, operating similarly to the containing mother. 
These techniques depend crucially on the therapist being able to discern, fi-om 
the complex of projections and identifications, the feelings and thoughts arising 
for her/him that are due primarily to the client’s, rather than his or her own, 
unconscious phantasies. This might be most difficult where violent projections 
(especially projective identifications) are occurring. If Bick is correct there 
might be problems arising from a state before the acquisition of the phantasy of 
internal space. A chent lacking the capacity to contain (and introject and project) 
would be to some extent isolated within, and unable to use, the therapeutic 
relationship, and, if the developmental processes sketched here are accurate, 
would find symbohc communication and flexible thinking extremely difficult. 
Bion coined the term -K  (minus K) for the patient’s destruction of their own 
capacity to think, arising when the relationship between the container and 
contained is disturbed -  for example, when the client has been unable to introject 
an object capable of conferring meaning.
It can be seen that the way internal and external objects are used to satisfy 
instincts and defend against anxiety becomes increasingly elaborate; but the 
abiUty to ‘move them around’ adaptively, upon which symbohsation (concrete 
and abstract) depends, is constrained in numerous ways. The therapeutic 
relationship is a ‘space’ that can, potentially, become populated by the internal 
objects and phantasies of the client such that his or her thinking states (primitive 
to adult) become manifest, and some of the least adaptive can be brought into 
consciousness and expressed/thought about differently.
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In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not dependent upon the 
therapeutic system of deliveiy but on the active components which directly 
challenge the client’s faulty appraisals. Discuss.
Of the three broad psychotherapeutic ‘paradigms’ (humanistic, psychodynamic 
and cognitive) the cognitive has typically placed a greater emphasis upon the 
technical aspects of the treatment and less upon the relationship between the 
therapist and client (Jacobsen, 1989; Mahoney, 1988; Mcleod, 1998; Safran,
1990). Within the psychodynamic tradition the relationship has been treated as 
central to the therapeutic endeavour -  both as a tool for understanding the 
analysand/patient through counter-transferential phenomena (for example, 
Heimann, 1950; Kahn, 1974; Kemberg, 1982) and as a therapeutic ‘ingredient’ 
itself in virtue of being reparative (for example, Kohut, 1984; Winnicott, 1958). 
Likewise, as diverse as the humanistic schools are, the relationship between the 
client and counsellor is typically taken to be the most powerfril aspect of the 
counselling encounter -  for example, Rogers’ core conditions, of empathy, 
unconditional positive regard and congruence, as therapeutic in, and of, 
themselves (Rogers, 1951).
In cognitive therapy the interest in the relationship has, until recently, been 
limited to concern with the establishment of a good working alliance in the 
service of which Rogers’ core conditions are often practised. Given that 
cognitive therapy aims to help cHents change using an educative method (Beck 
et al, 1979; Hollon & Garber, 1990), client co-operation is essential. The 
working relationship is, therefore, viewed or treated as a necessaiy precondition 
to effective therapy (Bums & Auerbach, 1996). This, however, is a very one­
sided and attenuated conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship when 
compared with the other approaches. The partitioning of approaches into the 
three ‘paradigms’ signals, amongst other important aspects of each, their 
disparate genealogical histories and affiliations. It is the positivist-empiricist 
background of cognitivism that has helped to maintain its resistance to working 
with the inter-subjective and phenomenological dimensions so readily embraced 
in other approaches. The over-arching dictât of cognitivism is that the theory.
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practitioner, and ultimately the chent, should be ‘scientific’ (see Jacobsen, 1989, 
p.87). And so, it has evolved as “more of a technology than a jframework for 
understanding life” (McLeod, 1998, p.81). Perhaps, though, this is something of 
a caricature of some forms of contemporary cognitive therapy, applying 
appropriately only to the historically earliest forms of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (for example. Beck, 1967, 1976, 1987) -  therapies inheriting fi-om 
behaviourism an ideal of scientific ‘neutrality’ and specificity. Clark, in his 
discussion of the limitations and strengths of cognitive theoiy and therapy 
(Clark, 1995), terms this founding form of the model ‘standard cognitive 
therapy’, and offers a definition (citing Rush et. al., 1977) that includes the 
following statement: ‘The therapist and patient collaborate to identify distorted 
cognitions, which are derived fi-om maladaptive behefs or assumptions. These 
cognitions and behefs are subjected to logical analysis and empirical hypothesis- 
testing which leads individuals to reahgn their thinking with reality’. Positivistic 
science is thus at the core of ‘standard cognitive therapy’, although its subject 
matter (cognitions) are far removed from the manipulable ‘observables’ of the 
traditional physical sciences upon which such empiricism is based.
The emergence of cognitivism, after the dominance of behaviourism in 
psychology, has been termed a ‘revolution’, in that mentation became a 
legitimate focus of study. Thinking processes and structures were theorised in 
addition to the reinforcement and extinction schedules of learning theoiy, 
although a rather mechanistic conceptualisation of ‘thinking’ remained. Within 
cognitive therapy the model of thoughts as causal antecedents to emotion and 
behaviour was until recently dogmatically adhered to, and even now the 
relationship between emotions, cognitions and behaviour is described in terms of 
reciprocal determination (i.e., in causal-mechanistic terms) (for example. Beck,
1991). With the so-called ‘second cognitive revolution’ -  influencing and being 
influenced by developments in other fields of inquiry, ranging from literature to 
anthropology to the physical sciences -  there has been a shift towards viewing 
individuals as actively constructing their reahties, and towards viewing ‘meaning 
making’ as the defining aspect of humanity. Cognitive therapy, in accordance 
with this shift, is often now termed ‘constructivist’, and places less emphasis 
upon the rationality and veracity (‘reahty orientation’) of a client’s beliefs and
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thoughts than upon their adaptiveness (for example, Guidano, 1988; Mahoney, 
1991, 1988, 1993; Neimeyer, 1993). There is now, therefore, a more pragmatic 
flavour to cognitive therapy -  appraising the chent’s cognitions in terms of 
whether they work for the chent, and theorising these cognitions in terms of their 
place within a cognitive structure with a developmental history. An important 
implication of this pragmatism is that the therapist no longer has the right to 
define reahty for the chent (is no longer the arbiter on what is true, real, accurate 
etc.), although it might be argued that the veiy act of educating a chent in a 
model explaining their difficulties/dysfimctions is to present a version of reahty 
as true/real. Moreover, ‘adaptiveness’ can step into the shoes of veracity, and the 
therapist can become the arbiter upon what is, or is not, ‘adaptive’. For example, 
Jacobsen suggests that the therapist can change the chent by selectively 
reinforcing fimctional interpersonal behaviours (Jacobsen, 1989, p.89). Absent 
fi-om this recommendation is any acknowledgement of the therapist’s partiality -  
again the assumption of scientific neutrality underpins the technique. 
Constructivism thus changes the emphasis of cognitive therapy, but it remains to 
the practitioner to be more or less radical with its imphcations.
One possibility, however, is to formulate a new role for the therapeutic 
relationship. Safi-an (1990), Safi-an and Segal (1990) and Mahoney (1988), 
amongst others, have suggested that rather than being an adjunct to the 
‘active’/technical components of therapy, the relationship can perform a central 
fimction in the change process. This conceptualisation of the relationship (as a 
vehicle of therapeutic change) is made available, they suggest, by a 
constructivist re-orientation of the theoiy of psychological fimctioning. When 
individuals are understood as meaning-makers rather than as better or worse 
‘mappers’ of reality, then cognitions become ‘relational’ (expressed by 
constructivist therapists as hierarchically organised structures and processes 
operating at tacit levels). In other words, sense-making involves the automatic 
relating of beliefs, thoughts, emotions etc. to each other. The senses/meanings 
that are made are evident in the interpersonal realm -  especially in stereotyped 
or repetitive patterns of relating. Moreover, being initially formed through 
interpersonal experiences, such meaning-making structures are also, they claim, 
susceptible to change through interpersonal experience.
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These constructivist possibilities have been capitalised upon by cognitive 
therapists attempting to resolve disjunctions between traditional cognitive- 
behavioural theories and chnical practice.
According to standard cognitive-behavioural therapy the client’s dysfunctional 
cognitions (faulty appraisals) should change, leading to symptom relief, once 
these cognitions are fully articulated and rationally challenged. This would 
depend, however, upon the estabhshment and maintenance of a good working 
alliance. In practice, however, clinicians are faced with complex people with 
their own agendas and idiosyncratic patterns of relating who, even if complying 
with the rather unusual demands of the chent-therapist relationship, might still 
fail to change despite having ‘succeeded’ in the assigned treatment program.
Treatment failure despite a good alliance has generated an elaboration of the 
cognitive model: the postulation of ‘deeper’ cognitive structures (as described 
above) that resist change despite change on the surface level of negative 
automatic thoughts. Nevertheless, cognitive therapy is still found wanting if it 
cannot account for failures at the outset -  i.e., failures to estabhsh the kinds of 
relationship needed to implement the techniques. Inter-subjective tensions, 
conflicts and resistances are often the locus of theoiy and practice in 
psychodynamic and humanistic work, but for the cognitive therapist have 
traditionally been an un-conceptualised obstacle -  a brick wall. This is a 
distressing state of affairs for the therapist, who is unable to be therapeutic in the 
sense deemed important by the cognitive technology, and so has been ripe for 
cognitive conceptualisation. Attempts have been made to fill the explanatory 
gap, and to counter criticisms that cognitive therapy is primarily technical, and is 
blind to inter-personal dynamics, through theoretical integrations with other 
therapeutic orientations or through the cognitive re-interpretation of their inter­
personal constructs. Debate has ensued, however, about the acceptability of 
conceptual appropriations from other models (see Clark, 1995). Transferential 
processes are a case in point. Rudd and Joiner (1997) review the evidence that 
the therapeutic relationship is of central importance, not only as a precondition 
of successful therapy but as an active component of the change process. They
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are, however, anxious to eradicate what they term psychodynamic ‘mysticism’, 
and so they attempt to transform ‘transference’ and ‘counter-transference’ into 
cognitive language. They coin the phrase ‘therapeutic behef system’ to function 
as a cognitive explanation for ostensibly inappropriate chent behaviour, their 
contention being that the client’s behaviour/behefs/assumptions etc. are healthy 
given the chent’s ‘world view’. This world view is a stable cognitive structure 
based upon past learning. Again, a constructivist shift enables the therapist to 
normalise the prima facie irrational or resistant behaviour of the chent and avoid 
pathologising reactions to such clients.
It seems to be no coincidence that it is the experience of profound relationship 
difficulties between therapist and chent that has brought the relationship to the 
centre of some of these newer forms of cognitive theory and therapy and that 
such newer forms (for example, schema focussed therapy, Young, 1994) are 
deemed to relate most to the practice of therapy with problematic chnical 
populations -  for example, suicidal chents (Rudd, Joiner & Rajab, 1995), 
personality disordered chents (Layden, Newman, Freemen & Morse, 1993; 
Linehan, 1993), or otherwise ‘resistant’ chents. The cognitive elaboration, 
invoking ‘deep’ structures (schema/core behefs) has been integrated by Safran 
with interpersonal therapy (originating in the work of Sullivan, 1953, 1954, 
1956), resulting in the postulation of ‘interpersonal schema’ as explanatory 
constructs for the chent’s interpersonal style. Thus, the relationship between 
therapist and chent finds a cognitive explanation and can be treated as a 
therapeutic tool.
Safran posits that his cognitive-interpersonal therapy provides a guide for the use 
of the therapeutic relationship, in that the active processes of the relationship are 
central to understanding the chent’s difficulties. He offers a developmental and 
biological/evolutionary justification of this thesis -  claiming that the need for 
interpersonal relatedness is ‘hardwired’ -  and claims that the individual learns 
interpersonal behaviours aimed at increasing the potential for relatedness with 
others. Interpersonal schema are formed that may become maladaptive (reduce 
interpersonal relatedness), but nevertheless are sensed by the individual as 
actuahy or potentiaUy increasing relatedness. The behaviours/ways of being
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stemming from interpersonal schema have, he suggests, characteristic effects 
upon others, and the therapist can gain insight into the quality of the chent’s 
interpersonal schema by attending to his/her own response-tendencies. 
Moreover, the therapeutic relationship can become a vehicle for change in itself 
by disconfirming the expectations of the chent (being reparative). This is a 
sophisticated melding of cognitive and psychodynamic/interpersonal 
approaches, but makes some potentially contentious assumptions about the 
interpersonal dimension and the individual’s ‘place’ in relationships.
The notion that we construct reahty is treated in the psychological version of 
constructivism as a statement about what we each, as individuals, do with data. 
We are, on this account, information-processing systems populated by cognitive 
structures such as schema that ‘filter’ or interpret the world. This cognitive 
model still applies to constructivism (as well as to ‘standard’ cognitive theoiy), 
even if there is no longer deemed to be a definitive/objective version of such 
data or information -  viz., even if there are multiple individually constructed 
reahties, none of which is more objectively accurate than the others. If the 
proposal that meaning-making is the basis of psychological hfe is taken 
seriously, however, it is fimdamentahy in tension with such cognitivism.
As social constructionists point out, meaning is not ‘attached’ to symbols in 
stable ways such that they can be internalised and processed, but is co­
constructed within interactions. It is a dynamic and emergent property of 
relationships, and the centrality of relationships attests to this. Relatedness is not 
a ‘goal’ of psychological hfe but part of its fabric. Whilst it might be the case 
that an individual strives for a sense of relatedness to others, to explain the 
manner of their doing so in terms of a private inner world (for example, of 
cognitive hierarchies and ordering processes) is, on the social constructionist 
account, mistaken and unnecessary. Such a conceptuahsation of human relating 
renders the indeterminate and creative aspects of interaction determinate and 
mechanistic -  it is a reductive approach despite its exploratory method. The 
structures, patterns and conceptual resources utilised to account for the 
individual’s feehngs, behaviours and thoughts are more adequately characterised 
as interpersonal, both on micro-interactional and macro-social/cultural levels -
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constraints on the self arising from the positioning possibihties of the current 
interaction (see Harré & Langenhove, 1999), an interaction which is embedded 
within wider cultural understandings, narratives and expectations (see Foucault, 
1972).
One of the important insights of Safran’s model is that people ‘act into’ a 
context. He divides construal (cognition) from construction (action) -  proposing 
that they mutually determine each other in a cognitive-interpersonal cycle. In 
other words, the way the client understands their relationship to another 
determines how they behave towards the other, which determines (through the 
responses th g  elicit) how they understand/interpret the relationship. The chent’s 
style of communicating, as understood through the therapist’s responses to the 
client, thus becomes an important focus for intervention. He proposes that the 
most psychologically maladjusted individuals posses rigid and constricting 
interpretative schemas -  a conclusion arrived at inductively from the observation 
that they tend to behave/communicate in rigid/restricted ways (Keisler, 1986). In 
practice (though not in theory) this approaches a constructionist position, in 
which ‘dysfrmction’ is conceptuahsed purely interpersonally, and therapy 
becomes a process of exploration and expansion of the communicative 
possibilities available to the individual-in-relationship (with self and other) (for 
example, Gergen & Kaye 1992). However, the social constructionist argues that 
how a person behaves/acts into a context is part of the definition of how they 
understand it -  in the sense that understanding emerges in action/interaction and 
is not separable from the interaction in the form of some kind of analogue system 
lying behind it (for example, of internal schema and information processing 
rules).
The relationship is, then, as Safinn claims, inseparable from the technical aspects 
of therapy, but in a more profound sense than his constructivism would allow. 
The relationship/interaction is the locus for creativity and the development of 
new meaning (perhaps using cognitive techniques in the process) and, more 
importantly, new ways of making meaning -  more reflective and reflexive and, 
as such, less rigid and limiting. The therapeutic process, in contradistinction to 
the content, has long been held to be a crucial indicator of the fimctioning of not
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only the client and therapist but also the relationship between them, and has been 
used as a marker for therapeutic change. Process dimensions are often 
conceptualised in terms of the quahty of the relationship, for example, in terms 
of degrees of openness or defensiveness. Importantly, it is the quality of the 
individual-in-relationship, not only with other (for example, the therapist) but 
also with the self that signals a sustained therapeutic shift. The argument made 
here is that it would be a mistake to reify these aspects of the therapeutic 
encounter in terms of self-schema (mental content) and processing rules. Instead, 
it is possible to conceptuahse these changes in terms of relational activities and 
abihties, emerging throu^ interaction and being irreducible to separate mental 
‘components’. This locates the psychological realm in interpersonal processes -  
semiotic (meaning-making) processes being interactionally generated and 
maintained. The cognitive model of the person is one that, I would argue, is 
ultimately quite limiting despite attempts to render it sensitive to the nuances and 
complexities of actual relationships.
References
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: causes and treatment. Philadelphia: University 
of Peimsylvania Press.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy o f the emotional disorders. New York: 
New American Library.
Beck, A. T. (1987). Cognitive models of depression. Journal o f Cognitive 
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 1,2-27.
Beck, A. T. (1991). Cognitive therapy as the integrative therapy. Journal o f 
Psychotherapy Integration, 1,191-98.
Bums, D. D., & Auerbach, A., (1996). Therapeutic empathy in cognitive 
behavioural therapy: does it really make a difference?. In P. M. Salkovskis 
(Ed.), Frontiers o f cognitive therapy. New York: Guilford Press.
Clark, D. A. (1995). Perceived limitations of standard cognitive therapy: a 
consideration of efforts to revise Beck’s theoiy and therapy. Journal o f 
Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 9,153-172.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archeology o f knowledge. London: tavistock.
31
Gergen, K. J. & Kaye, J. (1992). Beyond narrative in the negotiation of 
therapeutic meaning. In S. McNamee & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), Therapy as 
social construction. London: Sage.
Guidano, V. F. (1988). A systems, process-orientated approach to cognitive 
therapy. In K. S. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook o f cognitive behavioural 
therapies. New York: Guildford Press.
Harré, R. & Van Langenhove, L. (1999). Introducing positioning theory. In R. 
Harré, & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), Positioning theory. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Heimann, P. (1950). On countertransference. International Journal o f 
Psychoanalysis, 31,81-84.
Hollon, S. D. & Garber, J. (1990). Cognitive therapy for depression: a social 
cognitive perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 68- 
73.
Jacobsen, N. S. (1989). The therapist-client relationship in cognitive behaviour 
therapy: imphcations for treating depression. Journal o f Cognitive 
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 3,2, 85-96.
Kahn, M. M. R. (1974). The privacy o f the self: papers on psychoanalytic theory 
and technique. London: Hogarth.
Keisler, D. J. (1986). Interpersonal methods of diagnosis and treatment. In J. O. 
Cavenar (Ed.), Psychiatry. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
Kemberg, O. F. (1982). Self, ego, affects and drives. Journal o f the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 30, 893-917.
Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? (A. Goldberg and P. E. Stepansky 
(Eds.)) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Layden, M. A, Newman, C. F., Freeman, A., & Morse, S. B. (1993). Cognitive 
therapy o f borderline personality disorder. Needam Heights: Allyn & 
Bacon.
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive behavioural treatment o f borderline 
personality disorder. New York: Guilford Press.
Mahoney, M. J. (1988). The cognitive sciences and psychotherapy: pattems in a 
developing relationship. In K. S. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook o f cognitive 
behavioural therapies. New York: Guildford Press.
Mahoney, M. J. (1991). Human change processes. New York: Basic Books.
32
Mahoney, M. J. (1993). Introduction to special section: Theoretical 
developments in the cognitive psychotherapies. Journal o f Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 2,187-193.
Neimeyer, R. A. (1993). An appraisal of constructivist psychotherapies. Journal 
o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2, 221-234.
Mcleod, J. (1998). An introduction to counselling. Buckingham: Open 
University Press.
Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client centred therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rudd, M. D., Joiner, T. E., (1997). Countertransference and the therapeutic 
relationship: a cognitive perspective. Journal o f Cognitive Psychotherapy: 
An International Quarterly, 11, 4,231- 250.
Rudd, M. D., Joiner, T. E., & Rajab, M. H. (1995). Help negation after acute 
suicidal crisis. Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 63, 499- 
503.
Safran, J. D. (1990). Towards a refinement of cognitive therapy in the light of 
interpersonal theory: II. Practice. Clinical Psychology Review, 10, 107- 
121 .
Safran, J. D., & Segal, Z. V. (1990). Interpersonal processes in cognitive 
therapy. New York: Basic Books.
SuUivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory o f psychiatry. New York: 
Norton.
Sullivan, H. S. (1954). The Psychiatric interview. New York: Norton.
Sullivan, H. S. (1956). Clinical studies in psychiatry. New York: Norton.
Winnicott, D. W. (1958). Collected papers. New York: Basic Books.
Young, J. E. (1994). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: a schema- 
focussed approach. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press.
33
How can social constructionism assist efforts to work integratively ?
The question of whether (and which) psychological models can be integrated is 
one of central concern to many counselling psychologists in their attempts to 
draw meaningfiilly upon the wealth of psychological understandings available 
to them, and in their attempts to develop professional identities. The way that 
this question is understood, however, yields veiy different ‘answers’. Attempts 
to translate models -  mapping them onto one another -  are common, however, it 
is becoming apparent that this is a generative exercise, yielding new 
understandings, so moves ever further from the goal of simplification implicit in 
a concept of integration. It is an approach that also tends to treat this task 
uncritically, as though psychological models must be collapsible into one 
another because they all ultimately describe or explain the same ‘thing(s)’. The 
suggestion that will be made in this paper is that simplification is possible, but 
not by collapsing systems of psychological understandings into one another. 
Using social constructionism as a basis for understanding the epistemological 
‘status’ of available models allows for the retention of multiple diverse models 
(plurality of theory and practice), but provides a ‘stance’ from which to practice 
-  a stance that is fundamentally at odds with reductionism. It is this stance to 
practice (and theory) that will be elaborated in this paper and formulated as a 
kind of integration.
Through rejecting realist conceptions of meaning that propose ‘inner’ mental 
representations, analogues, symbols or replicas of ‘outer’ realities, and through 
proposing that meaning are knowledge are fundamentally relational, social 
constructionism shifts the ‘psychological’ into the social realm. Instead of 
viewing the individual as the source of all that is psychologically interesting and 
important, the relationship is viewed as the ‘locus’ of the psychological (see 
Gergen, 1999; Harré, 1987; Shotter, 1993). This is because, according to social 
constructionists, and contrary to the correspondence theories of reahsm, 
meaning-making is achieved through co-ordinated pattems of interaction, these 
being conventional/consensual and normative rather than objectively grounded. 
The implications for psychology are profound, in that psychological concepts 
(for example: anger, fear, jealousy, self-esteem, memoiy etc. etc.) cannot be
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treated as having enduring realities and essences, but must be seen as 
constructions occurring for social purposes. Thus, Tanguaging’ becomes a 
critical focus -  as the arena in which we constitute our realities, including our 
‘selves’. By ‘languaging’ is meant all meaning-making (semiotic) practices, 
verbal and non-verbal (Maturana & Varela, 1987), though it is through the 
achievement of verbal interaction that we are able to accomplish the profoundly 
human phenomenon of reflexive awareness. Our self-consciousness is, 
according to social constructionism, a discursive ability -  affordhig us the 
possibility of positioning ourselves in complex ways, and, through multiple 
positionings, of attaining complex, multiple subjectivities (see Lewis, 2002).
The concept of positioning (see Althusser, 1971; Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré 
& van Langenhove, 1999) is an important one for conceptuahsing 
psychotherapeutic practice (WiUig, 1999). In using a particular intervention (or 
a particular model to generate/inform his/her interventions) the social 
constructionist therapist would be asking how this positions the client in relation 
to others (including the therapist) and him/her-self, and what that position 
potentiates and constrains. This is an abstract/de-contextuahsed question as it is 
posed here, and in practice the only way that ‘interventions’ (or simply, 
conversational ‘moves’) can mean anything at all is in relationship with the 
client. This therapeutic relationship is often described by social constructionists 
in terms of its potential -  for example, as a “space where ‘problems’ may be 
differently constructed” (McNamee & Gergen, 1992, p.6), and the 
formulations/hypotheses of the therapist have been characterised as an attempt 
to “create a resonance” with the other as a basis for beginning and maintaining a 
conversation (Cecchin, 1992, p.90). Empathy, or “imaginative attunement” 
(Maturana & Varela, 1987) is then, of fundamental importance -  co-ordinating 
the therapist and client so that their relationship can produce effects. So, in 
common with most therapeutic models, an empathie relationship is singled out 
as a necessary condition for a therapeutic interaction. Where disagreement 
between social constructionist therapists seems to be most evident is in the 
degree of commitment to ‘intervention’. Some emphasise the transformative 
potential of the conversation per se (for example, the Milan school of systemic 
therapy), but some have come to consider that this description of (prescription
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for) therapy tries to evade the issues of therapist accountabihty (for example, 
Cecchin, 1992) -  attempting to present the therapist as politically, morally and 
culturally neutral. This implication is unfortunate, since it is the uncritical, un­
reflexive use of psychological models and theoiy that social constructionism is 
in a good position to challenge. As Cecchin states, in therapeutic practice the 
therapists must “dare to use their resources to intervene” (Cecchin, 1992, p.93), 
and must take responsibihty for those uses. This acknowledges the situatedness 
of the therapist, and fore-grounds rather than evades issues of personal 
accountabihty. Psychological models, then, for the social constructionist, can be 
sources of sense-making -  potentially fiielling the dialogical conversation and 
helping the chents explore “aspects of the verbal terrain available to them” 
(Efran & Clarfield, 1992, p.213). The theory-derived hypotheses are, however, 
‘ironicised’ -  presented as ways of making sense rather than as reahties -  and 
their contextual limitations are attended to. Through this reflexive use of 
conversation, the therapist and chent are in a position to become aware of what 
their ‘doings are doing’ (see Shotter, 1993). This reflexivity operates on macro 
and micro levels -  in terms of ‘interpretative repertoires’ (for example, 
Wetherell, 1998) such as those constituting psychological hypotheses, and in 
terms of micro-interactional pattems and practices occurring in the therapeutic 
relationship (the moment-to-moment generation of meaning as it is experienced, 
both verbally and non-verbally). Reflexive awareness not only provides 
therapeutic potential in terms of the content of the discourse (that the therapist 
and chent can become aware of how they are constmcting the chent, the 
therapist, the world, the problem etc., and how those constmctions position 
them), but can also bring about stmctural changes. By ‘stmcturaT I do not mean 
that inner psychic structures are altered. Rather, that by the process of 
reflexively attending to his/her relational being, the chent can develop the 
ability to move between positions and generate transformative dialogues (see 
Gergen, 1999). This distinction, between the transformation of meanings and 
the transformation of meaning-making (between ‘products’ and ‘process’ 
(Gergen & Kaye, 1992, p. 178)), is one that pushes social constmctionism 
beyond narrative therapy (the discursive transformation of problematic stories 
and identities) towards a concern with the chent’s “capacity for relatedness” 
(ibid). This is a concern with the generation of meaning, and how the chent
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constructs ‘meaning-making’. In other words, semiotic practices are 
‘topicalised’ in the service of generating multiply reflexive dialogues that 
change the client’s understanding of meaning. The ‘circular questioning’ 
devised in systemic therapies is a good example of how therapists can use talk- 
about-talk to distance chents fi*om their narratives and help them to appreciate 
how ‘local’ and relational their accounts are (see Lax, 1992). It then becomes 
hard for the chent to maintain a claim for the objectivity or transcendent truth of 
their narratives, and precludes a naïve replacement of ‘bad’ narratives for 
‘better/good’ narratives. Instead, the chent comes to appreciate that the 
narratives that they use, and are used by, are only locahy ‘true’ and are open to 
chahenge by other, equally contingent, narratives. This reflexive distancing is a 
potential of ah psychotherapeutic practices that include versions of talk-about- 
talk. Self-reflection is such a version, the chent becoming an object to him/her- 
self in the process of self-description.
The contingency of ‘truth’ for social constructionists has struck many 
commentators as implying that anything goes (for example, Kenwood, 1999); 
all narratives or accounts being equally justiflable/unjustiflable. Since the 
charge of relativism is regularly treated as an argument that defeats social 
constructionism it is important to address it here. Relativism is no threat unless 
we want to adopt a naïve foundationahsm, and claim that there are immutable, 
objectively grounded truths in our systems of knowledge. The premise of social 
constructionism is that there can never be a non-signifled signifier: that we 
cannot perform justifications (of our truth claims, for example) that are removed 
fi*om justiflcatory practices. These practices are normative -  they are produced 
in our co-ordinated meaning-making activities, and these activities change and 
transform. Meaning is not eternally flxed. This is hardly a cause for us to panic, 
since there are systems of meaning (co-ordinated meaning-making activities) 
that we share and that enable us to ‘go on together’ (Wittgenstein’s ‘language 
games’, and the ‘forms of hfe’ in which they are embedded -  see Wittgenstein 
1958). This social account of meaning captures how it is that we are agentic 
(able to choose) within limits (within the boundaries of our sense-making).
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Returning now to the issue of integration, it can be appreciated that the 
relationship becomes the fulcrum of the therapy, and that the use of varied 
psychological understandings (models) can only be made in the service of 
conceptualising how the client is going about constructing him/her self, the 
problem etc., and perhaps as providing different distinctions that offer 
alternative constructions. The therapist is not in a position to justify the use of a 
model other than as a response to what emerges in the therapeutic relationship, 
and certainly cannot justify using a ‘diagnosis’ as an objective validation for a 
treatment plan. This is not, however, to down-play the value of psychological 
models in providing ways to ‘move’ in the therapeutic conversation, and ways 
of introducing differences and distinctions that resolve conflicts and distress. In 
a sense, then, the pluralism inherent in a social constructionist approach does 
not entail that there are no principled reasons for choosing or rejecting particular 
models. These choices, however, are always made in particular contexts, with 
particular clients, with reference to what those choices achieve -  that is, the 
choices are justified pragmatically and ethically.
The ethical dimension of choice-making is very clear for social contructionists. 
Without objectivity/truth to ground our practices, we must become personally 
accountable for what we do. We can be so through striving to understand what 
our doings are doing -  recognising that we are always acting firom and into a 
context. The fact-value distinction has been used to elevate objectivity and to 
brand emotional and sensual experience as idiosyncratic and unfit bases for 
knowledge claims. Yet these experiences are social -  they are how we know 
ourselves and each other through generating the co-ordinated action that makes 
meaning possible (Maturana & Varela, 1987). What we value drives our 
‘knowledges’. This potentially problematises all ‘positions’ and means that the 
therapist can never achieve ‘neutrality’ in relation to her/his chents. What the 
therapist can bring to the encounter is openness to new meanings and a capacity 
to dialogue, using her/him-self as a therapeutic tool in the relationship.
Although most social constructionist therapy is practised in groups (associated 
especially with systemic work) the same principles can be apphed (or stance to 
meaning can be taken) in individual work. Through highlighting relational
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being, social constructionism accords with the central concerns of Humanism, 
Interpersonal and Object-relational forms of psychodynamic models. It is, 
however, in tension with the aspects of individualism, essentialism and 
objectivism to be found in these therapies. What social constructionism helps us 
to do is corroborate the relational and dialogic aspects of these models, whilst 
avoiding re-formulating the relational in individualistic/atomisic terms. Here I 
have attempted to show how a relational stance to therapy can provide a 
principled therapeutic ‘orientation’ that is able to draw upon a diverse body of 
psychological models, but retains commitment to none. As Cecchin puts it, “the 
relational context [provides] the therapeutic constraints and possibilities [and] 
these cannot be pre-determined by virtue of a model’s vahdity or theoretical 
superiority” (Cecchin, 1992, p.93).
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First-year Clinical Placement: An NHS Psychology 
Department
September 1999 -  August 2000
My first year placement was within a psychological treatment service in an NHS 
hospital in the South East of England, taking referrals fi-om G.P. practices, the 
Community Mental Health Team and the psychiatric services of the Trust. I also 
saw clients in a Primary Care capacity in a local GP surgery.
The team was managed by a consultant clinical psychologist and included 
clinical and counselling psychologists (both full and part time), trainee clinical 
and counselling psychologists, and psychology assistants. This team comprised 
both a learning disability service and adult mental health department, some 
working in multi-disciplinary teams and others providing therapeutic services 
directly from the waiting list. Of the psychotherapeutic practitioners, some 
worked according to cognitive behavioural models, one worked 
psychodynamically, one was Rogerian (humanistic), and one integrative 
constructivist (personal construct theory). The chent group for psychological 
therapies generally had difficulties of low to moderate severity, all therapeutic 
work was individual, and referrals to the CMHT and psychiatric services were 
made if these became necessary.
My responsibilities were to conduct individual therapy sessions with selected 
clients from the waiting hst, see selected chents in the G.P. surgery and 
attending weekly business and case discussion meetings, and utihse weekly 
individual supervision (generic/eclectic, but particularly influenced by 
psychodynamic and personal construct models).
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Second-year clinical placement: A University 
Student Counselling Service
September 2000 -  July 2001
This placement was within a University Student Counselling Service in the 
South East of England. The service catered for students and employees of the 
university, and provided a service throughout the calendar year. There were five 
counsellors and two trainees, variously working psychodynamically and 
cognitive-behaviourally, one of whom was an ‘international student advisor’. 
The counsellors worked alongside student study advisors (psychologists 
specialising in learning/study problems).
Clients were booked in directly with counsellors unless they approached the 
service urgently, in which case they were seen by the duty counsellor and 
referred as necessary. The service worked in close association with the 
university medical practice, taking emergency referrals fi-om the G.P. s. Links 
with the staff body (especially personal tutors) were regularly made to ensure 
that they were aware of the nature of the service offered to students.
Most therapeutic work was individual, though occasionally therapeutic groups 
were run for specific problems (for example, anxiety management). My 
responsibilities were to see selected clients for psychodynamically-infbrmed 
counselling, attend weekly business meetings and utihse weekly supervision 
(psychodynamic, with particular emphasis upon Kleinian theoiy).
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Third-year clinical placements:
An NHS Psychological Treatments Service, 
a Community Mental Health Team 
and an NHS intensive group therapy programme
September 2001 -August 2002
My third-year placement comprised three different contexts serving an inner 
city NHS trust in the South of England: (1) a community mental health team 
(CMHT), (2) a co-ordinated psychological treatments service, and (3) an 
intensive psychological treatment service.
(1)1 worked one day per week for three months in this placement conducting 
general mental health assessments and providing short-term cognitive- 
behavioural therapy. After each assessment it was my responsibility to write a 
report to the referrer (G.P. and/or psychiatrist) and present the individual’s 
case to the weekly interdisciplinary meeting in order for service provision 
decisions to be made. This team consisted of one other psychologist, approved 
social workers, community psychiatric nurses, occupational therapists, 
registrars and a consultant psychiatrist.
(2) I worked throughout the placement delivering individual cognitive- 
behavioural/integrative therapy to chents selected fi’om the waiting list. The 
severity and extent of their difficulties was mild to moderate, and their 
therapies were not time-limited. I also co-facilitated an anxiety management 
group from a cognitive-behavioural orientation. My responsibilities were to 
provide the therapies described, to routinely correspond with referrers at the 
beginning and end of treatment, attend weekly business and case discussion
45
meetings, present topics for discussion in meetings and utilise weekly 
integrative/cognitive-behavioural supervision. The staff team consisted of 
psychologists and psychotherapists, trainee counselling and clinical 
psychologists and psychology assistants, and therapists worked from 
cognitive-behavioural, cognitive-analytic and psychodynamic orientations.
(3) During the last half of the placement I worked for one day per week as a 
therapist in program run on therapeutic community principles. The staff team 
comprised therapists from psychiatric nursing, social work and counselling 
psychology backgrounds, and many had undergone further psychotherapeutic 
trainings. The community was also served by a psychiatrist who looked after 
the medication requirements of the clients. All therapeutic work was 
conducted in groups, and the clients all had moderate to severe difficulties, 
most with long in-patient histories. My responsibilities were to co-facilitate the 
therapy groups, participate in pre-group planning and post-group de-briefing 
and utilise weekly group supervision -  all with the rest of the team. The 
supervision was cognitive-analytically focussed.
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Final clinical paper
Since beginning to train as a counselling psychologist my approach to theory, 
research and practice has shifted away from psychological essentiahsm and 
towards a conceptuahsation of the self (thus, the psychological) as socially 
constructed (see Lewis 2002). This shift was potentiated by my personal 
struggles with issues of the self. These struggles have been multiple and 
overlapping, but have often involved ‘boundary issues’. In interpersonal 
relationships the boundaries between myself and the other person have been 
sometimes painfully, and sometimes pleasurably, unclear -  and much of my 
early personal therapy involved exploring issues of merger and isolation. It 
seems that issues of ‘separateness’ and ‘contextuality’ are often central to the 
assumptions and functions of psychotherapy and counselling, and that achieving 
a dynamic balance between them in practice is sometimes very difficult. For 
example, it can be hard to decide to what extent it is appropriate to ‘locate’ a 
problem with/in the client or within the client’s past or present context.
My attempts during training to theoretically accommodate, and practice 
according to, a diverse range of therapeutic models -  each with different 
assumptions about the nature and extent of the individual’s ‘embededdness’ in 
the social/interpersonal -  led me to feel fragmented and ‘dislocated’, and to feel 
ever more distant from ways of deciding such issues. This fragmentation felt 
particularly problematic through hindering my attempts to integrate theories 
with each other, and with research -  an exercise that seemed necessary in order 
to work in a principled and coherent way with my chents -  and through 
hindering my attempts to sustain a feeling for (sense of) the value or not of the 
interventions I made.
Early in my training I began using social constructionist methods to research 
psychological topics, and the power of this approach to alter my 
conceptualisation of these disabling problems gradually became evident to me 
as I considered the apphcation of these research methods to therapy/counselling. 
Most obviously social constructionism involves a reflexive distancing from
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clinical theory, research and practice -  especially in problematising (Foucault, 
1984) their taken-for-granted aspects (for example, the use of diagnoses as 
indicators of psychological realities, or the use of theories as transparent 
explanations of psychological phenomena). This has afforded me the 
opportunity to emphasise practice as the Tocus’ for theory and research, and 
thus achieve a practical ‘coherence’ amongst theoretical multiplicity/diversity. 
This is so because social constructionism sees meaning as generated in 
particular interactions occurring within particular socio-cultural and historical 
contexts. As a therapist this means that I strive to acknowledge that each 
particular therapeutic occasion generated between a client and myself is a joint 
negotiation of meaning -  that the relationship is the site of meaning, and the 
meaning-making resources that might be brought to bear (for example, 
theoretical constructs) are rendered valid or not in terms of how they ‘position’ 
the chent (for accounts of Positioning theory see Davies and Harré, 1990; Harré 
and Van Langenhove, 1999).
The important features of a ‘position’ are that it includes a cluster of rights, 
obligations and duties, but is also momentary (rather than a sedimented feature 
of the person). In other words, positions are fundamentally social/interpersonal 
yet define who we can be at any given moment. In trying to understand an 
interaction, and the qualities displayed by the parties to that interaction, the 
focus thus becomes upon interpersonal dynamics and shared semiotic resources. 
With the inclusion of a social concept of the intra-personal (intra-psychic), for 
example, as ‘dialogical’ (see for example, Hermans, 1996; Hermans and 
Kempen, 1993) then the psychological distress that often feels inescapable and 
fundamentally ‘irmer’ to the sufferer can be ‘externalised’, ‘sharable’ and 
‘solvable’ as features of social being.
This is an orientation, then, that recognises the social generation of 
psychological distress (of ‘pathology’ in clinical parlance), deeming an 
understanding of the context of the person to be fundamental to an adequate 
understanding of the person. This raises issues about my positioning as a 
therapist, and the contexts that are created and invoked in the therapeutic 
encounter. The languages and rituals of the therapeutic orientations through
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which I gain my professional identity, the settings in which I work, my socio­
cultural affinities and my personal history and preferences all powerfiiUy 
influence and constrain the kinds of interactions that I can have with my clients 
-  thus constraining the sense that the client and I can make together of his or her 
experiences. The risk is that under the guise of professional and personal 
neutrality I force positions upon my chents and deprive them of alternatives.
My view of this issue is that it is inescapable. That is, efforts to become neutral 
are fiitile and deceptive, and I can better serve my clients by greater sensitivity 
to, and exphcit validation of, difference. I have been particularly influenced by 
those systemic therapists who have shifted from a commitment to ‘neutrality’ 
towards a recognition that there can never be impartiality (for example, 
Cecchiu, 1992). They follow this through by recommending that the therapist 
takes responsibility for his/her opinions and practices and strives to understand 
his/her stance as embedded in a wider context. Efi’an and Clarfield (1992) 
construct 3 premises in terms of which the therapist can ‘locate’ his/her attempts 
to influence the client:
(1) everyone is entitled to personal preferences
(2) people are entitled to express those preferences
(3) such choices should not be ‘disguised’ as objective truths or reahties.
They claim that “to act as if all views are equal and that we -  as therapists -  
have no favourites among them undercuts the very sort of frank exchange we 
want to have with our chents” (ibid, p.201).
I find this a particularly persuasive statement through its ‘resonances’ with my 
own experiences as a chent in a psychotherapy group. An important 
development for me was in moving away from a position of trying to ‘not mean 
anything’ (of trying to be interpersonally/socially neutral) and towards an 
understanding of myself as ‘contextual’, with all the responsibilities of 
participation. An important ‘touch-stone’ for me in deciding how to conduct 
myself became the question of whether I felt prepared to take the consequences 
of an action. In the group setting it became possible for me to cease avoiding the 
reality that I do, and wiU, sometimes madvertently hurt, anger or offend other 
people, and to accept responsibihty for doing so. It seems to me that this
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sensibility is an important one for me as a therapist, since it heightens my 
awareness that ‘good intentions’ are not always sufficient to prevent oppression 
of the chent, and enables me to be alert to such a possibility and ready to 
acknowledge and rectify my errors. It is, however, in the particular interaction 
that attempts to acknowledge difference and ‘own’ partiality are made 
meaningfiil, rendering ‘formulaic’ solutions to this issue unworkable.
When faced with a chent voicing/communicating a problem and requesting 
therapy I find myself in the position of being asked to help but being unclear as 
to whether I and the chent can negotiate and agree upon what counts as help. 
This part of the contracting element of the therapy can take place more or less 
exphcitly, but is often an issue at the start. It is a dehcate position for both of us, 
and is a stage in the relationship in which both me and my chent risk defining 
ourselves in ways which constrain where the therapeutic conversation can 
move. To some extent this is inevitable, since dialogue demands that the 
interactants are positioned, but my goal at this stage is to maintain, generate or 
sustain possibihty. This is often set against a push from the chent towards 
closure, especially the wish for a diagnosis and prognosis -  requests that can be 
seen as products of the referral and assessment procedures which often position 
therapeutic services as medical and chents as ‘sick’.
It is very important, therefore, as it is throughout the therapeutic process, for me 
to listen for how I am heard (to be aware, in the words of Shotter, of what my 
“doings are doing” (1993)). As McNamee states, the focus of social 
constructionist therapy is upon “what chents and therapists do together rather 
than upon any essential aspects of problems or people” (McNamee, 1992, 
p. 198). It is understanding rather than explanation -  that is, an examination of 
the conversationahinteractive patterns in which problems emerge, rather than 
the uncovering of root causes -  that offers the chent the greatest possibihty of 
psychological change (see for example, McNamee, 1992; Lax, 1992).
Although I sometimes use cognitive methods this is the one therapeutic 
approach that I avoid using early on, or in a ‘pure’ form, because of its 
commitment to psycho-education (setting out the parameters of the ‘problem’
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and the therapy in the first few sessions). I feel that close attention to the 
relationship dynamics is more usefiil in creating an atmosphere in which 
curiosity is generated and meaningful interpersonal connection is made. In other 
words, focussing upon the interpersonal -  where ‘meaning’ means something -  
is the beginning of a therapeutic encounter. Psychodynamic and humanistic 
approaches to ‘being with’ the client are thus often congruent with my ‘stance’ 
to theoiy and practice in a way in which cognitive therapy is not.
Attentive, empathie listening and responding (Rogers, 1951) is the basis for any 
productive relationship, and most of my work is dedicated to achieving empathy 
(understanding my chent through his/her own frames of reference). Without a 
high level of empathy it is not possible to work alongside the client. It is only 
through achieving a position similar to the client’s that I can help to make sense 
of the client’s feelings and conduct, and generate new (and empowering) 
connections and distinctions with him/her. Empathy is, however, not only 
instrumental, it is the fabric of human self-hood. We exist as humans 
relationally/socially, through our co-ordinated actions (Maturana, 1988). These 
co-ordinated actions are languages (verbal and non-verbal) -  they are the sites 
of meaning through which we experience ourselves, our responsive interactions 
involving the whole of the “lived body” (Gendlin, 1997). Empathy, or 
attunement to the other, supports the self-hood of the other -  validating him/her 
as having a position (a meaning). Without such validation the chent can have no 
power in the therapeutic relationship and has no basis for achieving change.
The absence of empathie attunement, in which the client was unable to achieve 
a meaningful connection with others, was particularly evident to me in a group 
therapy session that I co-facilitated. The chent was communicating her distress 
through the content of her verbalisations -  making remarks about death, 
destruction and oveipowering forces -  but was speaking in an incoherent way 
such that the group was unable to grasp any sense in what she was saying. In the 
group’s jftustrated/restless silence she became increasingly distressed and her 
speech became even less coherent. I, and probably the others, felt frightened and 
paralysed through an inability to make her speech ‘mean’ something that could 
be reflected upon, shared and reacted to appropriately. It was only through
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attending to these disturbing feelings in myself, and the positions they created 
for me, that I became able to respond to her. I first attempted to engage her, 
gently interrupting her to say that I felt she was quite distant and disconnected 
fi*om the group, and that it was hard to make any eye contact with her. This 
seemed to break her monologue and she commented that she knew it must be 
difficult for people to follow what she was saying. I then tried to link some of 
the very frightening themes she had touched upon with the preceding 
‘fragmentaiy’ group process. This appeared to significantly reduce her distress, 
and the group became able to conceptualise her behaviour as a relevant feature 
of the context. It also freed other group members to participate. It seemed that 
she was able to become ‘meaningful’ again by attending to her position in the 
group and connecting this with her distress.
I became veiy aware in that session how fiightening it can be when 
interpersonal co-ordination breaks down and the importance of generating some 
possibility of conversation. Harré proposes that ‘conversation’ ought to serve as 
a model for all types of meaningfiil interaction, verbal or non-verbal (Harré, 
2001), and there is much psychotherapeutic research that now privileges 
‘conversation’ through the concept of the self as ‘dialogical’ or ‘multi-voiced’ 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Billig, 1997; Stiles, 1997). The concept of 
positioning forms a basis for understanding how conversations 
(interactions/dialogues) become structured according to the moral constraints 
that are locally operative. This raises the issue of my role as a therapist and what 
kinds of ‘conversation’ I bring to the interaction.
As previously stated, the languages of psychodynamic, cognitivist and 
humanistic therapies all infuse and inform my practice -  they are the languages 
through which I have been encultured as a therapist, moreover, they are the 
languages through which my chent has been encultured (drawing variously 
upon constructions of the person/self that predominate in contemporary western 
society). All offer rich and varied perspectives upon the client, the ‘problem’, 
the therapeutic relationship and the broader context. My view upon the formal 
use of these bodies of work/practices has, however, shifted in accordance with 
concerns voiced by various social-constructionist orientated practitioners -
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predominantly systemic and narrative therapists (see Sarbin, 1986 and Bruner, 
1986 & 1991 for the development of the narrative approach). The concern in 
many systemic approaches is to avoid imposing a set of constructs upon the 
client, but to help chents observe their meaning-making practices and thereby 
facilitate a reflexive distancing between the chent and his/her problematic 
constructions.
Narrative therapy can be used similarly -  as a tool for the transformation of 
meaning-making through reflexive awareness (see Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Lax, 
1992) -  or can be used more traditionally to facihtate the transformation of a 
problematic narrative into one allowing alternative positionings for the chent 
(indeed, it has been argued that in ah therapeutic models “the task...is to assist 
chents in revising their old stories and in constructing new ones that have more 
relevance and meaning for their current and future lives” (Rosen, 1996, p.24)).
My attempts to adopt this constructionist stance to narratives can be iUustrated 
in my work with a woman who felt guilty about the suicide of a family member 
a number of years earlier (see the appendix. Case A). She constructed many 
competing narratives -  placing more or less emphasis upon the role of herself, 
her family, biological factors and cultural expectations -  in an attempt to find a 
final explanation for this relative’s death. This attempt (to find certainty and 
avoid ambiguity) was played out in her relationship with me to some extent as 
she attempted to find out whether I thought she was doing the right thing in 
talking about the suicide. In her search for certainty it seemed she was caught in 
a conflict between deterministic and non-deterministic ‘world-views’- the 
outcome of this conflict having profound implications for her understanding of 
her mothers acts and, crucially, for how she could make sense of her own life. 
After many sessions in which she grappled with competing constructions I 
attempted to introduce the possibility that there was no final/right answer. I did 
this in order to assist her to escape from the traps inherent in each of these 
‘world views’. A significant feature of our sessions together was her tendency to 
be analytical and to avoid emotional expressiveness, and the pause in her 
narrative projects created by this challenge (this new possibility) appeared to 
help her to re-orient herself. As she began to explore how it felt to speculate that
53
“nobody was to blame” (her interpretation of my intervention) she became more 
attuned to herself in the present -  making sense of her positionings in more of 
their experiential richness. She was then able to respond to the highly 
conflictual positions in which she felt placed by the family member who had 
died, the other members of her family, and society. The agitation, puzzlement 
and fear that she initially felt had, after 20 sessions, been superseded first by 
predominantly anger and then by sadness, and she felt, she reported, much 
“calmer”. She began to incorporate the Tost’ person into her life, contacting 
family members with whom she could share memories.
A complex pattern of changes had occurred here, and it is possible to interpret 
them from a number of models, but from my perspective it illustrates the 
importance ofjohnng with the chent in the construction of her narrative projects 
-  empathically attuning to her ‘positionings’ in order to facihtate her 
experiencing of these alternatives. Commitment to any one of them seemed, in 
this case, to become irrelevant -  a preoccupation with the details of each giving 
way to an enhanced abihty to move between them and, in a sense, ‘above’ them. 
She expressed this change as feeling less controlled by the past, and she 
appeared more able to engage in current conversation, with all of its uncertainty.
Narratives are powerfiil resources for sense-making and provide a wealth of 
transformative opportunities. As Harré puts it, “it is the construal of the past in 
terms of the presently told narrative that provides the stepping-off point for how 
the narrator’s life will be carried on” (Harré, 2001, p.679). The opportunity for 
the client to tell his/her stoiy/stories is, then, an important component of the 
therapeutic process, and even more so, the opportunity to re-construct it/them. 
In order to facilitate this process I attempt to generate an atmosphere in which 
the client feels able to make narrative shifts (in constructing him/her-self, the 
presenting and ongoing issues, potential solutions etc.), welcoming and using 
contradictions, paradoxes and inconsistencies. This orientation to narrative 
again accords more with psychodynamic and humanist ‘stances’ than with 
cognitive, and so the ‘languages of the former two tend to be more evident in 
my work.
54
It has been claimed that the fragmentation or loss of personal narratives is a 
major source of psychological distress and that therapy should aim to remedy 
this (Crossley, 2001). The danger in this contention is that narratives can 
become treated as fixed possessions of individuals, the interpersonal, situated 
‘construals’ of the past being glossed in modernist terms, and narrative therapy 
becoming a specialised form of cognitive therapy. A similar point is made by 
Gergen & Kaye (1992), who argue that new narrative constructions alone are 
unlikely to be adequate solutions to difficulties in hving since the shifting 
ground of the interpersonal demands flexibihty rather than static constructions. 
Flexibihty is, of course, a constructive ability -  a matter of process more than 
content -  requiring coherent movement within an array of possibilities. 
Fragmentation is an obstacle to such flexibility, but this is not fragmentation of 
narrative but of dialogue -  the inability to converse with self and other.
Such fragmentation seemed evident in the example discussed earlier (p.51), in 
which the client was unable to make meaningfiil contact with the group. It was 
also evident to me in my work with a man referred for panic attacks (see Case B 
in the appendix). He reported many early life-threatening traumas though saw 
no connection between them and his current overpowering fearfulness. The 
sessions, therefore, began to exhibit a rather split quality -  parts being devoted 
to his panic, and other parts to his past -  and I had a sense of the conversation 
jumping between these 2 ‘camps’. Integrating these aspects of his fife seemed 
an important task, since they were clearly important in maintaining his distress, 
and the development of a dialogue between them was achieved through 
attention to the process. I remarked upon the split and invited him to explore it 
with me. This observation provided us with a new way of talking about his life 
experiences in the present -  achieving integration through ‘seeing’ the 
fragmentation. Again, a reflexive awareness superseded his immersion in one or 
the other position, and he described this change as a new found “trust in 
[himjself’.
The generation and development of conversational abilities, in which the client 
can voice positions and draw them into relationship with one another, requires
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trust. As role theoiy acknowledges, the opportunity to take stances in a 
conversation is afforded or prohibited in relation to the context (what it is 
allowable for a person to say/do in that context), so the therapeutic relationship 
and setting is a crucial factor -  potentially censoring or inviting voices into the 
conversation, and my concern as a therapist is to be aware of how my 
positioning could implicitly or explicitly censor the chent, and how the client’s 
position could censor me.
Given the central importance of empathie attunement to the meaning-making 
possibilities of the therapy, a focus upon micro-processes replaces the attempt to 
understand individuals through nomothetic methods, and reflection upon those 
processes in supervision becomes an important vehicle for grounding my 
therapeutic work. Individuals do, of necessity, use cultural resources 
(explanatoiy theories, psychological categories, narrative devices and forms etc. 
etc.) to construct themselves, and are frequently socially positioned in the same 
terms. This makes the ascription of disorders, or personahty types, or states 
appear to be obvious and un-contentious, yet the research that claims to uncover 
these attributes fails to reflect upon its own situatedness. It co-constructs what it 
claims to discover about people. It is, though, important to realise that althougli 
they are socially produced these constructions become concrete realities for 
people -  they are the meanings in terms of which people think, feel, act and 
experience themselves. It is, therefore, not necessarily always an appropriate, 
nor a trivial, matter to challenge these understandings, although the rewards can 
be high when the client is able to question whether a construction works for 
him/her (to question for whose benefit a ‘reality’ is fimctioning).
As a therapist I address this dilemma by constantly attending to the question of 
how the person’s verbalisations and conduct are fimctioning for him/her. In my 
view therapy should aim to respect multiplicity/plurality and avoid attempting 
to tell the chent ‘how it is’. The local attention to fimction is an attempt to 
‘particularise’ the client’s experiences (a term borrowed from existential 
therapy, an approach that also eschews the general and abstract in favour of 
contextuahsed understandings -  see Spinelh, 1996). I see the task of the 
therapist to be helping the client construct a way of living that works for him/her
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and this often requires that the client develops ways of identifying and finding 
‘replies’ to personally damaging experiences. My role is, therefore, primarily 
facilitative. I do not mean to imply that such change is easily achieved, nor that 
I, as a therapist, should not actively introduce ideas into the dialogue, only that 
it is the capacities of the chent that will ultimately help him/her, not the views of 
the therapist.
The concept of reflexivity plays an important part in social constructionism, and 
has been identified as a structural feature of verbal language that serves to create 
conscious awareness -  it ahows us to reflect upon ourselves (for a review of this 
claim see Lewis 2002). Our abihty to be objects to ourselves (the iterative use of 
language) develops as we become competent language users, and offers us the 
potential to de-construct and re-construct our identities and experiences. 
Through reflexive speech (for example, talking about who we, and others, think 
we are, and how might have become who we are) such as is the mainstay of 
therapeutic dialogue, distance is created between the lived experience and the 
identity of the speaker. The speaker can ‘observe’ how he/she is constructing 
his/her narratives and positions and thus develop a high order of reflexivity that 
potentially increases his/her agency. It is, therefore, meaning-making abilities, 
especially linguistic abihties, that are of crucial importance in personal 
development -  development that offers the chance of emancipation from 
damaging positions, experiences and identities. The unusually intense 
interpersonal atmosphere of psychotherapy can function to ‘amplify’ what is 
said and how it is said to point that a chent can begin to listen to him/her-self 
more attentively. As a therapist I try to facilitate this by remarking upon and 
responding to what the client brings in a concerted way -  this effort often being 
felt by the client and myself as one of he/she being taken seriously. Thus, in a 
productive therapeutic relationship there is a felt ‘reality’ that can be profoimdly 
moving and transformative.
In practice my work has much in common with humanistic, especially client- 
centred, approaches. This is because I treat an empathie relationship as 
inherently therapeutic. However, it is not that I see it as helping people 
recognise who th ^  fundamentally ‘are’, rather I see it as helping people ‘mean
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something’ (have a ‘footing’ (GofSnan, 1975,1981) and ‘voice’ (Torode, 1977) 
in the present relationship) and experience the positions they are speaking from. 
To attune to the other means to shift with them rather than to ‘bring them back 
to themselves’, thus to hold diverse positions with the client. This can, in fact, 
be experienced as frustrating as chents come to reahse that they are not going to 
be advised how to proceed. This is a dilemma -  the paradox being that through 
trying not to hold all the power I am often experienced as doing so (as 
withholding the ‘answers’ or trying to manipulate the client with some hidden 
agenda). I try to address this issue m an ongoing way -  attempting to gauge in 
each instance what it means in the relationship, how it emerges and what part it 
plays.
Evaluation of my work
As will be clear from the preceding discussion and examples, one of the central 
strategies for social constructionist therapy is to question how the chent’s and 
therapist’s actions (verbal and non-verbal) are ftmctioning. This is also the 
strategy for evaluating the therapeutic process. It is not about ascertaining 
whether the actions are indicative of pathology, nor whether they accord with 
reahty. It is important, however, to appreciate that fimctions are products of 
contexts -  that a focus upon the individual ignores that fact that what appears 
personal is a cultural product. The functions of behaviour can only be 
‘functional’ within a backdrop of expectations, rights, duties, obligations etc. -  
all of which are defined culturally. When working with a person who is 
disadvantaged or subjugated in terms of their social ‘category’ it is particularly 
important to build such awareness into the work. Since we construct our 
identities according to the cultural resources available to us, it can often be the 
case that those with marginahsed and negatively-valorised characteristics can 
incorporate deeply damaging constructions of themselves and act from those 
constructions. It is, then, a matter of importance to help them de-construct those 
identities and find self-affirming constructions (and contexts in which they can 
continue to affirm themselves).
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Throughout my training I have used various models as seemed appropriate to: 
the setting (especially in terms of the number of sessions available to the chent 
and the supervision available to me); the expressed wishes of my chents; the 
nature, extent and severity of presenting issues, and my competence working 
within the models. As my experience has grown I have felt more able to 
orientate towards the constructionist “vein of thinking” (Lax, 1992, p. 82), and 
use the theoretical and technical resources available to me accordingly. In 
practice, therefore, my work could be viewed as eclectic or integrative, 
operating from “no set formulation or fixed model of work” (op. cit.) but 
weaving strands of theoiy as ways of sense-making that foster empathy, and that 
foster novel distinctions and connections through which the therapeutic 
conversation can move. As wiU be clear from the discussions so far, social 
constructionism forms a critique of ah practices that profess to be objective or 
politically neutral, requiring that as a therapist I take responsibility for my 
theoretical and practical preferences. I take this to imply that in my practice I 
must continuahy reflect upon what I am doing in relation to each client, rather 
than whether I am being true to a model or theoiy. The therapy is, crucially, 
built around the client, and as Goolishian states, the therapist is (and I strive to 
be) more of a “master conversationahst” than a technical expert (Goolishian, 
1990).
Efran and Clarfield state that since “few [people] explore all aspects of the 
verbal terrain that are potentially available [to them]” that “this is where the 
therapist may be of use” (1992, p.213). An indicator, then, of productive therapy 
is the tendency of the chent to initiate and pursue exploration of their narratives 
and accounts. I would add, however, that the verbal terrain is part of the wider 
terrain of meaning-making, in which the sensual/emotional is embedded. An 
exploration of one (verbal) imphcates the other (emotional/sensual).
My goal is to foster empowerment throu^ ‘enablement’ (see Willig, 1999) -  
that is, enabling the client, through greater constructive facihty, to find ways of 
positioning him/her self that resolve his/her difficulties satisfactorily. In practice 
this might mean an enhanced ability to live with what was previously
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overpoweringly oppressive through, for example, having a wider range of 
positions available in relation to the difficulty, or an abihty to construct it in a 
less oppressive way. It might extend to a heightened reflexive capacity, in which 
the chent gains a sense of being an author of his/her life projects -  thus, as 
having some degree of control over what constructions he/she creates or 
accepts. An abihty to judge what one’s ‘doings are doing’ (Shotter, 1993) is an 
important part of being sociaUy competent, and involves an awareness that one 
is operating out of and into a context. This awareness is often attenuated in 
those with interpersonal difficulties, and I view the development of greater 
sensitivity to the self-in-relation to be an important component of 
psychotherapy. Not only does it enable the individual to be aware of how he/she 
becomes connected to others and alienated fi'om them, it also enables him/her to 
be aware of the cultural influences for potential personal enhancement or 
detriment.
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Abstract
A case is made for the epistemological and ontological premises of social 
constructionism against arguments that it is subjectivist and determinist. From this, 
questions about the ‘status’ of the self, and its centrality (or not) to experience, 
emerge. Arguments for the de-centralisation and centralisation of the self are 
discussed, with particular attention to the embodied-embedded nature of the self, 
from which the spatio-temporal metaphors of ‘positioning’, ‘narrative’ and 
‘voicedness’ have arisen. It is argued that communication is inherently evaluative 
and that the self is a ‘special case’ of evaluation (in terms of moral agency): the self 
and morality are, therefore, conceptually linked. Traditional theories of moral 
development, ethics and justice are, it is suggested coming to be viewed as 
distortions, in that they ignore our inter-subjectivity. The concept of a relational 
self-of-selves is one that, it is argued, emerges from dialogic processes -  processes 
that draw upon these metaphors of embodiment, and generate high orders of 
reflexivity. Thus, social constructionism yields a sophisticated account of self-hood, 
agency and responsibility.
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The self as a moral concept
The concept of the self, it is frequently claimed, is enjoying a revival in 
psychological theoiy, research and practice (for example, McMullen and Conw^ay 
1996, p.64; Hermans & Kempen 1993, p.29; Harter 1999, p.l), albeit with 
something of a “new look to many of [the] contemporary formulations” (Harter, 
1999, p .l) compared with their “classic” predecessors (for example, James, 1890; 
Cooley 1902). This resurgence of interest in theorising the self -  its formation, 
content, processes, normative and non-normative developmental paths etc. from 
various theoretical perspectives -  is juxtaposed against questions concerning the 
status and functions of the concept, this latter project threatening to undermine the 
former in a number of ways. The threat derives from the debate between those who 
subscribe to broadly realist ontologies concerning psychological concepts, and those 
who consider psychological entities -  in this case, the self -  to be socially and/or 
linguistically constructed. Within this debate, then, are the related questions of, the 
status of the self (is it real or is it not?), and the functions of the self (is it central to 
experience in any way?) and the content of whatever kind of self remains.
The aim in this paper is to firstly assert and defend a non-realist (specifically, a 
social constructionist) position against the arguments frequently taken to defeat 
such a position, and secondly to reorient the questions concerning the selfs status, 
functions and content in the light of this position, drawing especially upon the work 
of Harré, Shotter, Gergen, and Hermans (on Bakhtin). This reorientation, in 
‘undoing’ the theoretical separation between matters of fact and matters of value 
(all matters being socially constructed, and none having a privileged form of 
objectivity), allows an new approach to the questions posed above -  one that 
focusses upon what self-talk achieves rather than what self-talk denotes. In it’s 
concern with how our interactions negotiate and construct our reality, a social
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psychology based upon constructionism fore-grounds the evaluative, moral 
dimension of social practices. It is argued that the concept of the self is closely tied 
with moral practices, and that the shift away from individualism-objectivism opens 
the field of psychology for a new conception of the self and morality - in particular 
that the reflexivity offered by a conception of a relational ‘self of selves’ provides a 
more complex notion of moral responsibility than is typically supposed by critics 
who argue from a realist position.
Concepts as constructs
Before proceeding to address these questions, a case will be made for the value and 
coherence of the social constructionist approach, and therefore of the broader 
philosophical movement of which it is a part -  a movement concerned with the 
nature and function of language in ontology (what is), epistemology (how we come 
to know what is) and ethics/morality (how we come to know what to do). A long­
standing and widely contested issue in philosophy has been the question of how 
knowledge of the world is possible, a problem which has frequently been 
characterised as one of representation (how the world is represented in the mind). 
This epistemological question took on a “new ontological twist” (Kerby, 1991, p.2) 
with the proposal that language does not fimction as a neutral medium by which 
things are represented, but is constitutive of those ‘things’. In other words, language 
does not have a relationship of correspondence to entities about which it 
communicates, but from which it remains separate; rather, it is part of the “very 
texture” of those entities (ibid).
Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Philosophy has fiimished the social sciences vrith the 
fhiitful concepts of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1958), 
concepts/constructs which are supportive of the anti-nativist postulates underlying 
social constructionism; especially that “what people do is intentional and 
normatively constrained” and “what people are...are product[s] of interpersonal 
interactions” (Harré & Van Langenhove, 1999, p.2). As part of his challenge to the 
representational theory of language Wittgenstein stated that “the meaning of a word
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is its use in the language” (1958, p.20), which articulates “the point made over and 
over again by philosophers this century [for example, Goodman, 1978; Quine, 
1962; Rorty, 1980] that language is not a simple mirror of reality” (Jopling, 1997, 
p.257). Words, then, are “performative”, or in Austin’s terms, we do things with 
words (Austin, 1962); and what we do with words depends upon the ‘language 
game’ in which we are participating (for example: blaming, inviting, justifying or 
describing). A ‘language game’, then, is not merely the words but the “action[s] in 
which [they are] woven” (Gergen, 1999, p.35) - it does not exist in isolation, but is 
embedded within ‘forms of life’. These are, Wittgenstein claimed, “given”, being 
“not based on grounds...not reasonable (or unreasonable)... [but]...there -  like our 
life” (Wittgenstein, 1969, 559). On this account language and logic are not possible 
to justify ‘externally’ from the practices in which they occur (the ‘forms of life’) -  
there is no objective standard against which to measure our truth claims (where 
objectivity is taken to mean ‘unconstructed’, or separate from our signifying 
practices). This broad thesis has been developed, elaborated and contested 
throughout the twentieth century, and its ground-shaking implications are 
reverberating through the psychology in the form of social constructionism in its 
more or less radical forms.
Arguments against social constructionism.
What seems pernicious about social constructionism to psychologists (especially to 
some psychotherapeutic practitioners) is that the ‘self and ‘psyche’ -  concepts that 
motivate and ground psychological theory and are taken to be the well-springs of 
psychological knowledge, explanation and change -  appear to become demoted to 
the status of ‘fictions’ or contingencies. According to Madill and Doherty (1994), 
for example, social constructionist research is at risk of rejection by 
psychotherapists “through being agnostic to individual motivation as a causal 
explanation of behaviour” (1994, p.262). A number of objections have been raised 
to ward off this threat.
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It has been argued, for example, that social constructionist accounts of the self 
entail determinism, in that, by focussing upon the functions of self-talk and 
constructions of the self in language, these accounts are unable to account for social 
and individual change. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984) 
and Hollway (1984, 1989) have responded by arguing for the need to theorise a 
motivated self (an agent to initiate change). Determinism is, however, a pseudo­
problem. As Edwards and Potter (1992) point out, the functional accounts (e.g. of 
the self) offered by discursive psychology are not causal but rhetorical and 
normative. It might be argued, moreover, that there are no explanations that are free 
of deterministic readings -  the motivated agent included -  when they are 
conceptualised within a mechanistic-obj ectivist paradigm. If discursive analyses 
demonstrate flexible, non-law-bound language use, then that is enough to ignore the 
charge of determinism.
A further argument is commonly adduced in philosophical arguments against anti­
realist positions; that is, that they entail subjectivism and relativism -  positions that 
are generally thought wanting (and wanton!). It is as a result of conflating these 
positions (subjectivism and relativism), however, that arguments against social 
constructionism seem persuasive. According to the subjectivist thesis what is taken 
to be: true, real, rational, good, false, unreal, irrational or bad etc., is made so by 
being proclaimed so - has no greater justification or credibility -  and everything 
taken to be true or false is so because it is believed/thought to be so. When taken as 
a statement about the individual’s relationship to her or his world this is patently 
incoherent. This is because truth and falsity (and all other units of meaning) are 
constructs embedded within social-linguistic practices (in the case of truth and 
falsity within our “styles of reasoning” (Hacking, 1982, p.64), these determining 
what counts as being capable of truth or falsity) and cease to mean anything when 
the connections with those practices are severed. This is similar to Gadamer’s point, 
that what we accept as possible interpretations of a text are determined by our 
“horizons of understanding” (Gadamer, 1975). It is these social-linguistic practices 
(expressed as e.g.: paradigms, i.e. ‘bodies of thought’; horizons of understanding;
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styles of reasoning; forms of life; language games) that are ‘subjective’, but only in 
the sense that they are embedded in and constitutive of human activity, such that 
they cannot be justified without appealing to their own criteria for justification (i.e. 
in a circular fashion). The criteria for justification are, though, not within the 
individual but within the social-linguistic practices (language games, forms of life, 
styles of reasoning) and these practices are constructed, maintained and changed 
within social interaction, so can never attain context-independent truth or validity 
(objectivity). Therefore, it is not the case that radical subjectivism, such that 
anything goes, results from the claim that psychological concepts (or any concepts) 
are produced by social consensus (rather than being depictions of a non­
conceptualised reality). What is or is not the case is not a merely arbitrary choice, 
but is determined by the standards appropriate to settling the matter within the 
social-linguistic practices in which the question arises.
Relativism takes many forms (see Hollis & Lukes, 1982), the most radical being 
those that relativise conceptual systems; for in taking our systems of meaning to be 
locally constructed (historically and culturally) and mutable, no claim for either 
perceptual, epistemological, ontological or moral facts can be upheld, where facts 
are taken to be universally and eternally true. All forms of social constructionism 
are open to the charge of allowing in some weaker or stronger form of relativism. 
The weakest would be akin to Perspectivism, where the thesis is limited to the claim 
that there cannot be context-free descriptions (or perspective-less accounts of any 
aspect of the world). The difficulty with making global pronouncements upon truth, 
objectivity, subjectivity and the like, is that these can be relativised to different 
discourses, and thus mean quite different things. Smith (1988), for example, argues 
that because ‘reality’ means different things to the realist and relativist, when the 
former characterises the latter in its ovm terms it produces “phoney readings”, for 
example, the reading that social constructionism entails radical subjectivism. It is in 
trying to divorce objectivity from reasoning -  to use it as a standard against which 
to determine the credibility of one style of reasoning above all the others -  that
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those with foundationalist or absolutist tendencies in epistemology and ontology 
have necessarily come adrift.
In their paper ‘Death and Furniture’ (1995), Edwards, Ashmore and Potter defend 
(though do not assert) a strong form of Relativism, and present a convincing and 
startling critique of ‘bottom line arguments’ that are frequently adduced against 
relativism -  and, by implication, against Social constructionism. The Furniture 
argument, they say, is of the kind designed to demonstrate “the reality that cannot 
be denied” (in this case, physical objects); and the ‘death argument’, “the reality 
that should not be denied” (in this case, war, suffering and death). What they show, 
by detailed analysis of the progression of such arguments is the failure of the 
realists to achieve a demonstration of non-linguistic (non-constructed) fact/reality, 
due to the impossibility of formulating justifications that are removed from 
justificatory practices. Moreover, they expose the tactics that make the realist 
‘arguments’ prima facie irresistible, thereby undermining any sense that the realists’ 
claims are uncontestible.
The Self.
What, then, of the self? The arguments most commonly cited in the literature 
against the self being the “natural entity” (Madill & Doherty, 1994, p.265) that 
Western scientific and folk theories take it to be, are ones demonstrating cross- 
cultural and historical variability (Geertz, 1973; Kondo, 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Taylor, 1989). The ‘Individualism’ against which such observations are 
ranged is, it is argued, part and parcel of Modernism: it is part of the modem 
scientific-technological paradigm which takes as its fundamental postulate that 
reality is an “aggregation of parts” (McMullen & Conway, 1996, p.64), existing in 
separation from one another and objectively specifiable (we can say what they are, 
and what they are is entirely independent of our saying so). The place of the self in 
this paradigm (e.g.: Allport, 1961; Jung, 1928; Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951) is as a 
self-contained individual (Sampson, 1977:89): a rational, unitary, autonomous 
whole (Henriques et. al., 1984). It is argued that cross-cultural and historical
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comparisons show these constructions to be local (‘situated’) preferences/practices 
rather than global truths (Foucault, 1981; Weedon, 1987; Shotter & Gergen, 1989), 
and with this awareness “the very concept of an integral self-hood... is coming to 
seem an illusion” (Smith, 1988:80).
Historical studies have, arguably, undermined the paradigm to the greatest extent by 
showing how radical ‘paradigm shifts’ bring about such drastic changes that the 
languages prior to and post change are untranslatable. There is, in the terms of Kuhn 
(1962) and Feyerabend “incommensurability” between different paradigms “ 
resulting in the “inability in one body of thought to understand another” 
(Feyeraband, 1978). Understanding consists in being able to conduct the styles of 
reasoning appropriate to that form of life (being able to participate in it), and as 
Hacking argues, this is not achieved by translation (by turning another form of life 
into one’s own).
It has been argued that these cultural differences have been overplayed (see for 
example Harter, 1999, p.283) -  that there is much more in common than is 
admitted, and not so clear a cut distinction between e.g.. Western and Eastern 
paradigms. This is likely to be ever more the case (the loss of monolithic paradigms 
as cultures increasingly overlap); however it remains the case that modernism is still 
the dominant paradigm of Westem-style science (of scientific science!) and that the 
psychology of the self (within scientific psychology) has been articulated largely in 
its terms. The self has been understood, implicitly if not explicitly, in terms of being 
a more or less unitary, discrete entity; a conception which is extremely powerful 
given our ways of talking (given that we are embedded within an individualistic- 
objectivist paradigm in scientific and folk-psychological discourses).
The Modernist theories allowing for the least ‘unity’ of the self have been the 
psychodynamic and ‘modular’ (e.g. information processing) accounts of psychic 
structure and ftmction, according to which the self has multiple ‘parts’ related in 
complex ways; nevertheless, these complexities are intra-psychic, suggesting the
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existence of a ‘self that they are ‘inside’, or of which they are parts. The self, on 
these accounts, is central to experience -  an organiser of the complex internal parts 
and processes, and/or a manifestation of them. As varied as these intra-psychic 
accounts are, and as much as they often maintain the importance of inter-psychic 
events and processes (e.g. theories of: object relations, social cognitions, etc.) the 
emphasis is upon the self as the ‘fulcrum’ -  the significant unit in terms of which to 
understand psychological phenomena/life. This ‘centralized’ construction of the self 
is the dominant one in Western culture.
A growing movement towards the ‘ de-centralisation’ of the self began, according to 
Colapietro (1990) with the American Pragmatists (James, Mead, Pierce, Dewey and 
others) and the French Structuralists (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Lacan and others), 
the former by emphasising the self to be largely constituted by “embodied and 
embedded” interactions, and the latter by emphasising the self to be constituted “in 
[the] impersonal structures and processes” of language (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, 
p. 32). From a social constructionist perspective, these are inextricable, since “it is 
from within [the] flow of relational activities and practices that all other socially 
significant dimensions originate and are formed” (Shotter, 1993, p. 10) -  one such 
socially significant dimension being the self.
To summarise, conceptual and empirical investigations have given support to 
relativistic arguments -  and in so doing they have supported the thesis that 
individualistic/atomistic conceptualisations of the self belong to an historically and 
culturally local paradigm. The movement towards a more social-interactional 
account of meaning has led to a re-positioning of the self -  a ‘de-centralisation’ -  
that has generated a different kind of theorising about the self. There are, then, 
counterpoised paradigms, having very different implications for what can be said 
about the self, and for the extent to which what is said can be defended. If the aim is 
to make a case for social constructionism then de-construction of the self (it’s 
social-linguistic instantiations) serves this purpose. There are also, however, 
‘formal’ arguments for the nature of the self that are not individualistic, in that they
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posit the self to be integral to the structure of our language/communication (e.g. 
Harré, 1987).
The self as a moral concept
Social constructionists are always faced with the problem of having to 
‘parenthesise’ their substantive claims (for example about the nature and functions 
of the self) as ‘not true’, and ‘not real’, in order to foreground the anti-objectivism 
of their claims (that any account is ‘local’ -  not universal). But such an ‘outsider 
stance’ is an enormously powerful critical tool -  it enables people to question “what 
their doings are doing” (see Shotter’s Rhetorical-Responsive version of social 
constructionism, for example, 1993a). It is this reflective and reflexive ability which 
allows for social and personal change, and which has been captured in most theories 
of the self, though especially attended to in developmental theories.
It is in the context of this reflective-reflexive capacity of the self that the question of 
the self as a moral concept will be addressed. The first thing to say in this regard is 
that ‘morality’ loses its traditional confines and gains a central position once the 
dogma of the fact-value distinction breaks down. ‘Facts’, in the Social 
Constructionist account, are not value-free descriptions of ‘external’ reality, but are 
inextricable from the ‘moral universe’ in which they are constructed- they serve 
social purposes and, at the very least, the paradigms conferring credibility upon 
those facts are upheld or rejected in an interested (purposive) rather than 
disinterested manner. Paradigms, forms of life, language games, discourses -  that is, 
all communicative practices -  are constitutive of, and constitute, the ‘moral orders’ 
in which humans have their being.
It is, then, to the relational spaces between people, where meaning is made in 
‘living languages’ -  that is, to talk, texts, and all other signifying practices - that 
social constructionism attends; questioning the functions of discursive practices and 
acts, and analysing the ways in which particular goals are achieved discursively 
(Coyle, 2000; Parker, 1990; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Shotter, 1993a ,1997). Social
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constructionist research, then, approaches the status of the concept and the 
questions posed about ‘the self (is it real, is it central to experience?) functionally. 
What do we say about ‘the self, and what do we achieve in saying so?. This 
treatment of the question suggests an answer to the reality problem (its ontological 
standing is constructed through language/social practices). Whether it is central to 
experience in any way, however, is a question of a different order; to be answered, 
perhaps, by a substantive (but ‘parenthesised’) theory or account -  the parentheses 
denoting its context-dependence. In other words, the question of whether the self is 
central to experience depends upon how, in practice, ‘self and ‘experience’ are 
made meaningful in a community of speakers; semiotic practices that can be 
identified and theorised from an empirical approach. It could then be reformulated 
as a question of what experiences a concept of self allows that would be impossible 
otherwise, or what selves a concept of experience allows. These formulations seem 
odd when assessed from within an individualist-objectivist paradigm since 
‘experiences’ and ‘selves’ are taken to have a reality beyond what can be said or 
communicated about them. The reader is referred back to Wittgenstein’s point that 
meanings are normatively constrained -  ‘experience’ and ‘self no less than any 
other concepts.
It would seem, so far, that all that has been implied about the self is that it is a 
language user embedded in a community of language users -  but this, it will be 
seen, gets us a very long way indeed. William James (1890,1902) gave the ‘classic’ 
depiction of the self as constituted by the ‘F (the self as knower; the subject) and 
the ‘Me’ (the self as known; the object). This dualism has largely been retained by 
subsequent self-theorists, though the contents of each ‘pole’ have been variously 
amended and redistributed. According to James the ‘I’ functions as an organiser of 
experience and is constituted by a sense of continuity, distinctness, volition and 
self-awareness. The ‘Me’ contrasts with the ‘F in being empirical (“all the person 
can call his or her own” Hermans & Kempen, 1993:44), Debate prior to and 
subsequent to James has hinged upon whether we need such a “self of selves”
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(James, 1890). James’ functional account -  that the self is necessary as the 
organiser of experience -  is a widely accepted one and has been developed and 
described in various ways although some Social Constructionists have ‘de­
centralised’ the self to such an extent that a unity in any sense is seen as specious 
(e.g. Gergen’s “multiphrenia”) reflecting a sense that “the very concept of integral 
selfhood...is coming to seem an illusion” (Smith, 1988:80).
According to these social constructionists the traditional divide between the person 
(and/or self) and society -  the ‘separatist view’ -  is a construction which has 
ignored the extent to which people are merged with their contexts. Attention to this 
dimension (the relational/interpersonal context) yields a view of the self as not only 
decentralised but also either “fluid” (Gergen 1991,1994) or multiple -  the person or 
self changing with the context. Vygotsky’s work on the social development of 
children (especially, that children learn through doing with others, in the ‘zone of 
proximal development’ e.g. Vygotsky, 1981) has been used to support the thesis 
that human self-hood and identity are ‘distributed’ (Bruner, 1985; 1990); that they 
are emergent within, and distributed across relational contexts. This approach to the 
question of the self is a useful corrective to traditional ‘centrist’ and ‘separatist’ 
versions, but it offers no account of what the self is for us (how it functions) in 
practice (in interactions). Attention to this dimension yields different answers.
Harré proposes that the self (the ‘I’) is a theory, that it has no content, but is a 
“formal unity, a mere point in psychological space” (Harré & Van Langenhove, 
1999, p.7). It is a theory, he claims, that is held for a specific purpose, that being to 
provide a location for moral agency, or choice. The many social contexts between 
which a person moves create multiple, often contradictory positioning possibilities 
-  calling out numerous diverse personae (or mes). The self, then, if  taken to be the 
publically positioned person, cannot be conceptualised as a psychological unity 
without assuming there to be an, in principle, discoverable and describable unity 
lying behind these public manifestations. The discoveiy of the underlying self has 
been the preoccupation of modernist psychology. The argument proposed here is
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that the self is not an entity but a supposition or theory that affords the person an 
important ability -  that ability being to index his or her utterances in complex ways. 
This ability is socially necessitated by the need for personal accountability within 
the moral order. The duality of T’ and ‘Me’ is thus created in, and enables, self- 
reflexive discourses that serve moral rather than descriptive purposes (discourses 
that function to provide a locus for accountability rather than to describe the 
person).
Harré gives an explanation for the intuitive appeal of the realist-individualist view 
(according to which the self is an entity in principle discernable by introspection), 
that is, that the self is a theory constructed by analogy with the ‘person’ (the me(s)) 
(Harré, 1987). The person, as understood in individualistic terms, is the publically 
identifiable being who, in social constructionist terms, is embedded in and 
constituted by social-linguistic practices. The fundamental signifying practice, 
enabling the generation of a ‘me’ (or mes) and an ‘T, is the use of personal 
pronouns. By using personal pronouns the person can position him or her self and 
be positioned by others. This is part of a more general point about language -  that 
the meaning of a word, phrase or sentence is ‘indexicaT; it is established by the 
context (Bar-Hillel, 1954; Barnes & Law, 1976). The ‘indexicaT property of 
personal pronouns is, therefore, not peculiar to them; indeed “the real challenge 
would be to find a non-indexical expression” (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p.245).
Harré contends that, whereas third person psychological predicates (for example, 
‘he hopes he will succeed’, or ‘he is angry’) function as descriptions, first person 
psychological predicates (for example, ‘I hope I will succeed’ or ‘I am angry’) 
function as avowals (commitments to the ways of being they express). This model 
can be iterated such that the self becomes the object of its own descriptions in 
addition to being the subject of its own avowals (instead of being limited to saying 
e.g. “I feel sad”, the second order avowals “I think I feel sad”, or “I’m not sure 
whether I should feel sad” become possible). A duality is thus created allowing 
discourses that would otherwise be impossible -  discourses in which people express
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evaluations and attitudes about themselves (i.e. reflexive discourses). In Mead’s 
terms, one can take “the attitude of the other” to oneself (Crossley, 1996, p.55). 
Without the presumption of choice, agency is an empty notion -  and choice requires 
that the person is capable of adopting a super-ordinate perspective (is capable of 
reflexive awareness). The reflexive possibilities provided by the iterative use of 
personal pronouns allow just such a self to emerge.
The ‘source model’ for the self is, on this account, the body in space; and it is upon 
spatial relations that the ‘positioning’ metaphor has been developed (that people 
position themselves and are positioned, socially and psychologically, in and through 
discursive practices). Another powerful metaphor related to this is that of the self as 
a story or narrative (for example, McAdams, 1988; Sarbin, 1986) The primary 
dimension for narratives is time. For social constructionists space and time are, it 
seems, the source models for self-talk; arising out of our embodied experience (that 
being, the occupation of a position in space which is traceable through time). For 
the positioning and narrative metaphors of the self, then, having a perspective -  
being a ‘centre of experience’ -  is fundamental. This, however, does not entail any 
strong thesis on the nature of ‘the self as a psychological entity, only that without 
embodied (spatio-temporal) existence the very concept of a self becomes 
incoherent, and that with it we are able to generate discourses of agency and moral 
responsibility. This is not to say that embodied experience forms an objective extra- 
linguistic foundation (justification) for a theory of the self, since a non­
conceptualised justification can never be made. It is to say, however, that 
embodiment in space and time is a conceptual resource without which it is 
impossible to conceive of our selves.
Although spatio-temporal embodiment can be used as an explanation for centralised 
self- theories and generate useful metaphors in terms of which to understand and 
apply social constructionism (in terms of ‘positions’ and ‘narratives’), with the 
inclusion of ‘movement’ new possibilities are generated. Hermans (1996) offers an 
account of the self as ‘dialogical’ (drawn from Bakhtin’s (1973, 1983) theory of
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the‘polyphonic’ novel). Bakhtin’s theory of dialogicality functions as a rebuttal of 
the idea that meaning is transmitted between speakers (from one mind to another) in 
a linear fashion; rather, speakers are embedded within a flow of communication in 
which their utterances are meaningful only as replies to others (their utterances are 
interanimated with other voices), (see Wertsche, 1990). A dialogical account of the 
self, says Hermans, deepens the narrative metaphor by making the spatial 
dimension as important as the temporal, and -  through fore-grounding the ‘voice’ -  
allows a “dynamic interplay between positions”. The world is, he says, “populated 
by interactants” and the self is “stretched” across a variety of positions and is a 
“process of dialogical movements in imaginai space” (Hermans 1996, p.3 8). This 
view of the self accords with narrative psychology, according to which the self is a 
text or story, but overcomes a conceptual difficulty in the account of the self as text 
or story -  that stories need tellers and listeners (op. cit., p.38). The self, he says, is 
composed of multiple voices and each voice, he says, has “agent like qualities”, 
holding a position in dialogue with other voices. The self is, therefore, relational, 
and “the transactional relationships between the different ‘I’ positions may lead to 
the emergence of meanings that are not given at one of the available positions” (op. 
cit., p.47). The ‘self of selves’ on this account, is an emergent position (meta­
perspective) from which an overview of selves can be achieved.
Bringing these accounts together it seems that the conception of the self as unified 
can be accounted for in terms of our bodies being the centre of speech sounds and 
indexical speech acts, but the content of any ‘self (the psychological domain) exists 
in the realm of interpersonal/shared activity -  especially in language through voices. 
But, it might be asked, how can voices have ‘agent like qualities’?.
As Harré (1999) points out, agency arises through complex ‘positioning’ 
possibilities -  the possibility of assuming a perspective upon one’s discursive 
positioning of oneself. This capacity (to be an object to oneself) is, perhaps, 
achieved dialogically -  through the play of opposing voices. Dialogue is demanding 
because voices are value-laden -  being generated and occurring within a moral
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order (social-linguistic practices that express values and are inherent evaluations). 
Taylor, similarly, has argued for strong conceptual links between ‘the self and 
morality, in that self-hood consists, he claims, in having an evaluative orientation 
through “webs of interlocution” in a “defining community” (Taylor, 1989, p.39). 
So, in a general sense, our values ground our reality, since the discourses through 
which we co-construct our worlds emanate from our attempts to position ourselves 
and each other within a context of positioning possibilities, and the ‘realities’ so 
created have a constraining effect upon the moral orders and the manner in which 
values are expressed.
Moral-Self development
It is a widely accepted notion that the development of the self proceeds from a less 
to a more differentiated state, each stage depending upon structural changes (in 
cognitions, or internal objects, for example). Moral development has also been 
theorised this way, and, in accordance with Modernism, the end/aim is taken to be 
at the point of greatest differentiation of self and other (subject and object) -  viz., 
greatest individualism/individuation. Anti-individualism is becoming an 
increasingly prevalent position in ethical theory with the development of Gilligan’s 
‘Ethics of Care’ (1982) and challenges to the ‘ Contractarianism’ of Rawls (1971) by 
exponents of ‘ Communitarianism’ (Sandal, 1982) (see Mason, 1997). According to 
the rationalistic and ‘atomistic’ Contract Theory, social ties and affective relations 
are contaminants of morality, contrasting with a view of the person as socially 
constituted (MacIntyre, 1981) and interdependent (Baier, 1987). A powerful 
criticism of Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ is that making impersonal rules the carriers 
of morality, we risk “creating a society in which we treat one another with only cold 
respect, as bearers of rights” (Benhabib, 1992:281). Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
development (e.g. 1971) articulates such a position, valuing, as it does, the 
progression towards disinterested moral reasoning. Hoffman (1982, 1983) has 
proposed that moral development proceeds with the development of empathy -  
thus allowing moral ‘interestedness’ -  but he preserves the primacy of cognitive 
states (true empathy -  acknowledgment of the other -  depending upon the child
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having a ‘theoiy of mind’). Moral development is, therefore, theorised as a 
derivative of cognitive development, perpetuating the presumption of modernism 
that facts are of a different (higher) order and status to values and, in principle, 
separable.
Many social constructionist accounts of moral development and moral practices 
differ markedly from this, in that they foreground the evaluative aspect of relational 
activity out of which the responsible moral agent emerges (is constructed), this 
emergence being constrained by the “living tradition” (MacIntyre 1981:207) within 
which we are called to account for ourselves (for example, Clark & Holquist, 1984; 
Shotter, 1993a).
Gergen proposes a morality shifted away from modernist individualism (of personal 
responsibility, blame and praise) to “relational responsibility” (McNamee & 
Gergen, 1999) -  eschewing the ‘top-down’ approach to ethics (of universal rules) in 
favour of a ‘bottom-up’ approach, in which people adopt “relationally responsible 
language” (Gergen, 1999:157). From the Public Conversation Project, 
Massachusetts (e.g. Chasin & Herzig, 1992), Gergen extracts the factors that seem 
to further “transformative dialogues”: self-expression (sharing personal
stories/accounts; affirmation; mutually coordinated dialogue; and self-reflexivity 
(questioning one’s own position). The ‘relational’ approach to moral problem­
solving could be seen as an expression of the ‘high reflexivity’ of this late-modern 
age (Giddens, 1991), in that it rejects universal ethical principles and focuses upon 
the self -  the self has become the intrinsic source of value (Baumeister, 1991; 
Taylor, 1989). Gergen’s relationally responsible self has achieved another order of 
reflexivity, in that it is aware of its intersubjectivity and multivoicedness, and must 
manage itself-in-relation. The degree of reflexivity made possible with the 
realisation that our worlds are jointly negotiated allows us to concieve of our moral 
roles differently. Far from being a threat to personal responsibility , social 
constructionism enhances the possibilities for us to be aware of what our utterances 
and actions achieve.
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Conclusion
It seems, then, that social constructionism has delivered very different accounts of 
the self, depending upon the context of the question (which is, perhaps, to be 
expected). Questions arising from the context of modernism about the reality of the 
self yield answers addressing ontology and epistemology (that the self is 
constructed in social-linguistic practices and is not an objective entity). Questions 
concerning the need for a ‘self-of-selves’ can be addressed as ones concerning the 
emergence of this construct within social-linguistic practices, and the micro and 
macro functions that self-discourses achieve.
Social constructionism, far from removing responsibility and allowing in moral 
anarchy, demands a sensitivity to the impacts of the positionings in which one 
places oneself and is placed. The generation of such relational capacities has been 
present more or less explicitly in many schools of psychotherapy (as far back as 
Moreno’s Psychodrama). Many might object that Gergen’s conception of morality 
does not fill the gap left by traditional ethical theories, much as the self is 
disappointingly insubstantial -  the shift away from individualism-objectivism has 
similar effects upon both concepts. The claim made here is that the relational ‘self- 
of-selves’, in providing a high order of reflexivity, is a particularly useful and 
powerful solution to the problems of agency and responsibility arising from the 
dissolution of traditional, realist conceptions of the self.
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Psychotherapists’ accounts of client self-blame: a discourse
analytic study
Yvette Lewis*
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, UK 
Abstract.
Self-blame is an interesting Tocus’ for psychotherapists’ discourse, since it often 
serves as an explanation for psychological distress yet also raises dilemmas of 
accountabihty and responsibihty. It has traditionally been investigated in terms 
of a ‘cognitivist’ model of the self, but here, using discourse analysis, the focus 
is upon how self-blame is constructed within and fimctions to construct 
competing versions of the self.
Eight psychotherapists were interviewed and the interviews were transcribed and 
analysed in detail, the analysis attending to micro and macro level discursive 
features. Various emergent themes are pursued, the discussion showing how 
discourses are invoked, constructed and resisted through shifting speaking 
positions. Particular emphasis is placed upon the construction of self-blame as 
‘terminal’ to contrast with a construction of the self as complex, multiple and 
reflexive -  and the use of this contrast to distinguish therapeutic fi-om non- 
therapeutic discourses.
* Correspondence should be addressed to: Yvette Lewis, Practitioner Doctorate 
Programme -  Psychotherapeutic & Counselling Psychology, Department of 
Psychology, University of Surr^, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK (e-mail: 
yvette.lewis@talk21 .com).
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Self-blame might be considered to be a paradigmatically modernist concept, 
entailing a reahst, objectivist, individuahst and ‘centrist’ model of the self (see 
Gergen, 1999, for an account of modernism). According to this model, the self 
is -  among other things -  ‘agentically’ responsible for the person’s actions and 
able to discriminate between and objectively evaluate those actions on the basis 
of personal insight (introspection) and moral mores and rules. It is in this vein 
that much of the psychotherapeutically-oriented research on self-blame has been 
conducted and in terms of which much of the theory on self-blame has been 
articulated.
Research has focused upon how self-blame mediates anxiety, depression and 
self-destructive behaviour (for example, in breast cancer (Glinder & Compass,
1999), peer victimization (Graham & Juvonen, 1998) and sexual abuse (Peters 
& Range, 1997)) in order to understand, predict and amehorate negative 
psychological outcomes. Informing this research is a conceptuahzation of self­
blame as a negative, stable, internal attribution (self-perception) that can be 
measured and potentially manipulated and is distinct from -  though causally 
related to -  affect. This articulates the currently dominant cognitivist approach 
in psychology. Accordingly, self-blame (in practice, restricted to self-blame that 
is implicitly regarded as unwarranted) has been described and explained in 
terms of ‘biases’ -  for example, damage to the normal ‘self-enhancing bias’ 
(Harter, 1999, p. 279), ‘egocentrism’ to the extent that responsibihty is taken for 
events beyond the person’s control (Piaget, 1932) and ‘victim blaming’, which 
is seen as a socially instantiated attribution error (see Kendall-Tackett, Williams 
& Finkelhor, 1993), with these biases seen as functioning to maintain the 
individual’s sense of control.
There are notable similarities and differences in the conceptuahzation of self­
blame within other psychological orientations. Psychodynamic approaches also 
conceptualize the function of self-blame as control, especially in terms of
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intrapsychic defenses, for example, through the internalization of ‘bad objects’ 
(Klein, 1933) or in terms of parental (superego) functions (Freud, 1933). Such 
accounts are predicated upon a view of the self as a structure possessing 
enduring characteristics and interests and maintained by pre-determined 
processes. Humanistic approaches (for example, Rogers, 1951) stress the 
necessity of being true to oneself; consequently, within this model, self-blame 
could be seen as an obstacle to optimal functioning if it prevents self­
acceptance.
This brief sketch of some of the salient aspects of self-blame in contemporary 
psychological theory, research and therapeutic practice is intended as a means of 
clarifying the relevance of and contextuahzing the alternative, social 
constructionist, discursive approach used in the present study. The ontological 
and epistemological bases for traditional psychological accounts differ from 
social constructionist and discursive approaches in being ‘realist’, that is, in 
taking self-blame to be a discoverable quality or attribute of the individual and 
focusing upon how it can be accurately defined, described and theorised. The 
notion that language ‘represents’ reahty, such that, for example, the terms ‘self, 
‘mind’, ‘cognition’ and ‘blame’ denote mental entities or states is abandoned by 
discursive psychologists in favour of an account of language as constructive and 
constitutive of reality (for example, Burman & Parker, 1993; Harré, 1992; Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987). From a social constructionist perspective, self-blame can be 
viewed as a construct embedded within/expressing local moral practices and 
having considerable explanatory power in common-sense psychological 
accounts (for example, in accounting for the occurrence of anomalous, 
disproportionate or proscribed feelings and behaviours). Through showing how 
self-blame fimctions -  how it is used flexibly and in concert with other 
constructions to achieve discursive results -  the notion that it can be 
conceptualized and theorized separately from the contexts in which it is invoked 
is challenged. The aim here was to investigate the particular, contextualized 
invocations of self-blame in psychotherapists’ discourse and the functions that 
these perform.
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Method.
Please see appendices for letters and forms.
The Participants.
In order to generate sufficiently rich and diverse interviews the eight 
participants (qualified and practising psychotherapists) were selected from 
varied theoretical orientations and work settings (chent groups). For participant 
details see Appendix Two (p. 122).
Data collection
In contrast to traditional psychological interviewing the concern of social 
constructionist interviewing is not with ehciting ‘accurate’ responses (accessing 
an underlying reality) but with discerning the discursive resources and ‘moves’ 
made in constructing the topic. Therefore, encouraging the display of a wide 
range of discursive practices and discourses, and especially the variabihty that is 
inherent in those discourses, is the goal of the discourse analyst’s data 
collection. This requires a relatively unstructured interview in which the 
interviewer is actively involved (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995) -  especially in 
following-up participants’ responses with probes that “purs[ue] the relevence of 
the contribution with the participant at the time of the interview” (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000, p.73), and allow the consideration of alternatives. Eight 
interviews of between thirty and sixty minutes were conducted, the questions 
covering those set out in the interview schedule (Appendix One, p.l21) but 
being expanded upon as opportunities arose.
Analytic strategy
The interviews were transcribed in detail using the conventions set out in 
Appendix Three (p. 123). The transcripts (Trl-8) were then repeatedly 
read/studied whilst attending to the questions of “why this utterance here?” 
“how is this utterance functioning?” and “what discourses are being invoked in 
this utterance/interaction?”. There is a divergence of opinion amongst discourse 
analysts over the extent to which research should focus upon the micro-level 
achievements of talk-in-interaction (involving a fine-grained analysis of
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linguistic material in terms of ‘discourse practices’) or upon the construction 
and use of culturally familiar discursive resources. Wetherell (1998) has argued 
that a synthesis of these approaches is required. The concept of ‘interpretative 
repertoires’ to some extent bridges the gap between the ‘discourse practices’ 
occasioned in actual conversations and abstract ‘discourses’. They are defined 
as ‘clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech’ (Potter and Wetherell, 
1995, p.89) or ‘systematically related sets of terms... with... coherence and often 
organised around one or more central metaphors’ (Potter, 1996a p. 131). 
Interpretative repertoires therefore have signification above the level of the 
particular conversation or stretch of talk, but are flexibly employed for specific 
purposes within the talk. These three levels of analysis -  the ‘macro-social’, 
‘macro-interactional’ and ‘micro-interactional’ -  were attended to during the 
analysis with the purpose of gaining rich insights into how self-blame was 
functioning.
The guiding principle was to determine the functions of the discourse -  the 
fimctions of the broad discourses (Parker, 1992) and their consistency and 
variability within and across texts (for example, what ‘versions’ of the self they 
are constructing or avoiding) -  and how these fimctions are achieved using 
interpretative repertoires and more fine-grained discursive practices (see Coyle,
2000). The criteria of validity and reliability appropriate to the evaluation of 
quantitative research are inappropriate for assessing discourse analysis, since its 
social constructionist fimnework (its non-realist epistemology) precludes 
recourse to the objectivity assumed by these criteria (Potter, 1996a). Instead, 
this study should be evaluated according to how well the analyses are supported 
by the texts, to what extent they render the material coherent and to what extent 
they provide useful insights (see Yardley, 2000).
Analysis
The material drawn out from the analysis of these texts was enormously rich 
and varied, and the scope for its discussion here very limited. To allow for 
adequate coverage of the themes that arose they will be structured under three 
questions or problems (problems that they can be constructed as raising):
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1) Who is to blame?
2) Is self-blame a problem?
3) What is the role of psychotherapy in relation to the self-blaming client?
The discussion will move between micro and macro levels of analysis -  
building a picture of how they work together to construct self-blame in these 
texts.
The texts are numbered TRl-8 and the line numbers indicate the location of the 
extracts within the text. The participant will be referred to as the therapist (T) 
since it is from the speaking position of therapist that the interview positions the 
participant.
Who is to Blame?
Victim-hood is a widely used resource to account for cHent self blame, and is 
most frequently constructed in terms of childhood sexual and physical abuse.
This appears to serve many fimctions, the most salient of which being to
construct the chent as ‘not to blame’ for his or her circumstances in adulthood. 
The issue of self-blame is constructed as relatively unproblematic in childhood 
-  that there can be no justifiable blame because the adult has all the power and 
control (it is notable that child-on-child abuse, potentially complicating this 
picture, was not discussed).
Extract one (TR 1) (Karen)
29 T  umm I suppose if I started with
30 some of the children I’ve worked with (.) ahh (.) its (1.0) it’s
31 important (.) for them somethow to believe that their
32 caretakers >usually mum and dad< (.) umm (.) HAVE
33 VALUE (2.0) that they care about them (2.0) that (.) ahh they
34 belong to people who: (.) have interest in them (.) and (.)
35 somehow want them to succeed (1.0) so (.) in order to
36 maintain that while they’re retceiving (2.0) >what amounts
37 to< sometimes just (.) minor neglect right through to (.)
38 incredible levels of sexual physical and emotional abtuse
39 (1.0) they tend to: (.) use it as a way of saying, well it must be
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40 them (1.0) it can’t be parents (1.0) it can’t be caretakers
41 >because< to accept that it was: (.) a-a caretaker or a parent
42 (.) is (.) is too awfhl to contemplate (.) it’s better to see (1.0)
43 themselves as ba:d o:r umm (.) intviting some sort of (.)
44 >negative response< (.) than to: (.) admit to jhaving (.)
45 parents °or caretakers who (.) >don’t care about you< ° (1.0)
Extract Two (TR 1) (Karen)
287 T I would say “well (.) how (.) how would you say no.”(1.0) in
288 what w ^  does a (.) six or seven year old chi:ld say no (.) to
289 most adults (1.0) >they<they don’t (1.0) that’s how adults are
290 so adept °at manipulating children" (.)
In these extracts the child is constructed as having a double-sided vulnerability, 
on the one hand through his/her needs and tendencies and on the other through 
his/her powerlessness and lack of voice. Through exploitation by adults the 
child becomes both an active and passive party to the abuse -  actively tiying to 
meet his/her needs and passively succumbing to external pressures. Victim-hood 
is thus constructed as complex, and as engendering self-victimisation (self­
blame). The possibility of being unloved is presented almost as a contradiction 
in terms (a logical contradiction) -  as ‘caretakers’ who don’t ‘care’ -  
functioning to construct how the failure of caretakers is interpreted by the child 
as a failure of the self (that it would be impossible to interpret any other way). 
Parental or famihal failure (from abandonment and neglect to active abuse) is 
similarly cited in other texts as a cause of childhood self-blame, leading to adult 
self-blame. This provides a powerful resource for constructing self-blame as 
intractable/resistant to change and as an agent of adult pathology and 
disturbance. However, more rhetorical work is required in those texts that 
position the adult as not to blame or not responsible for his/her actions, since 
this construction often conflicts with social practices and with therapeutic 
endeavour.
When the therapists are asked whether they ever feel the chent is to blame, this 
dilemma becomes apparent. From the speaking position of ‘therapist’ it appears
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that an explanation for the adult behaviour that is free of negative 
evaluations/judgements is required (all the therapists resisting such negative 
judgements), but this is counter to everyday social interactions in which people 
are routinely held responsible for what they do and are blamed for their 
transgressions. The challenge of this question is that it positions them 
dilemmatically -  as ‘therapists’ and as reporters of their everyday responses. 
Different strategies are adopted to deal with this dilemma, one being to allow a 
construction of the client as ‘to blame’ but offer mitigating psychological 
explanations, another being to reject blame as ever an appropriate attribution 
and another to draw on ‘responsibility’ as a contrastive/alternative construction 
to replace ‘blame’. ‘Responsibility’ is a useful construct since it fimctions across 
‘everyday’ and ‘therapeutic’discourses.
Extract Three (TR 3) (Carol)
122 I Umm Q .0) I’m wondering about the converse ( 1.01 about
123 whether (.) you’ve ever worked in a situation in which you
124 thought somebody clearly is to blame for something (1.0)
125 and umm (.) what the: issues are around tthat
126 T (3.0) J just before you asked me the fquestion I started to
127 formulate in my mi:nd some sort of comparison between self-
128 blame and (.) personal responsibility really=
129 I =uhhm=
130 T =Ahhm (.) and and (.) and so I think that’s where I would see
131 the difference lying >y’know I w< I would (.) see us all as (.)
132 responsible for our actions and the consequences of them (.)
133 ahh ah at (.) some level so I was beginning to kind of (.) feel
134 uncomfortable about the word self blame in (.) or bla:me (.)
135 in that sense ahh (.) an I think there’s a difference between
136 self blaming as a way of umm defending (.) yourself (1.0)
137 a:nd or getting your needs met or manipulating a situation or
138 whatever (.) reason you’re doing that (1.0) a:nd (.) personal
139 responsibility for (.) for past actions. (1.0) I think there’s a
140 difference (2.0)
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The construction of every person as responsible for his/her actions is offered 
cautiously -  using a conditional tense (‘would see’), with an additional construct 
to minimise the extent of the claim (‘at some level’) -  and personal discomfort 
is used as the starting point for resisting a discourse of blame. The work that this 
does is to construct the therapist as reflective, tentative and personally engaged. 
A standard resource for constructing ‘factuality’ (making an account 
convincing) is ‘stake irmoculation’ (Potter, 1996b). According to the Discursive 
Action Model (Edwards & Potter, 1993) interactants treat each other’s accounts 
as ‘interested’, so speakers attend to this in their rhetoric, attempting to 
construct themselves as having no vested interest in their claims. Throughout 
these texts, however, therapists repeatedly present their accounts as ‘personal’ 
and use their feelings as bases for their accounts. There are, no doubt, numerous 
functions for this, but it seems that one is to mark psychotherapeutic discourse 
as of a distinct kind -  as being built upon shared human experience, and as the 
antithesis of ‘oppositional’ and closed interactive forms (for example, ones that 
‘terminate’ in a negative, evaluative judgement of the client). Another, perhaps 
additional, interpretation of this extract is that the therapist is using a statement 
of her personal position (that she sees all people as responsible) as an 
‘irmoculation’ against the implications of having constructed self-blaming 
clients as not to blame -  that is, as a disclaimer against her previous accounts.
In extract three a comparison is made between self-blame and ‘personal 
responsibility’ that works to construct self-blame as complicated and 
instrumental (‘whatever reason you’re doing it’), and to construct personal 
responsibihty as uncomphcated (honest?) and complete (‘past actions’) -  the 
overall effect being to contrast expediency with integrity. Thus, an account is 
worked up that whilst it is possible that clients blame themselves, the therapist 
has other less damaging conceptual resources to accommodate the actions of the 
client (and themselves). The implication that such a construction allows, 
however, is that the therapist is an expert with a privileged position in relation to 
the experiences of the client, and is in a position to discount or invahdate the 
client’s self-blame. One way that this is guarded against is to stress the reality of 
the chents’ experience:
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Extract Four (TR 4) (Susan)
408. T I think it’s very important to explore< the client’s sense of
409. blame itself 0.5) actually to u ^  those words to them (.) ahh
410. (1.0) >but I< I think it’s got to be used carefully (5.0)
The stress in this extract is upon staying with the chent’s ‘actual experience’, 
and the danger of moving from that position. The numerous accounts in these 
texts of clients’ suffering under their self-blame perform a similar function, 
reinforcing the reahty of self-blame and the depth of associated experience (as 
weU as constructing the therapist as empathie).
Social blaming is frequently performed using a repertoire of victims and 
perpetrators. In a sense all the transcripts construct self-blame as an attack upon 
or victimisation of the self (constructing the self as victim and perpetrator). 
Often, however, the attacking part/aspect/voice is down-played, the rhetorical 
work being focussed upon exploring how the self-persecution is a result of (or a 
manifestation of) victimisation by others (as discussed above), supporting a 
construction of the client as not to blame. Accounting for self-blame in the 
present is frequently achieved by appealing to the past and theorising that 
inadequate parenting or familial experiences have damaged the functioning of 
the individual, or damaged the self (accounting both for how the client can 
‘allow’ him/her-self to be victimised now, and how he/she can perpetrate abuse 
on the self or others). However, many accounts also appeal to the contemporary 
severity of the clients’ circumstances; that they risk actual or imagined harm if 
they blame others. Fear is invoked as a powerfrd reason for self-blame, and is 
constructed upon the premise that if the client does not blame him/her self then 
they must blame the other. Other-blame is seen as implying loss of contact/loss 
of the relationship, breakdown of the family/disturbance of the family dynamic, 
anger and hostility from the blamed party (or from themselves towards the 
blamed party) etc. -  all of which are treated as feaifril and threatening scenarios. 
The following extracts show how these accounts are worked together to 
construct a persuasive account of the client, and how dilemmas are raised and 
addressed in the process:
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Extract Five (TR 4) (Susan)
51. T umm (1.5) and I think >in any relationship people are fifty
52. percent responsible (.) for what happens between two peonle<
53. and it’s some (.) someho:w (.) the non acknowledgement of
54. anybody else’s um (.) perhaps pmt in their situation (.)
Extract Six (TR 4) (Susan)
107. T different umm (2.5) and I think gradually (.) people explo:re
108. (.) what happened >especially when they were children< in
109. their relationships and the messages they ha they received
110. about themselves (.) a:nd (inaudible) people choose (.) the
111. wav they think, feel, and behaive as a wav of surviving. (.)
112. and it’s realising that those are the mechanisms (.) that
113. (inaudible) now may not be appropriate or even helpful (.) >it
114. helps see for instance< whv people are doing what they’re
115. doing now (.)tumm (.) and it makes sense of the (.) why they
116. think the way they do (.) th-that (.) that does challenge the
117. sense of (.) >y’know< vdiy (.) why are they blaming
118. themselves (1.0) umm (2.0) and it’s taking (.) it’s important
119. people own (.) their pa:rt (1.5) so: there is a sense of (.)
120. >instead of saying y’know “don’t blame yourself blame other
121. people” (laugh) it’s important< rea:llv important people own
122. the bits that they’re responsible fb:r (1.0) and it seems to be
123. (inaudible) own and change (.) or at least (.) to go down that
124. path of thinking how to change their behaviours (.) o:r
125. thinking f.) or >v’know< wo:rking on f.) anv one or all three
126. of those areas (1.5) but it’s a step by step process.
The suggestion in extract five is that self-blaming is an extreme form of taking 
responsibility, and the therapist states a veiy clear ‘ideology’ that two people are 
always ‘equals’ in a relationship -  have an equal share of the responsibihty. 
Extract six draws upon the repertoire of self-blame as a way of surviving, and 
negotiates the contradictions involved in constructing the chent as ‘agentic’ 
(able to ‘choose’ and exert power) and as mechanistic (operating automatically).
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This is resolved by constructing childhood choices as mechanisms of survival 
(107-116). In lines 110-112 the client’s fear of destruction is alluded to as an 
irresistible force. The present tense construction allows for a reading that the 
client is subject to such forces in the present, from which the therapist moves on 
to construct the client’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours as possibly out of date 
or inappropriate. The client is thus being constructed as in the grip of the past 
(therefore blameless) yet potentially free of the past. As previously discussed, 
this construction of childhood functions as an account to resist blame in or 
towards the adult -  who’s present circumstances are accounted for m terms of 
childhood experiences -  and is identified here (116-118) as a useful 
construction to offer the client. In the rest of this extract the therapist attends to 
how this construction can be reconciled with one of personal responsibility and 
power in adulthood -  how it can be limited such that the adult can construct 
him/her-self as ‘responsible’ and change his/her behaviours.
In 118-122 the therapist firstly avoids constructing the client as needing to take 
responsibility, instead repeating twice that the important thing is that the chent 
owns their part, ‘Owning’ is contrasted with blaming others and the self. Blame 
is constructed as simplistic and fiivolous (120-121) -  functioning almost as a 
kind of ‘reductio-ad-absurdum’ argument against blaming, lending a sense that 
‘owning’ is, on the contrary, a thoughtful process that pays heed to reality (is 
accurate and honest), and involves investment of the self. This supports the 
‘ideology’ of partial and equal responsibility, though instead of constructing the 
client as taking on all of the responsibility for others, constructs him/her as 
taking too little responsibihty for the self. The concluding lines (123-126) 
function to construct change as a halting and difficult process -  necessary, 
perhaps, given that the explanation for why the client is not to blame for the past 
also potentially functions as the explanation for why they are to blame in the 
present, requiring that psychotherapy constantly negotiates this tension in order 
to minimise client self-blame.
The issue of blame is constructed as particularly problematic in TR 1, in which 
client’s experiences of childhood victimisation are constructed alongside their 
status as ‘offenders’.
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Extract Seven (TR 1) (Karen)
145 T accep (.) I’M NOT VERY GOOD at that word blame (.) I:’m
146 I’m very (.) I’m not happy with shame and blame (.) um (.) I
147 NE (.) I’ve never t found it was: (.) verv: helpful (.) >you
Extract Eight (TR 1) (Karen)
592 T the incident is o.ver (.) but (2.0) but actually (.) enabling
593 somebody to accept responsibility seems to me to be much
594 more use (.) than to (.) to wag a t finger (.) I-I (.) I see no point
595 in it (.) y’know we en:dlesslv lock people |up because (.) we
596 blame them for what they did and we need to punish them.
Blame is referred to in association with shame, perhaps invoking and resisting 
an authoritarian discourse of impersonal moral judgement and authority over the 
individual (the naming and shaming of individuals for crimes, or the blaming 
and shaming for moral transgressions), which is countered not only by 
pragmatic arguments (that it is not usefiil) but also by the construction of the 
therapist’s objection as a personal attitude or stance -  invoking a humanistic 
discourse of the value of the individual and, as previously discussed, locating 
the therapist within an alternative (‘non-terminal’) discursive form. It appears 
that the therapist is resisting the macro level legal-judicial discourse of blame 
and punishment (and possibly also a religious discourse of sin and atonement). 
Blame is also resisted in TR 2, but not so much by constructing the client as ‘not 
to blame’ as constructing ‘blame’ as incongruent (as stemming from and 
operating within the wrong kind of discourse):
Extract Nine (TR2) (Jane)
49 T would see bla:me as being (.) a judgmental sort of a wo:rd
50 (1.0) when people u:se that word its (.) it’s in (.) um (1.0) a
51 derogatory sort of a wav (.) really "I s’ppose (.) sort o f
52 Towning >the fact that y’do have some responsibility for the
53 wav things have turned out is Afferent (.) much more
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54 tpositive< it can be u:sed more positively (.) >blame’s a bit
55 negative isn’t it.< (2.0)
This is later corroborated with accounts invoking a competing discourse of 
feelings, experiences and phenomenological awareness -  within which ‘blame’ 
becomes irrelevant. The important issue becomes not ‘who’s to blame’ but ‘how 
does it feel’.
Extract Ten (TR 2) (Jane)
114 T And (.) I suspect she was one of (.) she may well have been a
115 sort o fbullv who went round stopping other people from (1.0)
116 that’s just my hypothesis at the moment (.) >y’know< (.)
117 communicating their distress (.) because she was very
118 distressed hersdf (1 0) a:nd uh (2.0) IN HER ATTITUDE TO
119 HERSELF THERE IS THAT (.) sneering sort of >y’know<
120 “you’re just doing this to draw attention to yourself’ (.) even
121 in therapy she finds it reallv really hard (.)
128 SHE FEELS (.) terriblv terriblv ashamed of (1.0) she blames
129 (.) at the moment she’s completely stuck with blaming (.)
130 herself for doing that kind of thing and she’s profducing all
131 this stuff (.) >y’know< as jevidence to me: (.) of what a ba:d
132 pŒson she is. (1.0)
In this extract the therapist presents a hypothesis to account for the client’s 
behaviour -  one that foregrounds the client’s suffering and emphasises a 
struggle in which the client comes off the victim of her own blame. This 
struggle with the self, and the construction of self-blame as a form of self-abuse 
are widely used resources to construct the chent as actively concerned about the 
abuse (whether they are victim or perpetrator) and veiy disturbed by it -  in other 
words, to have a troubled conscience.
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The juxtaposition of extreme victim-hood (from abuse, exploitation etc.) against 
extreme self-blame in these texts fimctions to counter any chent self-blame 
(demonstrating it to be mistaken) by showing that there is ‘no room’ for it -  the 
chent already punishing him/her self more than is justified by his/her actions. 
Indeed, as already discussed, part of the construction of childhood abuse in 
many of these texts is that the child naturally self-blames and constructs him/her 
self as the perpetrator in some way, leading to the conclusion that his/her self 
blame is likely to be questionable.
It appears then that blaming the chent is made increasingly difficult the more 
the chent is constructed as blaming him/her self -  and so this (self-blame in 
chents) is a veiy important rhetorical resource, especiahy when talking about 
chents who have offended or who are seen as comphcit in offenses (who are 
blamed within wider social contexts). It also locates them as in need of 
therapeutic intervention, since their self-blame is seen as excessive and self­
destructive.
The discursive repertoires and resources so far discussed are used flexibly and 
subtly to accomplish the construction of the chent as ‘not to blame’ and position 
the therapist as reasonable in saying so. Although this was an overarching 
dimension in many of the texts, alternative constructions also emerged. In TR 8 
self-blame is constructed as emanating more from tensions in the present than in 
the past -  tensions to do with social vahdation and legitimacy for the client’s 
feelings.
Extract Eleven (TR 8) (Mary)
484 T is that (,)it’s almost (2.0) the self blame is almost (.)yes it is if
485. someone perceives they haven’t got a right to feel bad (.) if
486. you’ve had an horrendous backgroumd and a verv depri:ved
487. childhood- deprived of empition 'nd >y’know perhaps< (.)
488. perhaps physical abuse and sexual abuse tl.O) it’s almost (.)
489. sometimes ea:sier >to cope with that< because it’s something
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490. concrete (.) at least I understand why I fed like this and I can
491. talk about it and make sense and move om (1.0)
500. T And that’s (.) often (.) more complex tiying to get (1.0)to get
501. the understanding in people that it doesn’t have to be about
502. something (.) that society (laughs) views as >y’know< you
503. have (.) if you’ve been abused or this or this or this then you
504. have the right to come (.) and get therapv=
Whereas childhood abuse is treated in most other texts as a ‘paradigmatic’ 
explanation for self-blame, it is explicitly constructed here as less problematic 
for the client, in that as an explanation it has social legitimacy and confers 
rights. The having of a ‘legitimate’ account of the position of the self is 
constructed here as fundamental to self-acceptance.
TR 6 is also notably different fi'om the texts so far discussed, since self-blame is 
constructed as not taking responsibihty rather than taking too much, and is 
understood/constructed solely in terms of present gains (‘pay-offs’) rather than 
as the avoidance of threat. The client is thus positioned more as an engineer than 
a victim of circumstance, and other people are not used as a resource for 
accounting for the client’s behaviour or self-blame.
Extract Twelve (TR 6) (John)
10. T self blame is often about a wav of finding (.) vourself f.) the
11. person who’s responsible (.)
Extract Thirteen (Tr 6) (John)
20. T =UMM that ('2.0) thev mav well f.) want to f.) be seen (.) as
21. the victim (.) a:mm (.) someone who always (.) is blamed for
22. something (.) a:nd (.) I guess (3.0) in some tinstances it mav
23. be that they’re not actually taking responsibility for what 24.
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actually is going (.) on so (.) I guess it’s a (.) there’s a 1-level 25. 
of (1.0) not taking responsibility.
In all other transcripts the chents’ self-blame is accounted for at least in part by 
some other more powerfiil person (past or present) or by entire 
institutions/organisations. The media (TR 8), the church (TR 7), religion (TR 
1), and the mental health system (TR 3) are all mentioned as potentially 
victimising and blaming institutions, for, amongst other things: dictating how 
the person lives, setting impossibly high standards, protecting itself at the 
expense of the individual, failing to meet needs, using it’s power to devalue the 
individual and failing to hear and act upon legitimate complaints.
One veiy obvious conclusion from the discussion so far is that self-blame is 
constructed as in need of explanation (by the research project itself and by the 
responses of the therapists/participants), and a lot of work is done to account 
for the ‘paradox’ that clients are most likely to blame themselves when they are 
least to blame. This ‘paradox’ is one that is constructed to problematize self­
blame and show it to be unwarranted -  positioning the chent as beyond blame. 
This construction can only function so far, however, and comes into conflict 
with a widely assumed ideology that ‘someone is to blame’ -  an ideology that 
is difficult to avoid when constructing clients within a repertoire of victims and 
perpetrators. Alternative discourses to blame are invoked to accommodate such 
dilemmas.
Is Self-Blame A Problem?
Throughout the texts there is a tension between normalising and pathologising 
self-blame, and sometimes the construction of self-blame as normal (as a part 
of human nature or as inevitable in some way) is used to problematize it -  to 
argue that it is a serious issue for the individual and for society. Discourses of 
‘pathology’ (of the self or system) and ‘human nature’ are, therefore, used to 
construct self-blame as problematic -  in damaging or destroying the self and in 
being beyond the power of the individual to control/combat/cure. A major 
dilemma with these accounts is that they construct the client as powerless, and 
this is countered throughout the texts by interpretative repertoires of ‘reahty
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orientation’ and ‘self-awareness’. The way that this works is that self-blame is 
constructed as emanating from deception (by self or others) and from forms of 
faulty thinking or faulty perceiving, and the implication is that something can 
be done -  faults can be rectified -  though not necessarily easily.
As discussed in the previous section, childhood is a very suitable resource for 
constructing distorted reasoning and perceptions as normal -  the child's 
vulnerabilities (needs and tendencies) taken to predominate over ‘reality’. 
These distortions are constructed as ‘carried through’ to adulthood, or being 
manifest in adulthood, through faulty reasoning or through ‘mechanisms’ of 
compulsion or impulsion: habit (TR 6), conditioning (TR 1), learning (TR 8), 
scripts/schema (TR 7), ‘brainwashing’/repeated messages (TRs 4 & 5). The 
following extract shows how one therapist generates an account of self-blame 
as resulting from a form of ‘brainwashing’ :
Extract Fourteen (TR 5) (Lynne)
105 T Md and and (1.0) again as a generalisfation: (.) frequentlv
106. you you (.) you see trends within the family funit (.) prior to
107. them (.) being together with a partner o:r the person that
108. abuses them (1.0) umm (.) that there is (1.0) other t.) other
109. exa:mples where they (3.0) th-they will have taken blame
110. before (2.0) so they may have been brought ^  in a family
111. dvnamics: .hhh tha:t (.) suggested to them fairly early o:n
112. ri .0) that v’know >IF ONLY THEY WOULD CHANGE
113. THEN (.) EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD BE FINE<
114 I umm
115. T Because a lot of the abuse is based around (1.0) around that
116. veiy aspect (1.0) >Y’know< “I wouldn’t drink (.) if you
117. weren’t like this” o:r (.) “1 wouldn’t have to fhit you if you
118. didn’t pr-provokate me” o:r u:m (.) and so on (1.0) so: (1.0)
119. there is a tendency for that dvnamics to already have been (.)
120. somewhere dse (.) in other relationships (1.0) and usually
121. parental ones (.) "not always"
107
In lines 112-113 the client’s distorted belief is constructed in veiy absolute 
terms, conveying a sense that it is inflexible and unrealistic. That it is spoken 
loudly and quickly seems to support its construction as a brutal, dictatorial 
message that is familiar to the client. Accountabihty and blame are managed 
very carefully in this construction, where at first the account is spoken of as a 
generalisation (105), and in terms of trends and dynamics -  the therapist thus 
avoiding attributing agency and constructing anybody as the cause/originator of 
the abusive message. After this general case is made the construction shifts to 
the use of reported speech -  implicitly positioning the client’s partner as an 
enduring source of the message, but doing so within a discursive structure that 
‘objectifies’ this claim. The conclusion that the parents are the likely 
originators of the message is constructed, again, within a generalisation -  
distancing the speaker (therapist) from its impHcations. Thus, a persuasive 
account is given for how erroneous beliefs come about through the chent’s 
treatment in childhood that can be flexibly employed by the speaker (treated as 
more or less accurate as needed, possibly even resisted).
Visual/observational metaphors are very common throughout the texts, and are 
used especially to construct the therapeutic process and the clients’ relationship 
to their self-blame. This is done through a repertoire of therapy as increasing 
awareness -  a very flexible repertoire constructing the client as ‘scientist’ (as 
rational or objective) or as ‘humanist’ (as devoted to human 
interest/experience), sometimes drawing upon both of these discourses 
simultaneously:
Extract Fifteen (TR 4) (Susan)
143. T Umm (1.0) and I think it’s a sort of da:wning that perhaps
144. there is some contribution thev are ma:king (1.0) um (.)
145. there’s also a sense of “aw whv didn’t I s” >the big thing 146. 
s’obviously y’know< “whv didn’t I see what was happening 147.
to me, whv did I let myself (.)get into that”(.) s’there can be a 148. 
lot of (.) self recrimination 'nd “whv are you so stupid” (.) an 149.
I think it’s very important to support the person (.) when 150. 
they’re m that place (.) to s ^  (.) “you we:re (.) bang in the 151.
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middle of it, couldn’t be objective (1.0) and you don’t know 152. 
what you know now (1.0) ahh (.) bit by bit if they learn more 153. 
about themseilves and how they relate to the world (.) they 154. 
can start to understaind (.) and indeed sometimes (.) there 155. 
needs to be some for^veness for themselves (1.0) amm (.) 156. 
and acceptance (.)
Discourses of ‘objectivity’ (rationahty) and ‘self-acceptance’ (humanism) are 
woven together in this extract using repertoires of awareness. The reported 
speech, constructing the chent as frustrated and self-blaming warrants a strong 
and definitive response from the therapist -  that the chent was not able to be 
objective. This construction of the present as privileged over the past is one 
that is repeated many times through the texts -  ahowing the therapist to 
position the chent as immune from criticism for past actions/failures etc., 
whilst retaining agency and responsibihty in the present. The chent has 
radically altered him/her-self, on this account, through becoming aware. This is 
a very useful resource for the therapist (and client?), because it ahows a re­
definition of self that releases the chent from the need to self-blame whilst 
simultaneously constructing him/her as needing to change (to be different from 
the past). This change is constructed vaguely as a slow process of realisation 
and understanding (greater awareness) coupled with a changed orientation 
towards the historical self (of forgiveness and acceptance), and in being 
constructed as gradual ahows for ‘relapses’ and difficulties.
The chent is thus, pre-therapy, constructed as irrational or possessing only 
partial awareness/understanding, and the therapist as (comparatively) 
‘enlightened’. This implication (of therapist as expert) is resisted in various 
ways, most effectively by constructing the individual as comprised of multiple 
parts or levels -  a move that allows the therapist to construct the chent as only 
partially unaware, and when the need arises to construct him/her-self as also 
partially unaware -  thus to provide an account of the therapist within a 
repertoire of overall equality.
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Extract Sixteen (TR 7) (Mike)
387.1 clients< (.) are-are there things tiiat that you blame yourself
388. fo:r (.) in your work I mean are there ever um (.)
389.T .hhh Tthat’s a Thard question because I w-(.) hh I don’t know
390. is the answer=
391.1  =riehtn.O)
392. T bmt (1.0) I think my natural modesty is stopping me >from
393. saying no< (laughs)
394.1 (laughs)
395. T b-bif I say no there aren’t it’s because I have a veiy good
396. supervisor .hh (laughs)
In this extract the therapist is constructed as partially unaware -  as not being an 
expert upon himself -  and as needing help to become aware. The position of 
the therapist is, therefore, constructed as analogous to that of the client. 
However, the ‘reflexive position’ adopted (392) fimctions to call the therapist’s 
lack of awareness into question, and mitigates any imphcation that it is 
problematic.
Though the ‘unconscious’ is a frequently used construct, constituting and being 
constituted within repertoires of awareness, there are other constructions 
invoking multiple parts of the self that often fimction similarly. The most 
common in these texts are the splitting of the self into inner parent and child 
(forming inner agents or voices or attitudes) and the division of the self into 
‘levels’ (especially into ‘emotional’ and ‘intellectual’ levels).
Extract Seventeen (TR 5) (Lynne)
195. T At a logical, thinking level (2.0) frequentlv the-they are (.)
196. "they’re perfectly aware (inaudible)" (.) SELF AWARENESS
197. usually is is enou:rmous (.) in my experience the clients are (.)
198. h-hi:ghlv articulate (.) they’re u:sually veiy self-awa:re (.)
199. umm (1.0) umm (.) intellectuallv (.) perfectly able to see
200. what’s going on (1.0)
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Such accounts of the self (as split into levels or parts) are variously constructed 
as ‘real descriptions’ (for example, TR8) and instruments/tools for change (for 
example, TR3), The complex subjectivities thus created can accommodate 
many of the dilemmas of agency and responsibility arising from issues of 
blame (of the self and other), and allow a distinction to be made between 
‘surface’ and ‘deep’ self-blame -  the former being constructed as easily 
changed and the latter as resistant/difficult to work with.
Self-blame is often constructed as psychologically ‘deep’ (and deeply 
problematic) through discourses of emotion and intense feeling, especially 
through the concepts of shame and guilt. These function differently in different 
texts and contexts -  for example, sometimes one or both being constructed as 
‘contrastives’ to self-blame and at other times as almost synonymous with self­
blame. The use of shame and guilt does, however, serve the overall function of 
locating self-blame within ‘macro-sodaT discourses that have connotations of 
overpowering the individual -  for example, legal-judicial and moral-rehgious 
discourses that ‘terminate’ in a judgement or sentence upon the individual. A 
contrast thus seems to be emerging in this analysis between a ‘unidimensionaT 
self with a ‘terminal’ voice (speaking position) and a complex self, the former 
being used to construct problematic self-blame.
What is the Role of Psychotherapy in relation to the self-blaming client?
In this section some of the themes aheady presented will be picked up and 
elaborated upon within a discussion of the function of psychotherapy. Self­
blame is often constructed as a form of ‘stuckness’ from which the individual is 
unable to escape:
Extract Eighteen (TR 4) (Susan)
373. T umm (.) but I think as long a:s you’re aware of what you’re
374. doing (1.5) a:nd (.) you can use it to work with as actually a
375. constructive thing (.) turn it arou:nd (.) but I think the real
376. problem is if you just stay frozen in it (.) umm you know (.)
377. just the feeling of (1.0) umm (1.0) for me (.) the feeling of
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378. (inaudible) like “oh Fm wasn’t good enough (.) I didn’t do it
379. right” (.) well actually (1.0) I:’m probably oka:v and (1.5) 1
380. can always check it out if there’s any (.)a red conce:m (3.0)1
381. think it would be a dis destructive (.) if I did get (.) caught up
382. in it (.) ahh (.) °I don’t know about (.) what I’ve done so far"
383. (.) if I ^  something major (.) then yes (.) obviously I’d have
384. to take (.) BUT then I think taking responsibility (.) umm
385. (1.0) I think blaime can be a very emotive (.) word (2.0) but
386. taking resp OWNING what’s mine ahh (.) and dealing with it
387. really.
In TR 4 the therapist is answering a question about her own self-blame in 
relation to her work. Many of the resources previously discussed are brought to 
bear here to allow the therapist to construct consistent and plausible positions as 
‘reporter on herself and as ‘therapist’. Self-blame is constructed as either 
benign or pernicious, and which form it takes is accounted for in terms of the 
therapist’s ‘awareness’. ‘Level of emotion/feeling’ is used to construct serious 
(deep) self-blame, and the repertoire of the ‘privileged present’ is invoked (357) 
to build a case that the self-blame of the present is comparatively 
unproblematic. The use of reported speech (378) is interesting here in that it 
suggests that the problem with self-blame is its ‘terminal’ flavour. The 
‘stuckness’ is voiced here in short, categorical, evaluative statements about the 
self, constructing a ‘monological’ speaking position (one in which there is only 
one dominant voice, or position, implying rigidity as -  see Bahktin, 1981). The 
construction of self-blame as lacking in variation is conveyed in other texts 
similarly, by the use of repetitive forms and repeated words:
Extract Nineteen (TR 1) (Karen)
272 T SHOULD have found a wa:y (.) >I should have stopped him.
273 (.) I should have been able (1.0) I shouldn’t have let him do
274 it.
This ‘univocality’ is constituted in TR 4 within a discourse of emotion and in 
TR 1 within a discourse of morality (should), discourses that both construct a
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sense of deep constraint. It is countered in TR 4 by more flexible, moderate and 
less repetitive forms of speech that weave alternating voices. Extract nineteen 
appears, then, to be simultaneously describing and displaying the construction 
of therapy a process of moving from static and closed (unreflexive) subject 
positions to flexible and multiple (reflexive and ‘polyphonicVmulti-voiced) 
positions. The ‘terminaT construction of self-blame is worked into the metaphor 
of therapy as a process of spatio-temporal movement - the taking of different 
perspectives in space and time:
Extract Twenty (TRl) (Karen)
248 T but to somehow (.) bring them backwards and forwards
249 between THAT was (.) how you learned to bei (.) who you
250 were (1.0) um (.) tins is who you are no:w (1.0) um (.) and
251 mo:ving backwards and forwards between tha:t (.)
Extract Twenty-one (TR 8) (Mary)
203. =umm (3.0) Just being able to sort of see it from a shghtly
204. different (.) angle=
205. =Um
206. =Hadn’t changed what had happened but(.)changed hisown
207. view of himself 12.0)
Extract Twenty-two (TR 8) (Mary)
273. that mterest is sflll important I think (.) because (.) if people
274. are closed and “well that’s iust okay” when actually it’s not
275. okay (.) then they’re not open to: (.) looking at it from a
276. different angle (.) so it’s the same thing that it’s trying to get at
277. (.) >and it’s< “I wonder why other people don’t see this as
278. okay” (.) “I wonder why I don’t” (.) “and I wonder what else is
279. going o:n”
These three extracts illustrate how the therapeutic process is constructed in these 
texts as an imaginative re-positioning (temporally and spatially), through 
dialogue that breaks through/inflltrates ‘stuck’ (monological or ‘univocal’)
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positions. Extract Twenty-two also highli^ts how the voices within this 
therapeutic dialogue arise from the moral orders in which the therapy/therapist 
is embedded. The client is constructed as, through this dialogical process, 
achieving a super-ordinate position (a reflexive self) -  viz. achieving a 
perspective upon his/her-self.
This therapeutic movement can function within a ‘realist’ construction of 
‘awareness’ (that there are true/valid and false/erroneous ways of 
seeing/interpreting the self and others) or more pragmatic accounts (that there 
are useful/helpful and harmful/unhelpful interpretations) -  and the constructions 
of ‘awareness’ oscillate along this dimension. It seems from the texts, however, 
that realism and pragmatism are deployed functionally according to the 
demands of the interaction, and there need be no overriding commitment to one 
or the other for the accounts to be adequate and rhetorically persuasive.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was not to obtain veridical accounts of self-blame 
but to analyse how accounts are constructed within the demands of the 
interviews. The stoiy of self-blame offered here is one possible construction 
that was made available within these texts and is, inevitably, very selective and 
‘constructed’ (rather than ‘extracted’). With this in ‘mind’, one veiy obvious 
conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that, in these interviews, self­
blame is constructed as in need of explanation (by the research project itself 
and by the responses of the therapists/participants) and a lot of work is done to 
account for the ‘paradox’ that clients are most likely to blame themselves when 
they are least to blame. This ‘paradox’ is one that is constructed to 
problematize self-blame and show it to be unwarranted -  positioning the chent 
as beyond blame and positioning the therapist as reasonable in saying so. It is 
proposed here that the emergence in these texts of ‘terminal’ discursive forms 
as signiflers of problematic self-blame can account (at least partially) for the 
resistance these therapists show towards constructing chents or themselves as 
blameworthy, one very important premise of psychotherapy being that the 
person’s positioning can change.
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This construction of the client as ‘not to blame’ can only work to some extent 
since it comes into conflict with a widely-held assumption that ‘someone is to 
blame’ -  an ideology that is difficult to avoid when constructing clients within a 
repertoire of victims and perpetrators. Alternative discourses are invoked to 
accommodate such dilemmas, with these often fore-grounding the experiences 
and feelings of the chent (drawing upon humanistic/phenomenological 
discourses), and these carry inherent conflicts. This is a point about the inter- 
textuahty of language (Kristeva, 1986) -  that talk and texts use 
words/phrases/constructs that have social histories. They are locatable within 
(are constructed using) discourses and repertoires from which they cannot be 
extricated. ‘Awareness’ has associations with rationahst/objectivist discourses 
(invoking truth-bound constructions) and romantic and humanist discourses 
(invoking ‘self discovery’ and the primacy of feelings).
Consistency is a demand of reports/narratives/accounts that is problematic in 
context (in interaction) -  especiahy, as here, where the demands of the 
interaction are conflictual (positioning the speaker in dilemmatic ways). So, 
whilst the therapists in ah these interviews attend to the need to construct 
consistent accounts, to do so constrains their answers to such a degree that those 
answers are in danger of becoming inadequate or implausible. Different 
rhetorical moves, drawing upon different repertoires and discourses are made in 
order to minimise inconsistency whilst maintaining flexibility (plausibility). 
These inconsistencies, far from invalidating the accounts, are the ‘nodes’ of 
tension that ahow for creative and flexible accounts to be constructed (Bilhg, 
1988). Without them, ah accounts would fah in the ‘real world’ setting of talk- 
in-interaction. By attending to features of the accounts other than the exphcit 
content, however, simhar constructions of the client, the therapist and the 
therapeutic process emerge in which, for example, ‘terminal’ features are 
contrasted with complexity, multiplicity and reflexivity. It seems that what is 
important about self-blame is how it is ‘voiced’ in the interaction, and an 
important resource in working with this is the construction of the client as a 
population of voices (speaking positions) with the capacity for high orders of 
reflexivity. This reflexivity allows ‘terminal self-constructions to be questioned.
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[ Contextual issues -  This research arose from an earher investigation into the 
concept of the self (see ‘The self as a moral concept’, this volume) -  a project 
tracing the movement in psychology away from ‘essentialism’ and towards a 
view of selves (and all constructs) as discursive achievements. It was suggested 
in that paper that selves serve social purposes, in particular that the construction 
of a self enables the reflexive talk in which people can be positioned, and 
position themselves, as moral agents. The issues of responsibility, blame and 
accountability are ones with which I have had ongoing struggles, both to 
‘capture’ theoretically and to use to morally ‘locate’ my own actions and 
experiences. From a personal perspective, therefore, self-blame seemed to be a 
topic of interest -  an investigation potentially providing insights into the 
interplay between, and interdependence of, ‘selves’ and ‘society’. Moreover, 
this interplay frequently, it seems, creates dilemmas that emerge as issues for 
the client and therapist.
The research project, both in terms of design and analysis, is thus influenced by 
(speaks from) my personal interests and investments in the topic as much as 
from those of the participants, and the questions that I asked of them ‘set the 
tone’ for the manner, style and content of their discourse. So, for example, 
although I attempted to design an interview schedule such that it would elicit as 
varied and as rich responses as possible, the formal interview (question and 
answer) structure would have favoured some discourses, practices and speaking 
positions over others. I struggled with this tension in designing the research -  
that is, I tried to elicit rich material without unduly influencing/constraining the 
responses with discourses inadvertently ‘imported in’, whilst also trying to 
avoid taking up a realist epistemology (that is, avoiding viewing myself as 
separable from the data).
I was very aware during the interviews of my position as a trainee -  moreover 
as a trainee asking a favour of more experienced therapists -  and I felt that this 
dynamic sometimes influenced the way that the interviews proceeded. It was, 
for example, difficult to resist the temptation to explain myself and be 
apologetic for the dilemmatic positionings that arose out of the questioning
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process, and sometimes it was difficult to pursue a line of questioning for fear of 
heightening the discursive conflicts.
The absence of these issues from the report reflects the discursive process of 
‘fore-grounding’ the topics and processes of interest whilst remaining 
imreflexive about those constituting the reporting discourse. Such selection is 
inevitable. There must always be aspects of the interaction that are taken-for- 
granted and that remain potentially open to critical analysis. I hope that in this 
report I have managed to fore-ground those aspects of the interaction that, 
within the framework of the research question, are most salient.
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APPENDIX ONE
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Introduction
Thank-you for agreeing to this interview. Fm interested in looking at self-blame from 
your perspective as a psychotherapist. With your permission Fll tape the interview 
and afterwards ask you for some demographic information. Firstly, could I ask you to 
read and sign the consent form?
The Interview.
How might you define self-blame?
Do you think it has any functions?... for clients
Do you ever have chents who blame themselves for things?...prow?/??...in ways that 
are significant for the therapeutic work.
Can you think of any examples?
Did you work with the person’s self-blame?...in what ways?...were there any 
significant changes?... how did you detect the changes?... explore 
Were there any things particularly difficult in that work?... explore 
Do you think self-blame is necessarily conscious?
If not, how might you become aware that the client is blaming her/him-self for 
something?...how might you work with unconscious self-blame?... explore 
Have you had cases where a person blames him/her-self for something you think 
he/she is clearly not to blame for?... .explore...
how did you work with them?... .explore 
What about when you think the person is to blame?.. .prompt...
how might that impact upon your work with them?
Are there any cases in which you think it might be important to increase a person’s 
self-blame?
what kinds of outcome might you be seeking?...how might you ascertain the 
presence of this/these outcome(s)?
Do you ever blame yourself for things in your work with clients?... explore
Is there anything else about this topic that you feel is important, that we haven’t talked
about?
Do you have any questions?
Thank you for participating in this study. Could I ask you to complete the 
demographic details before we end?
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THE PARTICIPANTS
Table 1 : Participant Demographic Information.
APPENDIX TWO
TR l TR2 TR3 TR4 TR5 TR6 TR7 TR8
Pseudonym KAREN JANE CAROL SUSAN LYNNE JOHN MIKE MARY
Age 64 54 44 38 49 48 57 43
Gender F F F F F M M F
Years Practice 12 14 20 2 4 13 16 1
Theoretical
Orientation
Psycho-
Dynamic
&
Phenom­
enolog­
ical
hiteg-
Rative
Humanist
&
Integ­
rative
Trans­
actional
Analysis
Eclectic
(Roger-
ian
Basis)
Integ-
Rative
Psycho-
Dynamic
&
Integ­
rative
Integ-
Rative
Practice
Setting
Private
&
Psychiat-
RicUnit
Eating
Disorders
Unit
&
Family
Therapy
NHS
Psycho-
Therapy
Service
Volun­
tary
Agencies
with
women
who
exper­
ience
violence
Counsell­
ing
agency
Private
practice/
Religious
setting
Univer­
sity
Counsell­
ing
Occupation
Therapist
Counsell­
ing
Psychol.-
ogist
Adult
Psycho­
therapist
Counsell­
ing & 
Personnel
Human
Resource
Mangr.
student
Business
Officer
Psycho-
Therapist
&
Priest
Counsell­
ing
Psychol­
ogist
Context of 
Interview
Therapist
Home
Work­
place
Office
Work­
place
Office
Agency 
Counsell­
ing room
Agency 
Counsell­
ing room
Agency 
Counsell­
ing room
Therapist
Home
Work­
place
Office
Age: Range = 26 years, Mean = 49 years. Standard Deviation = 8.39 years.
This table appears in the method section under ‘Participants’ (p.4).
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APPENDIX THREE
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS
(.) a short pause (less than half a second)
(1.0) a timed pause in seconds
.hh inhalation (the more h’s the longer the breath)
hh exhalation (the more h’s the longer the breath)
( ) in doubt (unclear fragment of talk). Words inside indicate guess.
> < pace quicker than surrounding talk
(( )) a non verbal sound
full stop indicates stopping fall of tone
: colon indicates lengthening of preceding sound
, comma indicates continuing intonation
under underline indicates emphasis
CAPITALS capitals indicate noticeably louder talk
degree signs indicate noticeably softer talk
t  i  marked rising or fallmg intonation directly after the arrow
= contiguous utterances
abrupt cut off of previous sound
[ ] between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate extent of
overlapping talk
[[ speakers start simultaneously
hyphens indicate stammering quality
column of stops indicate omitted text
  Ellipses indicate omitted text
T Therapist
I Interviewer
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APPENDIX FOUR
LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS
Department of Psychology:
Psychotherapeutic & Counselling Psychology.
01483 259176.
Yvette Lewis: psmlyl@pop.surrey.ac.uk 
Adrian Coyle: A.Coyle@surrey.ac.uk
When Clients Blame Themselves: 
Psychotherapists Accounts of Clients* Self Blame.
Dear
I am conducting a study into self-blame -  specifically, self-blame in clients’ accounts 
from the perspective of the psychotherapist. This forms part of my practitioner 
doctorate training in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University 
of Surrey.
Self-blame often arises in chent’s accounts and assumes significance in the therapy in 
various ways, and research has suggested that it often mediates psychological 
problems. My aim in this study is to approach the topic from the perspective of the 
therapeutic practitioner, throng discussion, and thereby gain detailed and context- 
sensitive accounts that might serve to unsettle taken-for-granted understandings of the 
concept. I hope to disseminate my research findings to psychotherapeutic practitioners 
throu^ conference presentations and submissions to relevant journals. Thus, I hope 
that my research will have implications for the way interventions are conceptualised 
and achieved in psychotherapy.
Your participation in this study would be greatly appreciated, and would involve a 30- 
45 minute interview (at a location convenient for you -  perhaps your place of work, or 
at the University of Surrey if you prefer) in which to explore issues of clients’ self­
blame in therapy generally and in your own practice in particular. Interviews will be 
tape-recorded and transcribed to provide me with a complete and accurate version of 
participants’ views and insights for my analysis, after which the tape recordings will 
be destroyed. Although extracts from individual interviews will appear in the final 
research report, no individual participant will be identifiable to others through these 
quotations: the confidentiality of all participants will be ensured. The completed 
research report will be produced in September 2001; copies will be made available to 
all participants who wish to receive them.
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Please note that ethical approval has been obtained for this study. If you have any 
questions please feel free to contact me, or my research supervisor (Dr. Adrian 
Coyle), at the above address. If you are willing to participate please either phone or 
email me or return the slip below, including your telephone number or email address, 
and I will contact you to arrange a meeting at your convenience.
With Thanks,
Yvette Lewis
Counselling psychologist in training
When Clients Blame Themselves:
Psvchotherapists’ Accounts of Clients’ Self-Blame.
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
email:
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APPENDIX FIVE
CONSENTFORMS
CONSENT FORM. PARTICIPANT’S COPY
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in this study on ‘psychotherapists’ 
accounts of clients’self-blame’. I understand that data from this interview may be 
quoted in the research report to illustrate the points made, but that no participant will 
be identifiable in that report.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without neediug to 
justify my decision and without prejudice.
I agree to the audio-taping of this interview, and understand that the tape recording 
will be destroyed after it has been transcribed and analysed.
Name of Participant 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
Name of Researcher 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
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CONSENT FORM. RESEARCHER’S COPY
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in this study on ‘psychotherapists’ 
accounts of chents’self-blame’. I understand that data from this interview may be 
quoted in the research report to illustrate the points made, but that no participant will 
be identifiable in that report.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to 
justify my decision and without prejudice.
I agree to the audio-taping of Ms interview, and understand that the tape recording 
will be destroyed after it has been transcribed and analysed.
Name of Participant 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
Name of Researcher 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
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APPENDIX SIX
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Please complete the following details. These will be presented in generahsed form ia 
the research report.
Age:
Gender:
Ethnicity: (tick) Black-African 
Black-Caribbean 
Black-Other 
Chinese
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi
White
Other (please specify)
Years in Practice:
Highest Educational Qualification:
Theoretical Orientation:
Therapeutic setting in which you work:
Occupation
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^ W hilst maintaining a broad theoretical base and insisting upon 
I  sound and sensible methodology its objective is to avoid the more 
gÊi cmplistic approaches to psychological science, 
p '  The Journal aims to bring together the medical and
KpCTchofogicaJ disciplines and this is reflected in the composition 
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p’and psychologists are especially cncourai^ed. _ 
jp. Ongin.ll mcoretical and research connibutions are invited from
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and conclusions,
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Bl' publication as a full article or case reports making a disiinctivc 
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î,5 ü  words should be provided.
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'^y., W’idcniatgins and only one side o f  each sheet. Sheets should 
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f e . '
should be submitted and a cop'yshould be retained by the ' 
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fl>J Tlris journal operates a policy o f  blind peer review. Papers will ;.,' 
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independent expert referees as well as by the editors or an 
associate editor. T h e referees will not be made aware o f  the 
idcr.rity o f  the author. All înfornution about authorship ,
including personal acknowledgements and Institutional ’ 
affiliations should be confined to a removable frontpage and - 
the text should be free o f  such dues as ideniifidalc sc lf^ ation s .. ■. 
(‘in  our earlier svork.. -'). The paper s ride should be repeated 
on the first page o f  the text.
(cj Tables should be typed in double spacing on separate sheets.
Each should have a sclfiexplanatory title and should be 
comprehensible without reference tw the text. They should be 
referred to in the text by arable numerals. Data given should 
be checked for accuracy and must agree with mentions in the 
text.
fdj Figures, i.e. diagrams, graphs or other illustrations, should be 
on separate sheets, numhered scqi.ictiti.tlly'Fig. 1’ etc., and 
each identified on the back with the author’s name and the 
title o f  the paper.‘iTicy should be carefully drawn, larger than 
their intended sire, suitable for photographic reproduction and 
clear when reduced in size.
M  Bihliogranhicat refercuces in the text should (]uore the author’s 
name and the date o f  publication thus: Junes (1991). They 
should be listed alphabctiwlly by the aurhor at the end o f  the 
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H). Submission o f  a paper implies tliat it has not been published 
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cLsewhcrc- A’jrhors are responsible for getting written permission 
10 publish lengthy quotations, illastrations, era., o fw h k li they do 
not own the copyright.
11. Work published in fill) or in substantial part elsewhere is not 
acceptable. Xvltere the work is substantially similar to work 
published, accepted or submitted elswhere by the author or audwr’s 
resc.irch group, this should be clearly stated in the m,inuscr:pt 
and a copy or this work should be sent to the editor.
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APPENDIX EIGHT
1
Unis
25 May 2001
Ms Yvette Lewis
Counselling Psychologist in Training 
Department o f Psychology 
University of Surrey
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH. UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 873811
Registry
Dear Ms Lewis
W hen clients blame themselves! Psychotherapists* accounts o f clients* self-blame 
t ACE/2001/17/Psvch>
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed. For 
your information, and future reference, these Guidelines can be downloaded from the 
Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk/Surrev/ACE/.
This letter o f approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2001/17/Psych). The Committee should be notified o f any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if  the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Date o f approval by the Advisoiy Committee on Ethics:
Date of expity o f  approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics:
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
cc: Professor L J King, Chairman, ACE
Dr A Coyle, Supervisor, Dept of Psychology
25 M ay 2001 
24 M ay 2006
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APPENDIX NINE
TR: 1.
1 1 Okay (.) what I’m interested in is (.) umm (.) vour perspective
2 as a therapist on client self-blame (2.0) so (.) umm (.) It guess
3 [ ]
4 T °okay°
5 I first of all it might be good to umm (.) ask how you might
6 define self-blame
7 T (1.0) Ah: :m (.) I supptose (2.0) someone who (.) takes
8 responsibiltv (3.0) °fo:r (.) u:m° evTents that are fi-equently
9 outside their control (1.0) °I suppose that’s (.) how I
10 view it° (.) I-I (.) I suppose if l  sg down and explored it
11 philosophically >there might< there might be all sorts of
12 fecets to it (1.0) but I suppose it’s directlv linked to the work
13 I’ve done over the last 18 jyears both (.) as a therapist and as
14 a social worker stroke counsellor stroke therapist (1.0) umm -
15 it’s an enormous issue >in the work< (.) that I’ve t done (1.0)
16 that’s I suppose how I “(define it)°
17 I Umm (.) >so somebody who< frequently blames themselves
18 for things
20 [ ]
21T UMM (.) WHO TAKES res YES (.) who takes responsibilty
22 (.) um (.) amm (.) a responsibiltv that covers (.) amm (.) their
23 sense of value in themselves (.) >how they tfeel about
24 themselves< (2.0)
25 I Yeh umm so: : (.) >do you see it as having any< t fimction -
26 umm
27 [ ]
28 T tUmm (1.0) YES I do (.) umm I suppose if I started with
30 some of the children I’ve worked with (.) ahh (.) its (1.0) it’s
31 important (.) for them somethow to believe that their
32 caretakers >usually mum and dad< (.) umm (.) HAVE
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33 VALUE (2.0) that they care about them (2.0) that (.) ahh they
34 belong to people who: (.) have interest in them (.) and (.)
35 somehow want them to succeed (1.0) so (.) in order to
36 maintain that while they’re retceiving (2.0) >what amounts
37 to< sometimes just (.) minor neglect right through to (.)
38 incredible levels of sexual physical and emotional abtuse
39 (1.0) they tend to: (.) use it as a way of saying, well it must be
40 them (1.0) it can’t be parents (1.0) it can’t be caretakers
41 >because< to accept that it was: (.) a-a caretaker or a parent
42 (.) is (.) is too awfiil to contemplate (.) it’s better to see (1.0)
43 themselves as ba:d o:r umm (.) intviting some sort of (.)
44 >negative response< (.) than to: (.) admit to fhaving (.)
45 parents “or caretakers who (.) >don’t care about you< “ (1.0)
46 SO I think it does “ftilfQ a:: function in some way“
47 So in t adults (.) umm (.) would you see: the fimction of self-
48 blame as t  stemming from those experiences in ^childhood
49 YES yes (.) I think ITwould (.) >it’s a sort of< going-on
50 process (1.0) the women I work with (1.0) um (.) have toften
51 (.) received appau:ling (2.0) treatment at the hands of their
52 partners (.) parents (.) umm (.) I MEAN IT USUALLY
53 STARTS WITH PARENTS because -  children who have a
54 fairlv good experience tend not so much to get involved with
55 partners “who are going to be“ savage brutal and abusive (.)
56 and if they (.) they do get into such a relationship they’re
57 much more able to extricate themselves (2.0) but so many of
58 my patients, they’re um (3.0) the behaviour of their (.)
59 abusing partners is Tnormative (.) it’s all they’ve (.) ever
60 tknown so (.) umm (.) tit just transLATES someho:w (.)
61 AGAIN if you’re (.) if-if the child moves from the parents.
62 and goes through adolescence, and finds themselves a partner
63 (.) th there again wanting to betlieve that somebody loves
64 them >somebody values them< since they’ve already (.) told
65 themelves from the time they could think that it was their
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66 fault (.) and it just goes on (.) in exactly the same Twav >it
67 translates into another relationship< (.) and frequently to
68 another and another (1.0)
6 9 1 Umm umm (2.0) so how tho:w might you or how have you
70 worked with this (.) umm (.) ongoing tendency
71 T (.hhh) >WELL I SUPPOSE< th-th THE MOST ÎDIFFICULT
72 BIT is pro:ba:bly: (2.0) ahmm (1.0) >°how can I describe it°<
73 (1.0) IT’S IMPORTANT (.) not to: rob people of any vestige
74 of anything that they might have seen as positive with their
75 parents so: (.) that’s a sort of knife-edge to t walk (1.0) I mean
76 you listen to (.) their stofry (.) “you go“ alongside them (.) on
77 the joumtey (.) a:nd ahmm (.) maybe at the back of one’s
78 mind one is jumping up and fdown (.) thinking (.) how do
79 humans do this to one another >how could they do it to their
80 îoffspring< (.) but umm there isn’t any point (.) ^  there
81 wasn’t when I worked with tchildren (.) in robbing them of
82 what little faith they do have (.) >in their tparents (.) so (.)
83 PERHAPS it’s: umm (.) to begin with exploring about (1.0)
84 >what went on< (.) “um“ (.) what control they could have
85 taken (.) ahm (.) with children (1.0) that’s perhaps easier. (1.0)
86 because (2.0) thev (1.0) they (.) kno:w ‘nd can trecognise that
87 (.) parents are bigger (than (.) them) (.) whoever (.) abuser (.)
88 is usually larger and stronger (.) so they don’t have much
89 t choice in it. (2.0) There is a tendency still f.l to (.) t feel that
90 thev have attracted it in some wav the (inaudible) or nolence
91 >whatever it is< um o:f the abuser (3.0) SO I SUPPTOSE it’s
92 something about (.) to begin with (.) “whether tiiat was
93 children or adults“ (.) to freally just begin with (.) trvTing to
94 get them to explore (2.0) what happened not in (.) in “minute
95 Mtail ‘cause that (.) might come much later or never come at
96 g r  (1.0) but to: (3.0) TO LOOK at really “ahnosf what was
97 going on “at the time >and to look at< did they have -  any
98 power, control -  did they have any“ choices (1.0) umm (2.0) I
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99 t  THINK PROBABLY in early stages I’m not a great
100 shame and blame person (.) “‘cause I don’t think that’s (.)
101 incredibly helpful“ (.) TIP of course a patient is ængiy (.) I .
105 myself clear (.) umm
1061 >You were saying you weren’t a great shame and blame
107 person<
108 [ ]
109 T NO >I’m not a shame and blame person< so (.) perfhaps (.)
110 trying to get people used to: b (.) well (.) to begin to be able
111 to Mk about what happened (1.0) >as I said< m in childhood
112 it’s about knowing that the adult (.) had control. (1.0) the
113 REALLY DIFFICULT (.) part comes (.) when abuse has gone
114 on into adolescence (.) “even late into adolescence“ (1.0) and
115 that’s (.) that’s the reallv: difficult bit (1.0) again it’s abou:t (.)
116 trying to: help people to understand (1.0) >what for instance<
117 grooming is all about (.) n ho:w (1.0) what has become
118 normative as a chi:ld (.) moves so easily into adolescence
119 (1.0) “and (.) and then usually (.) no not usually, sometimes (.)
120 into adulthood“ (3.0) um (2.0)
1211 “You’ve Mready umm (.) >sort of<“ talked about -  what it’s
122 like for you in a way that you have to sort of (.) step back (.)
123 that you can see that the person isn’t (.) to blame (.) but
124 there’s some (.) hesitancy about actually: (.) pointing that out
125 (.) to: to:
126 [ ]
127 T of course yes
128 them
129 [ ]
130 T yes yes
134
131 I >Fm wpndering< um (.) are there jtimes (.) >have you had
132 clients< where (.) umm (.) you feel that they are to blame. (.)
133 >for something they’re blaming (.) themselves for< (.) or, or
134 noTQumm
135 tWELL nhh (.) >I have a;< (clears throat) a woman “who I’ve
136 done quite a lot of work with (.) in the hospital and umm“
137 (2.0) she was (.) gro:sslv abu:sed over a long period of time
138 >by her father< (.) ahh (.) she married a ma:n (.) who (1.0) I
139 think had already, was known to have committed offenses
140 against children (3.0) a::nd (.) she joined tin the abuse (.)
141 “sexually abusing her own children“ (2.0) umm (.) I’m not
142 into blame at all (.) but I’m into responsibility (.) and (.) M
143 t o  to isee (1.0) that she had t choices (.) so (1.0) I think
144 there’s a difference between (.) accepting responsibility and
145 accep (.) I’M NOT VERY GOOD at that word blame (.) I:’m
146 I’m verv (.) I’m not happy with shame and blame (.) um (.) I
147 NE (.) I’ve never t found it was: (.) verv: helpful (.) >you
148 know< if you’re jgoing into the situation (.) I worked for
149 manv years with abusing families (.) ahmm (.) it seemed to
150 me to be easier to go into the family (.) and say “look (.) we
151 know what’s happened” (.) a::h (2.0) you know that the
152 children are being remo:ved. or fhave been remo:ved, or (.)
153 investigations are going ahead, charges may be made (.)
154 t  ALL of those things (.) but in a sense (.) it seems to me (.)
155 that you start from j where you’re at (10) and you work from
156 the point of view of how can you_make sure it never happens
157 again (.) ^  (.) I would accept the word responsibilitv (.) I’m
158 not overly good on the shame and blame =
1591 =Umm=
160 T =Ahh(.)
161 YES of course (.) umm (2.0) it (.) uhh (.) you î can point out.
162 (1.0) I DO point out (.) as a clinical Tteam we point out (.) of
163 course there is a responsibility (.) as an adult woman you
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164 know you had a t choice (.) you: (.) you perhaps used alcohol
165 and drugs to (.) to:: ahh (3.0) reduce your sense of
166 responsihility>°ifyou like°< (.) fahh (3.0) I’VE
167 DISCOVERED that (.) umm (2.0) the more work one does
168 with umm (.) er >especially women< “I mean I haven’t
169 worked with men for some time except (.) except in private
170 practice (.) which is (.) Afferent to it" (2.0) (clears throat) I
171 suppose the Ttask (2.0) is to enæble Tthem (.) to see that
172 they’ve a choice (inaudible) The great difficulty then comes
173 with (.) women who’ve perhaps done very well with their
174 husband (.) verv well (.) and begin to see that they can
175 negotiate (.) that they’re treated in a decent fashion (.) and (.)
176 t fhen that heightens their awareness (.) of what (.) thev did or
177 didn’t do (1.0) and then (.) the self blame (.) becomes >highly
178 exaggerated< (.) then of course you get lots: of (.) tphvsical
179 acting out, self-harm, quite destructive behaviour. (.) a:nd it’s:
180 (.) it’s a TURBULANT time when (.)when fwomen learn that
181 (.) that the:y had choices (.) they really did (1.0) they learn
182 that it’s: (.) possible for them to be spoken to by name (.) to
183 be valued (1.0) to be thought of (.) to (.) be respected “as
184 people“ (1.0) and (.) at one level they enjoy that (.) but at
185 another level it becomes almost intolerable for them. (.)
186 because they see what might have been and what they never
187 did (.) SO THERE IS A (.) a (.) there is (1.0) an accfeptance
188 of >you know< (1.0) that these women are respfonsible and
189 that’s fed t back (2.0) ahm (2.0) but I think the self-blame then
190 “becomes h i^ y  exaggerated (.) umm (.) not ex^aggerated (.)
191 how do you exaggerate something like Tthat“ (.) there’s a
192 heightened awareness (2.0) of how it’s possible to live (1.0)
193 how it’s possible to communicate and negotiate (.) in ways
194 that they’ve never experienced before (.) and then they begin
195 to trealise what they’ve done to their children.f.l >and in turn
196 of course begin to realise< (1.0) that thev are the products of
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197 their t own parents (.) “and then they begin to look at their
198 own children and start that terrible question (.) what have I
199 |done“
200 I Umm (.) umm (.) >so there’s a sort of< (.) process set under
201 by (.) by (.) >coming to a< a responsible postition(l.O)
202 T >But I think you< GET there much faster if you don’t blame.
203 I Uhhm (.) umm (.) yeah (1.0) I’m twondering (.) if there are
204 specific (.) um (.) kinds of >I don’t know< umm (1.0) >tools
205 that you might use< or 1.1 wavs that vou might (.1 help the
206 person to: the woman to (.) actually (.) work through their
207 self-blame to-to a point where they’re not using the blame and
208 shame and they’re taking resp
209 [ ]
210 T WELL I SUPPOSE (.) ANY >any
211 therapeutic undertaking is about moving backwards and
212 forwards and staying where you are all at the same time isn’t
213 it. (.) you know (.) you (.) yes of course (.) I have in mind one
214 particular woman who swings fi'om incredible levels of < (.)
215 accepting responsibilitv for what she’s J done and being aware
216 (1.0) her children are in care “and having to go through umm
217 -  signfificant levels of therapy' (.) >S0 I’M THINKING
218 ABOUT IT< (.) | would you remind me of the question.
219 >TTm sony<
2201 Yeah (laughs) (.) IT WASN’T A VERY CLEAR QUESTION
221 (.) I’m not sure I’ll be able to remind you (.) but it was just er
222 (.) er (.) thinking o:f (.) I guess ways o:f (.) helping that
223 process of (.) the person actually emerging from the blame
224 T YES (.) er (.) it’s a (.) for me (.) nersonallv (.) it’s about
225 moving backwards and forwards (1.0) It’s about keeping in
226 mind the child who was trained ( 1.01 helping them to keen in
227 mind the child who was trained (1.0) Lnto: (1.0) and-and (.)
228 lived (1.5) man incrediblv abusive (.) umm f.lHOUSEhold 
235 îmoving backwards and forwards betwee:n (.) reminding
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236 them of their own t  child (1.0) >their inner child<, their own
237 childThood (2.0) what t what they lea:med (.) how they
238 learned to t o  who they are (1.0) what they’re doing no:w
239 (1.5) the price they’re tpaving for what they’re (.) >you
240 know< their (.1 their loss of their t free:dom fl.Ol their loss of
241 their individuîahty to some e x t f ^  because “there are
242 collective rules that have to be abided“ (.) umm (.) that they
243 have to abide by (.) so: it is (.) constantly moving backwards
244 and forwards between (.) frying to help them to see; (1.5) their
245 own abused chi:ld (1.0) not to collu:de (.) because there’s no
246 point in colluding (.) because then you’ve you’ve lost you:r
247 >patient anyway (.) because they lose their trust in you< (.)
248 but to somehow (.) bring them backwards and forwards
249 between THAT ws (.) how you learned to t o  (.) who you
250 were (1.0) um (.) Ms is who you are no:w (1.0) um (.) and
251 mo:ving backwards and forwards between tha:t (.) um to (.)
252 Wk of (.) how it was to to  that child (1.0) to remind them tiiat
253 (2.0) how powerless they twere (.) that (.) of course they
254 J leamed (.) how to be (.) violent, aggressive (cough), abusive
255 (.) they | did have choices (1.0) um (1.0) tk  suppose just to
256 move backwards and forwards along that-that continuum.
257 (1.0) It’s interesting that one of the hardest things to do (.)
258 “it’s only really popped into my head as I think about it, and
259 that is“ (.) it’s t  almost easier (.) for some of the patients (1.0)
260 to come to terms with what their parents Tdid (.) than to
261 forgive the t child who allowed it (.) to happen. (1.0) it’s
262 reallv strange (1.0) but it’s the:re (1.0) it’s present in a number
263 of women. (1.0) There is a sense in which-I (.) from time to
264 time (1.5) fry to remind them (.) of the child (.) the powerless
265 child (2.0) and (1.0) it’s interesting they u ^  words like (1.0)
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266 e:ven when they’re talking about themselves when they’re
267 fi:ve. or si)L or seven (.) and they’re talking about fully grown
268 adult males often (1.5) they ta^  abou:t um (.) “I
269 SHOULDN’T have let him (1.0) “put his penis in my mouth“”
270 (2.0) “I SHOULD have (.) stopped him” (1.0) “well (.) you
271 were five. (1.0) t could you have stopped him.” (2.0) “I
272 SHOULD have found a wa:y (.) >I should have stopped him.
273 (.) I should have been able (1.0) I shouldn’t have let him do
274 it.” (1.0) ahmm (1.0) The chiild who accfepts (.) and um, um
275 (.) >I mean it’s the worst, one of the worst bits< the child who
276 accepts a gift (1.5) who: accepts sweets LI um (.) THAT
277 seems to be in-cre:diblv difficult for-for the:m (.) to t THEN
278 let go of self-blame (2.0)
2791 So they accept a gift fo r (.) in-in excha:nge LI for the:
280 [ ]
281 T Yes yes
282 I abuse upon them.=
283 T =Yes. BUT >and you’re Ttalking< abou:t
284 t children of five and six and seven >“you know“< and-a:nd
285 [ ]
2861 Umm
287 T I would say “well (.) how (.) how would you say no.” (1.0) in
288 what wav does a (.) six or seven year old chi.ld say no (.) to
289 most adults (1.0) >they< they don’t (1.0) that’s how adults are
290 so adept “at manipulating children“ (.) children want to say
291 yes >don’t they< (.) n we all say that-that the child who says
292 no is t naughtv (.) you know (.) >the number of times we< (.)
293 he said noi (.) >well he did< (.) great!, isn’t it twonderftil, you
294 find a child who’ll say no (.) >however there’s the child who
295 wishes to plea:se and says ves< (.) So: that (.) THAT is an
296 area of self-blame that’s immtense =
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297 I =Umm (.)
298 T The (.) the young man I worked with many tvears ago who
299 (1.0) who (.) accepted a toy car. (1.0) from (.) from somebody
300 he twitnessed doing something to another child. (1.5) and
301 he’s never never (.) NEVER >got over it< (1.0) that he
302 accepted that toy ca:r (.) that somehow ACCEPTING A GIFT
303 (1.0) it (.) it APPEARS to be easier to come to terms with (.)
304 with (.) being afrai:d o:f (.) o:f Aei °um° THREAT (1.0) that
305 “you’ll go into care” or “FU be put into prison if you tell
306 anybody”= =all tho:se (1.0) tiiat seems to be: SLIGHTLY
307 easier to come to terms with (.) than a chi:ld who has accepted
308 (.) something. (1.0) umm (2.0) sweets often. (.) Fo:r a child
309 (2.0) a young woman I worked with who was prostituted by
310 her father when she was about six or seven (1.0) a:nd umm (.)
311 he would alwavs take her afterwards to: ahmm (1.0) some
312 shop to buy her (1.0) a bu:rger or > tsomething<=
3131 =Uhhm=
314 T =A:nd (.) as a result she had enormous eating difficulties. (.)
315 IUm=
316 T =A:nd (.) SO: there’s A TREMENDOUS amount of blame (.)
317 self-blame. (.) attached to: ACCEPTING something >in
318 exchange.< (.)
3191 Yeah >and you mentioned self-for|giveness< (1.0) and ho:w
320 (.) that’s so difficult in (.) those cases.
321 T SELF (1.0) self-forgiveness when (.) when ahh (.) when
322 jsomehow they (.) they see themselves as having stood to
323 Tgain (.) is EXTREMELY difficult. ( 1.0) but then (.) letting
324 go of self-blame is one of (.) of the hardest things that some
325 women (1.0) Fm minded of a woman I jW  (1.0) well (.) I’ve
326 done five years work with (.) and we’ve made ALOT of
327 progress (1.0) a:nd she:’s moved on (.) considerably (1.5)
328 |but um (1.0) there’s no forgiveness for that child (.) >within
329 her< (1.0) none at all.(.)
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3301 Umm (.)
331 T I DON’T THINK SHE SEES HER IN EXACTLY THE
332 SAME WAY (.) but I fear I (1.0) °I don’t think I’ve made a
333 lot of inroads in° (.) in t o  being able to come to terms with
334 why she as a five year old being abused by a 22 year old (.)
335 couldn’t stop him=
336 I =Um, um (.) and-and would you see tha:t (.) um (.) that fact
337 that she hasn’t managed to t o  that (1.0) does diat have
338 implications (.) for her future health (.) o:r=
339 T =Um=
340 I =Is it something that (.) yeah (.)
34IT YES IT DOES have impHcations because um (.) it (.) >I don’t
342 think um (.) we’ll go into details (.) because it will become (.)
343 too evident but< (.) um (.) it-it manifests itself in some (.)
344 prettv (.) bizarre (.) ffantasies (1.0) which (.) means that until
345 she really comes to fterms with (.) with it (.) we’re not really
346 going to be able to move her |on (.) um (2.5) a:nd >you
347 know< when the issue of self-blame was rai:sed >I thought<
348 (.) mm (.) reallv interesting because (.) it ^manifests itself
349 incredibly in the work. (.) fAND NOT ONLY in the work I
350 do in the hospital (.) um (.) I um (.) in my private practice (.) it
351 emerges (1.0) somehow or other it’s hard for us to: (1.0) to
352 co:me to terms with (.) how our parents let us |down (.) um
353 (.) “we like to keep them (.) a little bit neat and tidv“ (1.0) It (.)
354 the ones Fm always suspicious of are the ones who sort of sit
355 down and say “WELL I KNOW IT’S FASHIONABLE TO
356 TALK ABOUT A (.) AN ABUSING MOTHER AND
357 FATHER (.) BUT I HAD A LOVELY MUM AND DAD”
358 (1.0) AND MY HEART SINKS (laughing) (1.0) BECAUSE I
359 THINK (.) OH LO:RD (.) HERE WE GO AGAIN (laugh) (.)
360 UM (.) I mean occasionally you M get (.) the glowing family
361 remains intact but (.) but often it’s been a long hard haul for
362 them to create (.) fantasv parents (1.0) WELL THAT’S (.)
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363 Isillv L) it’s not to sav that a:ll parents are ba:d O  umm I’m
364 a parent (.) I hope I’m not too ba:d but (.) maybe I was just
365 good enough >you know< (.) I guess most patien (.) parents
366 are good enough. (.) but um (.) I think we don’t begin to
367 understand the damage that is done between (.) ah (.)
368 indifferent, abusing, whatever sort of parents they are (1.5)
369 there are some parts I guess which (.) “we can never M
370 anything abouf
371 Um=
372 =And we’re (.) left with that sort of (.) um (.) void. (2.0)
373 I I was just wondering about (.) um (.) >you were talking about
374 the people who< (.) umm (.) develop this u:m (.) >picture of
375 the familv< (.) as being a completely um (.) ideal place (1.0)
376 and I was wondering if you see self-blame as um (.)
377 necessarily conscious or whether it can be an imconscious
378 thing.
379 T (6.0) (.hhh) WELL I suppose in a sense it is isn’t it. (.) the-the
380 the person who comes (. ) patient or client who comes with (. )
381 perfect parents (2.0) well (.) if they feel pretty bad inside (.)
382 and they probably dp otherwise they’re not consulting us (1.0) 
3 83 um (2.0) where does the responsibihty the (.) because if it
384 doesn’t lie with the parents (1.5) at some level it hes with
385 j them doesn’t it. (1.0) if (.) if they’ve had to (.) work quite
386 hard (1.0) a:nd (.) I guess they won’t necessarily have done
387 that consciously (.) “worked hard at it“ (.) but (.) it just is (.)
388 “mum and dad are good folks” (1.5) well (.) if mum and dad
389 are good folks (.) “yeah (.) we had a reallv happv childhood”
390 >you know (.) to (only state)< “ L HAD A REALLY HAPPY
391 childhood.” >as I say< (.) leaves me with a sinking hea:rt (.)
392 ‘cause I think (1.0) now Ms is somebodv who’s feeling prettv
393 bad inside because otherwise why are they consulting me.
394 (1.5) If thev’ve got a pretty good mum and dad well where did
395 it all go (1.0) I guess it (1.0) if mum and M  were great (.)
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396 then who else is arou:nd to (.) shoulder the responsibility of
397 why they tf to  so bad (.) so yes °I think it can be quite an
398 imconscious (.) process (.) umm (.) keeping mum and dad tidy
399 and neat°. (3.0) And of course when you begin to: (.)
400 encourage them to t look at what happened to them (.) “and
401 how thev felt (inaudible) to feel ill at ease at their school o:r
402 (.) or alienated from other kids at school (.) or (.) the odd one
403 out“ (.) and you begin to try and explore a little of that (.) the
405 (.) “the (.) the hackles rise and defences come into plav and“
406 (.) um (.) “you therapists are all the same (.) trying to blame
407 our mum and dad” (1.0) and this is why in a sense I (.) I try
408 not to use (.) I don’t like shame and blame >that’s a personal
409 thing to me< I don’t (1.0) |I  don’t see there’s any value in it
410 what s (.) what use is there >you know< what (.) what l value
411 is shame and blame as a commodity. (1.0) YES (.)
412 ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILTY (.) and FACING things
413 (1.0) Î looking at them and crving over them (.) and letting
414 them go is of value but um (.) I’m not heavily into (.) um (.)
415 shoulds and oughts (.) um (.) “two of the most (.) obscene
416 words I know°
4171 Um(.)
418 T But that’s just personal to mo,
419 I Umm (.) shoulds and oughts (.) yes (.) and I guess they link
420 with blaming and shaming -  “should have done that (.)
421 shouldn’t have done that.”
422 T Yes (.) yes
423 I Um (.) so: umm (.) some people might co:me >kind of<
424 hiding those shoulds and oughts in a kind of (.) >idealistic
425 picture< and other people might come with the shoulds and
426 oughts (.) rea:lly out there (.) and blaming themselves for
427 everything
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428 T Oh I: (.) |yes (.) I think often shoulds and oughts can come
429 umm (.) ftom a highly structured highly reltigious
430 background 
4311 Um
432 T Were (.) ahh (.) the shoulds and oughts a:re disguised in (.)
433 the fo:rm o;f (3.0) well (.) you’re being Twatched=
434 I =Um=
435 T =Gpd knows these things (.) a:nd (.) these are the rules (1.5)
436 a;nd (.) and if you break them (.) the consequences are t dire
437 (2,0) and ^they’re often (.) quite hard to work with. (1.0) a:nd
438 (.) I think I almost flpst a private chent when I said I (1.0)
439 “I’m not very Tgood at this should and ought business” (.) and
450 (1.5) and she was (.) much (.) sort of (.) set aback (.) 'cause (.)
451 she %  there was a clearly defined value system for us all
452 (3.0) and that’s taken a lot of working on for her (.) “and if “
453 (.) if she was happv with that (.) then my guess would be: that
454 (.) that she wouldn’t be coming to see me. (.) but (.) bit bv bit
455 she could see that (.) perhaps (.) shoulds and oughts (.) tend to
456 rob people (.) of the choice (.) of choosing (.) to be (2.0) “I
457 don’t know“ (.) um (.) a I good person (.) >I can’t think of< (.)
458 another way of putting it (inaudible) um that (.) shoulds and
459 oughts I tend to see as (.) a set of ru:les that (.) um (.) one
460 should do this and one ought to be doing this and one should
461 be doing that (1.0) umm (.) we:ll (1.0) there’s not a lot of
462 choice left in that (1.0) then (.) it’s a question of (1.0) well I
463 don’t t know I suppose doing it until you get caught or
464 something o:r (.) umm (1.0) somebodv else laying down the
465 ru:les (1.0) of course (.) thou shalt not tkill seems to me to be
466 a pretty good rule to live by or (.) not taking other people’s
467 property seems -  a prettv good ru:le to live by (1.0) but I
468 think it’s better to have it as a rule to live by (.) because of a
469 rational explanation (.) like well (.) if we go around killing
470 people there are consequences or if we (.) go round (.)
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471 depriving other people of their property than there are
472 consequences. (.) I think that’s a much more rational approach
473 than just a (.) >y’know< a fait accompli (,) “thou shalt not”
474 (1.0) so (.) I suppose that’s probably (.) how (inaudible) (2.0)
475 I don’t know why I got to that but tanyway (.) fthere it was.
476 I Yeah. (.) I’m just thinking about (.) um (.) a sort of >I don’t
483 T YES. (1.0) there is um (1.0) Estell Weldon once said that (.)
484 working (.) in a forensic setting (.) um (.) there is at once the
485 therapist, the patient, the client (.) and the flaw (1.5) so of
486 course (.) um (.) to Mdl is (.) neither (.) legally acceptable nor
487 acceptable to most (.) average sort of (.) human t beings (1.0)
488 so it’s THERE, it’s present (.) but um (1.0) nevertheless (.) so
489 is the person (.) in the room (.) and (.) umm (.) I suppose I
490 (2.0) >I fthink one has to make< choices. (1.0) I’ve worked a
491 lot with perpetrators (1.0) I’ve falso worked a great deal (1.0)
492 with the victims or survfivors of those perpetrators (1.5) but I
493 tty to: work with the person whose in the room. (1.0) so if I’m
494 working with someone whose been (.) on the receiving end of
495 some pretty dreadful treatment then that’s where I’m working.
496 (2.0) to enable them to make sense of what happened to them.
497 (2.0) if (.) I’m working with a perpetrator then (.) then I guess
498 (.) my mergies go into helping them to understa:nd (.) umm
499 (.) how they came to: (.) to that offense (.) to (.) "to what they
500 did' (.) and (.) and even more importantly (.) how they live
501 with that (.) because (.) um (.) I (.) >onlv from my own
502 experience< (.) I cannot speak for (inaudible) experience (.)
503 that (.) umm (1.0) there is an incredible burden 'on those who
504 have killed' tl.O) and that (.) that mav sound t.l a bit
506 melodramatic (.) but it (1.0) however hard you work (.) um -
507 (.) to help them to come to terms with it ( 1.0) NOT to make it
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508 adl better (1.0) not to that it’s oka:v (.) um (.) but just to:
509 (.) how do they live with it (1.0) for some on almost a minute
510 to minute basis (2.0) I worked with a woman who said (.)
511 “how can I laugh (.) how can I ever laugh again ( 1.01 when
512 (.) if that girl’s parents saw me what would they t think (1.0)
513 how (.) how can I, how can I ever (.) go out and have hm (1.0)
514 have good things in my life.
515 I Um.
516 T So (2.0) I uh (1.0) I think people carry this enormous burden
517 and of course the self-blame (3.0) HOWEVER mentally ill
518 they are (1.0) one or two of the people (.) I’ve worked with (.)
519 are extremely mentally iU °>not just personahty disordered<
520 but (.) I’ve worked with people with mental illness as well' (.)
521 and the self-blame there (.) and the accepting (.) accepting
522 responsibility (.) it is frequently quite profound and it’s not
523 (2.0) not (.) re:movable or let-go-able (.) if you like (.) ahm (.)
524 it’s there (1.0) the:y can learn to live (.) beside it (.) but it’s (.)
525 I don’t think (1.0) it doesn’t go awav (.) its (.) a lifetimes
526 companion. (1.5) sounds odd I know (1.0) but (.) having
527 worked with a number of people 'who’ve killed (.) someone
528 (.) um (inaudible) and then' (.) and then it stops and they have
529 to (1.5) turn around and face it as opposed to what they’ve
530 mostly done perhaps (1.0) which is run like hell. (1.0) then
531 you get to somewhere where (1.0) you’re made to stop (.) and
532 you have to (1.0) and you have to live with it (.) and the
533 blame attached to tiiat of course is enformous (.) but (.)
534 (inaudible) they are restppnsible (1.0) and um (.) and helping
535 them to understand (.) what perhaps was going on for them (.)
536 o:r indeed (.) usually (.) who they were killing at the t time (.)
537 because it isn’t necessarily the person they were really killing
538 (3.0) does that make sense.
539 I Um, um, umm (.) so there’s something about (.) working with
540 the ^ tails so that they’re not running anymore
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541 T Um. (.) because t o  is how it m s  (1.0) I WORKED with a
542 man for quite a long period of time (1.0) and um (.) and one
543 (.) one session he said “I would like to: um (.) I w (.) I think I
544 need to talk about what I (.) what I J.#d (.) and so he sat down
545 and (.) he described the ^  of one of his (.) very serious
546 offenses (.) and he described it sort of moment by moment (.)
547 a:nd um (.) at the md of the session (.) towards the end of the
548 session (.) he said um (.) “ n how d’you feel about that?” (.)
549 but of course he was saving “how d’you feel about me?” (.)
550 but “what d’you fW about that” (1.0) and I said (.) “I’m
551 feeling profoundly sa:d” (cough) (.) and um (.) he said >y’
552 know< “that’s the first time I’ve ever heard that” (3.0)
553 because of course when he went for trial (.) he just survived
554 (.) and um (.) his family abandoned him (1.0) he just (.) kept
555 going (.) and 'course he did what was (.) required to be Idone
556 (.) and eventually he got (.) locked |up (3.0) um (.) but (.)
557 really (.) all that can be done about tiiat (.) is to look at and try
558 and make sense of f 1.01 but I don’t think there’s much that
559 one can do >to (.) alleviate the burden.< (.) I’m sure there are
560 a number of people who could walk awav (2.0) but the blame
561 stroke responsibility then (.) for the people I’ve worked with
562 is profound (.) and (.) sort of immovable
563 Umm (.) Umm (.hhh) um (laugh) >I’m going to ask< (.) um
564 (.) do you ever (.) blame yourlsdf (•) for anything in your
565 work with your clients
566 T(3.0) Um (3.0) |YES (1.0) >but I don’t bla:me myself'cause I
567 don’t like blame.<
568 I (laugli) that’s why I hesitated to ask (.) 'cause you’d already
569 said
570 I ]
571 T (laugh) NO (.) I DO accept responsibility (.) I ydll go over (.)
572 I was at a conference recently (.) and I realised that with one
573 particular patient (.) fl had not dealt with the situation (.)
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574 particularly fwell (.) I had Imissed (.) what had told me
575 (1.0) Fd gone off on my own tack (.) a:nd um (.) I realised
576 tiiat when she was talking (.) on a subsequent occasion (.) I
577 realised that (.) I-had-missed (.) what she was trying to Ml me
578 (.) and I (.) accent responsibihty (.) and I think (.) I said to her
579 M “Fm aware from what you’re saving M I missed that
580 completely didn’t I.” n she said “Ives -  you did.” (.) and I
581 said I (.) “Fm really 1 sorry (.) for that (.) because (.) from
582 hearing you now (.) I can see that (cough) (.) what I was
583 saving 'was of no value to you whatsoever”' (1.0) SO (.) um
584 (.) given that Fm a (.) human being (.) Fm not divine (.) uh
585 (1.0) yes I (.) >I get it wrong, I make mistakes. I don’t hear<
586 (.) and I accept responsibility (1.0) BUT AGAIN (.) I don’t
587 think (.) I don’t use the word blame because blame is such an
588 empty, useless concept f  1 vou know (.) WHAT DOES IT DO
589 (.) when’d y (.) “I blame you for treading on my ffoot” (.) Fd
590 much ra:ther (.) >you know< (.) that you looked where you
591 were going (.) and if you say sorrv >well that’s |great< (.) and
592 the incident is o:ver (.) but (2.0) but actually (.) enabling
593 somebody to accept responsibility seems to me to be much
594 more use (.) than to (.) to M g a t finger (.) I-I (.) I see no point
595 in it (.) y’know we en:dlesslv lock people fup because (.) we
596 blame them for what they did and we need to punish them.
597 (1.0) well that seems to me to be a useless occupation because
598 (.) unless you do something about (.) what it is that they’ve
599 (1.0) they diff (1.0) >w’dyou do (.) d’you just t lock them in a
600 jbpx and throw away the fkey (.) I mean< (.) it seems a
601 useless (.) concept, blame (1.0) DOING something about it
602 ves. (.1 accepting responsibility. YES Fd go along with it
603 wholeheartedly (.) 'but blame’s such a tacky word' (laughs)
604 (.) I don’t like it (.) as you can hear
605 I I can (laugh) yeah. (1.0) umm (.) we’re running on a bit=
606 T =That’s usually the wav with me=
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607 I =Err (.) er (.) it’s t great (.) yeah (1.0) sox I guess (.) um (.) is
608 there anything else that you think is important that we haven’t
609 covered (.) about=
610 T =Um no (.) don’t think so (.) I think (1.0) I suppose I see (.)
611 blame as (cough) invariably starting in childhood
612 lUhhm
613 T (cough) y’know (.) you get the chent who says “I got the
614 blame for it” (.) y’know (.) “I got the blame for what my
614 brother did” routine (.) so (.) I guess blame comes early in hfe
615 (.) and (.) um (.) and children make quite early decisions (2.0)
616 whether that’s in a happy household or an unhappy household
617 (.) and they find (.) wavs and means and techniques of
618 surviving (.) and um (.) and if they are continuously shamed
619 and blamed (.) they tend to accept responsibility for their
620 shame and blame and (.) and it takes off fi*om there (.) and it
621 (.) it’s really ba:d (.) to be with women and work so hard (.)
622 but still find at the end of it there are those elements that (.)
623 that um (2.0) that, that one can’t seem to really get at (1.0) I
624 THINK there is only wie other area that I think is perhaps
625 extre:melv destructive (.) and I (.) don’t know whether you’d
626 look at (.) or whether it’s of Tinterest toi you (.) but (3.0)
627 (.hhh) 11 guess (.) that (.) that part of the (cough) child stroke
628 adolescent (.) or adult if you like (3.0) to the lo:nelv child (.)
629 the child who’s had so little of (.) physical or emotional (.)
630 comfort (1.0) that terrible area of self-blame (.) when (.) ah
631 (1.0) 'and this mainly (.) um (.) refers to >sexual abuse< ° (.)
632 is when they (.) they got something out of it (.) not the
633 sweeties routine (.) but the comfort. (.) the sexual pleasure (.)
634 I think that’s an area of self-blame that really is difficult 'to
635 work with (.) extremely difficult' (1.5) “why when I was 15
636 didn’t I Ml” (1.0) “why when I was 14 didn’t I Ml them.”
637 (1.0) “why -  when my brother was doing that and I was 15”
638 >y’know< “why didn’t I Ml them” (.) and that’s an ar (.) an
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639 enormous area of self-blame (.) y’know (1.0) 'that takes
640 weeks, months, years of work (.) to come to terms with' (1.0)
641 it’s another area (.) a very: (.) tricky area to work with (1.0) I
642 tend (.) because I work differently >at the hospitaK (.) I tend
643 to: offer that as a possibility (.) because it otherwise takes us
645 years to get to it (.) that somehow or other (.) I will say
646 something like (1.5) “I guess there were times when it (.) ws
647 even quite pleasant” f  ) and tha:t is (.) that’s a really difficult
648 (.) idea to bring out into the open air (1.0) but when it comes
649 out we can usually make quite a bit of progress (.) but that is a
650 (.) it seems to me a specific area of incredible self-blame
651 Umm (.) so in some ways it’s so difficult for them to bring it
652 out that=
653 =I tend to (.) to (.) oh dear I was going to say “lob it
654 m” but I don’t lob it in (1.0) I tend to sort of tentatively
655 suggest that (.) sometimes there might be (.) a lot of comfort
656 (.) perhaps even pleasure (.) it (.) it’s such an undertaking (.)
657 especially where children have been so berefi; of any physical
658 contact (.) that um there (.) will frequently be (.) an element of
659 pleasure (.) >and sexual arousal< (.) and that’s an area th
660 (hhh) it’s a minefield.
661 I Umm -  umm. (1.0) Before we end (.) do you have any
662 questions.
663 T No, no I don’t think so (1.0) except I (.) I hope I was some
664 value
665 I Yes -  thank you very much yes -  it’s been a (.) a really good
666 interview
667 TGood
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A discourse analysis of client self-blame in psychotherapy
sessions
Discursive approaches to psychological research offer accounts that counter­
pose the traditional assumption that the way towards a deeper understanding of 
the individual is through discoveiy of the ‘goings-on’ in his or her mind. The 
focus of discursive psychology is upon the ‘goings-on’ between people -  the 
premise being that it is not within an internal world that sense is made (that 
meanings are forged and contained) but within ongoing interactions (see for 
example: Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Parker, 1992). 
Madill and Barkham (1997) show how ‘cultural meanings’ are invoked by a 
psychotherapy chent as ‘intimately personal problems’, and how such problems 
are ‘dissipated’ by therapeutic work invoking competing cultural meanings that 
allow the chent alternative, culturahy sanctioned, constructions of herself. They 
do this by analysing the ‘subject positions’ (Althusser, 1971; Davies & Harré, 
1990) adopted by and made available to the chent. According to Davies and 
Harré (ibid) discourses, in terms of actual conversational interactions, constitute 
the self in terms of the ‘positions’ the interlocuter occupies within the 
interaction. Though these discourses are flexible, being continuously co­
constructed between speakers, they draw upon available existing subject 
positions for which there are integral responsibihties, rights and duties. The 
chent, in presenting a problem, is thus voicing culturahy shared conflicts -  ones 
that generate moral struggles, and potentially position the chent as 
blameworthy.
So, in contrast to traditional therapeutic approaches that ‘locate’ a problem 
(such as self-blame) within the mind or relationship and attempt to penetrate the 
mind or relationship to remedy that problem, a discursive approach throws the 
‘problem’ into question. In doing so it foregrounds the moral dimensions of 
psychological theory and psychotherapeutic practice -  showing how versions of 
events and selves are constructed within and fonction to maintain local moral 
orders. Such an approach is, therefore, an important ‘corrective’ to the all-too-
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common assumption in psychology that a diagnosis or formulation of the 
client’s problems is a morally neutral activity. In appreciating that accounts or 
verbal interactions are ‘action-orientated’ -  that is, that they are constructed in 
order to achieve things rather than objectively/passively transmit information 
(see Edwards & Potter, 1993) -  the discourse analyst necessarily treats 
evaluative practices (for example, blaming, justifying and excusing) as 
important features of discourse, in that these are discursive acts that construct 
the limits of the self and the moral orders that sustain those limits (see Lewis 
2002; Gergen, 1999, p.84).
Self-blame is a construct that frequently features in accounts of psychological 
disturbance, and has been researched primarily from a cognitivist model (for 
example, Glinder & Compass, 1999; Graham & Juvonen, 1998; Peters & 
Range, 1997) -  a model sustaining the ‘individuahst’ presumption that self­
blame is a property of the chent’s mind or belief system. From a discursive 
point of view, self-blame can be understood as a resource both chents and 
therapists use in the construction and resolution of problems, but also as a 
resource-in-the-making (its meaning always being ‘situated’ within the 
interaction in which it is invoked and co-constructed). A discourse analysis of 
psychotherapists’ accounts of chents’ self-blame (Lewis & Coyle, 2002) 
showed how such a functional approach to talk (in this case, psychotherapists’ 
talk about chent self-blame) can yield not only varied constructions of self­
blame in terms of content -  the macro-cultural level discourses invoked and the 
‘interpretative repertoires’ drawn upon (see Wetherell, 1998) -  but ihustrate 
how this ‘content’ performs interactional work. Most interestingly for present 
purposes is that it yielded alternative understandings of self-blame in relation to 
the construction of the chent’s process. A common feature of the construction of 
problematic self-blame was as a ‘terminal’ or foreclosed subject position, this 
being contrasted with the construction of the ‘healthier’ chent as complex, 
multiple, and reflexive.
It is then, perhaps, not the ‘fact’ of the chent blaming him or her-self that is 
important per se, but that such blame operates within deeply constraining 
constructions of the self -  constituted within ‘terminal’ discursive forms (that is,
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as comments that seem to close-off rather that call-forth fiirther responses). It is 
from within the context of these suggestions and ‘findings’ that this research 
analysing chent self-blame ‘in action’ is situated. The analysis attends to how 
self-blame emerges and is responded to, in psychotherapy sessions, with 
particular attention being paid to the broad and detailed fimctions it is playing in 
the interaction between therapist and chent, and the interpretative possibilities it 
‘opens-up’ or ‘closes-off.
Method
Participants and data collection
The texts used here were transcripts of psychotherapy sessions, selected by the 
researcher on the basis of self-blame being a relevant feature of at least part of 
the session. Corroboration by coUeagues was used to guard against idiosyncratic 
readings influencing these selections. The texts were obtained from the 
Psychological Therapies Research Centre, University of Leeds, and out of an 
initial ‘random’ selection of 12 transcripts, 8 were deemed to fulfil this 
criterion.^
In each text the participants (therapist and chent) were different (no therapist or 
chent appears in more than one text). An effort was made to draw upon as 
varied a sample as possible, so an even spread of therapeutic approach 
(cognitive-behavioural/CB and interpersonal/IP), therapist and chent genders, 
and age ranges were criteria used to guide the initial selection process. Of the 8 
transcripts eventuaUy used, 4 were of a CB orientation and 4 were IP. The 
session number indicates how many previous sessions the dyad (therapist and 
chent) had completed. (See Appendix One, p. 183 for details).
The selection of transcripts on the basis of demographic variation is not, as in 
traditional psychological research, to ensure ‘representativeness’. The notion 
that the research can validly and rehably represent a population depends upon a
 ^Transcript Notations:
(.) short pause, ( ) non-verbal sound
[ ] timed pause, .... ellipses or column of stops indicate omitted text
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view of language as a mirror of reality rather than as constitutive of ‘reahty’, 
implying that objectively true characterisations of the topic can be generated. 
The key tenet of discourse analysis is that language constructs rather than 
represents -  that it is organised to perform rather than report (is action-oriented) 
-  such that the content of any text is meaningful only in terms of its context. 
The demographic variation sought here was in order to increase the chances of 
tapping a wide range of discourses, discursive resources and discursive 
practices. However, it must be acknowledged that the participants, therapists 
and researcher are all white, middle class and largely university educated, so the 
analyses of self-blame offered here are to be ‘contextuahsed’ within a range of 
discursive practices and discourses that are likely to exclude others.
Analytic strategy
The analysis began with repeated, close readings of the texts, with particular 
attention being paid to how self-blame is invoked, constructed and functions 
(both on a micro-interactional level and in terms of macro-cultural level 
features). It thus attended to the resources used in constructing self-blame, the 
negotiation (co-construction) of self-blame and how it fonctions within the 
session. Since only single sessions from each client were used, there was httle 
opportunity to trace and link the development of themes that arose in each case, 
although some vdthin-session developments of themes are pursued. The 
approach instead was predominantly to focus upon particular instances in which 
self-blame became sahent and to look for patterns and variations across cases, in 
order to comprehensively ‘tap’ the practices and resources discernible in the 
texts.
Positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990), and the concept of ‘interpretative 
repertoires’ (see Wetherell, 1998) were frequently used as interpretative 
frameworks, since they facilitated the movement between micro and macro 
levels -  making clear both the discursive constraints and the interactional 
creativity in the texts. That is, they can accommodate the notion of ‘critical 
discourse analysis’ that people are constrained by the discourses (meaning- 
making resources) culturally available to them, and also the notion in
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‘conversation analysis’ that people actively position themselves and ‘manage’ 
their interactions in context. Concepts drawn from Billig’s ‘rhetorical analysis’ 
(see Billig, 1996) are used to make the link between ‘occasioned use’ and 
‘abstract discourses’, since particular sequences of talk can be conceptuahsed 
as, explicitly or implicitly, orienting to abstract ‘discourses’ as a way of 
‘arguing for’ particular versions of the speaker or the topic over other versions. 
Using these interpretative tools and frameworks an analysis of the emergence, 
uses and ‘problematics’ of self-blame is constructed.
In accordance with its social constructionist epistemology, the report must be 
judged according to its utility and plausibility -  how well it is supported by the 
texts, to what extent it renders the material coherent, and whether it provides 
useful insights (Yardley, 2000).
Analysis
The texts of the sessions have been labelled Dyads A-H and the line numbers 
indicate the location of the extracts within the text; each client is referred to as 
‘C’ and each therapist as ‘T’. Smaller quotations from the texts are included 
within the body of the analysis and are identified by dyad and line number.
As was evident upon reading through the texts, constructions of self-blame cany 
with them imphcations for the construction of the self in relation to socially 
significant acts. Two crucial dimensions in these sessions then are (1) how the 
client and therapist go about constructing the act for which the chent is 
(potentially) to blame, and (2) how they construct the ‘self that is blamed. 
These constructions are, as will be shown in the analysis, interdependent. A 
third ‘dimension’, separated out for the purpose of the analysis, is how these 
constructions are negotiated and employed by the therapists (see ‘Therapeutic 
Moves’). In this section the links between discursive content and process 
become clearer, and are drawn out.
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(1) To blame for what?
Two common strategies were to construct the act as (1) other than it might 
initially be understood, or (2) incidental or irrelevant. These will be discussed 
separately:
The act is not what it seems.
Dyad A is an interesting case in that the client and therapist hypothesise about 
the imphcations of the chent committing a socially proscribed (potentiahy 
blame-worthy) act -  that is, giving up his job -  an act that the chent constructs 
as impossible to carry out due to interpersonal and social obligations. In doing 
so he maintains a construction of himself as sociaUy responsible, yet he and the 
therapist also progressively undermine the validity of proscribing the act 
through drawing upon competing discourses. They draw heavily upon 
discourses of pathology, upbringing and social stereotyping to achieve this 
undermining. For example:
Extract One, Dyad A
239. C: I didn’t reahy want to go back to work anymore (.) but I felt so terribly
240. guilty about being off that sort of overcame the (.) the problems of
241. depression (.) and I just had to go back
Here the chent constructs his obhgation to work, and his guilt about 
transgressing, as compelling to the extent even of overriding his depression, 
thus constructing leaving work as personally impossible. His wishes (and 
implicitly, his needs) are constructed as irrelevant to his decision. This 
dichotomy -  his needs versus his obligations- is later taken-up by the therapist 
and chent as a resource to re-construct the proscribed act. Firstly, however, the 
chent challenges the status of the social norms dictating these obhgations (the 
‘external’ demands upon him). For example:
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Extract Two, Dyad A
252. C: I mean there are plenty of women who don’t work and their husbands
253. work (.) I don’t see why it shouldn’t be the other way round (.) but
254. that’s not the way my mind works
Extract Three, Dyad A
264. C: doing what’s expected all the time (.) that’s right (.) it’s part of my
265. upbringing I suppose (.) and I don’t know how much you’re bom with
266. and how much is pushed into you as you’re brought up but um that’s
267. the way I’ve ended up
In these extracts the client continues to position him-self as powerless in the 
face of (originally) external/alien demands by citing cultural indoctrination 
and/or conditioning. Thus his potential self-blame is constructed as a 
compelling yet arbitraiy condition. By positioning himself as aware of this yet 
still unable to overcome the guüt the client retains his responsible social 
position (as having morally appropriate sentiments and reactions) yet also 
constmcts the grounds for dissent.
By constructing these mores/rules as ‘internal’ (as elements of the client’s 
relationship with himself) the therapist offers the chent the opportunity for 
dissent without blame/fault. This seems to work by positioning the client as both 
blamed/victim and blamer/persecutor, and as within his rights to reject aspects 
of himself that are damaging:
Extract Four, Dyad A
255. T: but it feels sometimes that the way your mind’s working is that you
256. don’t allow yourself anything
257. C: that’s right I don’t (.) I don’t allow myself any way out (.) that’s the
258. problem (.)
259. T : mm [20] I sometimes feel that you umm you say to yourself that
260. you’ve not been good enough therefore you’re not allowed to have
261. any (.) anything that you can enjoy or maybe want
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Not allowing himself what he wants/needs appears to be an insufficient 
construction as it stands for him to warrant his challenge to these obligations, 
the client going on to warrant the possibility of giving up work by constructing 
his continued compliance as depleting him to the extent of threatening his 
mental health. Thus, non-comphance (giving up work) is constructed as a 
potentially responsible and necessary act -  as a preventative measure. Or at 
least, leaving work is constructed as inevitable sooner or later, and possibly best 
done sooner whilst he remains relatively undamaged (ahve?):
Extract Five, Dyad A
284. C: I feel it’s just opting out and I shouldn’t do that [6] but that’s the
285. thing I feel I want to do (laughs) it just (.) just feels as if it’s ebbing (.)
286. my sort of enthusiasm ebbs away eveiy day I go there it just seems to
287. get worse and worse [10] so I mean maybe it will come to that before
288. very long (.) I don’t know
The client continues to negotiate a construction of his ‘hypothesised act’ as 
justifiable by invoking repertoires with which he can challenge the ‘work ethic’, 
for example, positioning himself as a ‘family man’ saying: “I wanted to settle 
down, get married, there are quite a lot of men feel like this (.) that it’s not the 
general er accepted feeling” (line-293) Again he positions his 
wishes/inclinations as socially misunderstood, and positions conventions as 
arbitraiy and erroneous. He describes himself as “hanging on to” his 
relationship with his wife, distinguishing himself from other men who are 
“hanging on to” work, and makes the case that he retains a relationship with his 
wife at the cost of his work whilst other men retain their work at the cost of their 
relationships. He then concludes: “I’m hanging on to my relationship with my 
wife I suppose (.) and if that went I should just disintegrate altogether...” (line- 
306). The imphcation seems to be that if he goes back to work he might lose his 
wife and ‘himself. The construction of himself as socially marginalised through 
devotion to his wife is a reconstruction of the problem that affords him a 
position of moral ‘strength’ -  that he is potentially the victim of blame as a 
result of his devotion to others and responsibility to himself rather than through 
rejecting his social responsibihties. Thus the therapist and client progressively
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re-construct ‘the problem’ and ‘arrive’ at the solution implicit in the alternative 
discourses -  a solution that had earher been constructed as irresponsible/selfish.
That the chent began by ahgning with a view of the act as blameworthy and 
gradually undermined this position shows that he oriented to it as a dilemma in 
which his ‘stake’ must be concealed or down-played in order to validate his act 
as defensible on wider grounds than his own interest (stake innoculation, Potter, 
1996). He achieved this through the use of varied repertoires/discourses that 
allowed alternative interpretations of his act and preferred constructions of him­
self in relation to that act. This could be conceptuahsed as a therapeutic process 
of ‘re-storying’, in which the meaning of the client’s proposed act is re­
constructed to ahow a ‘reading’/interpretation that resolves the potential blame. 
However, this conceptuahsation ignores the negotiation process, in which the 
‘positioning’ possibilities arising from these constructions are utihsed 
‘dynamically’. As iUustrated here, the apportioning of blame, the construction 
of the act and the positioning of the chent shift in co-ordinated ways, such inter­
dependence being a useful resource for achieving preferred constructions of the 
self ‘indirectly’. By offering re-constructions of the act the chent can position 
him/herself differently and thereby avoid or invite blame.
The act is irrelevant
Self-blame is frequently used in these sessions as a resource to position the 
chent as separate from, and disapproving of, the blame-worthy act that he or she 
has ‘committed’, thus aUowing the retention of blamelessness and the 
positioning of the chent as upholder of ‘the real’, ‘the true’ and ‘the good’ (as 
virtuous). The chent is thus positioned according to the stance he/she takes upon 
his/her acts rather than according to the effects of the acts, severity of the 
consequences or social significance of the act. The act thus becomes of 
secondary importance, or even irrelevant, to the therapeutic process.
In Dyad B the chent constructs her self-blame as stemming from her feelings 
rather than her actions, saying that her self-blame is a result of “me feeling that 
I’ve upset someone else” (line-126), thus avoiding constructing herself as
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having done anything blameworthy/wrong. Feelings frequently function in these 
sessions to make the act irrelevant and to emphasise the damage to the self 
imphcit in a position of self-blame, as illustrated in the same chent’s comment: 
“I felt so awful and I just went down and down and down” (line-160). Not only 
does this make the social/interpersonal consequences of the act of less 
importance than the effect upon the chent (sel^, it also positions the chent as 
morahy ‘sound’ -  as being troubled by her behaviour to the extent of becoming 
a victim herself.
In Dyad C the chent achieves the ‘minimisation’ of the act by constructing it as 
a ‘mistake’. The therapist responds with the statement “and you don’t make 
mistakes” (line-54). This statement could be interpreted in many different ways, 
but the chent seems to orient to it as a chahenge and perhaps a criticism that she 
has positioned herself as special by blaming herself. The chent’s invokation of 
self-blame in relation to making a mistake thus appears to potentially carry the 
imphcation that the she is positioning her-self as perfect (error being 
uncharacteristic). In this session the chent counters this interpretation by saying 
that she makes mistakes “all the time” (line-64), and by reconstructing her self­
blame as a complex internal activity with little connection to the act (mistake) 
for which she blames herself:
Extract 6, Dyad C.
66. C: It was important and it was a mistake (.) but I mean (.) when I got home
67. last night and I thought about it (.) I mean I went to town on it (.) I
68. thought what am I going to do (.) and got visions of firing squads
69. coming to get me (.) I really like made a meal of it (.) Everything else
70. yesterday went out of the window
This emphasis upon ‘internal’ (intra-psychic) persecution -  in which the client 
constructs her self-blame in terms of disproportionate self-punishment and 
unreahstic expectations of hostility from others -  positions her self-blame as a 
kind of pathology. She explicitly separates the act and her self-blame in time 
and place, thus constructing her self-blame as a personal/psychological matter 
and minimising the importance of the mistake, whilst still acceding to its status
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as ‘wrong’ in some sense. Discourses of pathology are frequently used in order 
to diminish the social importance of the act (rendering self-blame unwarranted) 
whilst retaining its problematic status. This retention of the blameworthy status 
of the act is perhaps an indication of the resilience of the discourses within 
which the act is constructed. In order to disclaim the ‘dispreferred’ act the chent 
must then construct a disjunction between the act and the self -  a move 
functioning to sustain a construction of ‘selves’ as centralised, unitary, and thus 
accountable in some sense for their actions.
(2) The self that blames and is blamed
As already discussed the construction of the act, and the self in relation to the 
act, are not separate -  the discourses used for constructing one having 
implications for tlie other, these imphcations providing ‘indirect’ discursive 
opportunities. Thus, the preceding analysis has touched upon issues that will 
arise again here.
Self versus other blame
In Dyad C the blame is shifted around -  the chent weaving self-blame with 
other blame in order to retain a plausible construction of herself as 
separate/distinct from, and therefore not to blame for, her potentially 
blameworthy acts. She builds a case that her ‘mistake’ was the outcome of her 
employers’ deficiencies, demands and unreasonable agendas, and links her 
mistake causally to their failings. In using this strategy, however, there are 
important ramifications for her as a speaker. That is, through constructing the 
other as to blame for her actions she implicitly constructs herself as (among 
other things) non-agentic. In doing so she is able to avoid responsibihty and 
blame but then has a weak speaking position as one who is controlled by others 
and therefore untrustworthy/unaccountable. She avoids this by building a case 
that she was under extreme and unusual pressures relating to the ‘mistake’. She 
gives a narrative describing double-messages and conflicting demands from her 
employers, and continues:
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Extract 7, Dyad C
84. C: So (.) I mean I don’t know where I am at work (.) I’m backwards and
85. forwards (.) I don’t think they know what they want me to do (.) I don’t
86. know whether that made me forget this damned bloody report or what (.)
87. Eveiything I do (.) and it’s not all my own doing (.) I just (.) I don’t seem
88. to know where I fit in anywhere (.) I feel really like lost (.) And eveiything
89. it seems (.) and it seems to be really (.) everything’s exaggerated so I (.)
90. and I take things out of proportion (.) I know I’m doing it
After having used a series of extreme formulations to construct a case that such 
pressures have profoundly altered her (thereby constructing her actions as 
uncharacteristic) she disclaims/disavows the extreme postioning she has taken- 
up by referring to ‘exaggeration’ as a symptom of the position she has been put 
in by her context/employers. She thus avoids pathologising herself by 
pathologising her environment, and this pathologisation appears to be driven by 
the requirement that she avoids blaming herself for her ‘mistake’ whilst 
sustaining a coherent and accountable speaking position. By also constructing 
herself as angry her account is rendered more convincing -  anger being an 
emotion that is associated with (warranted by) assaults on the self.
The construction of the client as the source of the self-blame (frequently taking 
the form of pathologisation of the chent by the client or therapist) is often 
achieved through discourses of emotion/feeling and (as discussed in the 
previous section) serves to distance the client from the blameworthy act by 
making it an irrelevant/extraneous aspect of the self-blame. Self-blame as an 
emotion is also a useful discursive resource in other ways that afford the chent 
‘preferred’ positions. For instance, in Dyad C the chent asserts that she has been 
(uncharacteristically) ‘having a go’ at people around her, and that she views this 
as a sign of personal growth and a manifestation of a new-found clarity in her 
relationships with others. When the therapist constructs this behaviour in less 
favourable terms, as “You don’t know what they want of you. You don’t know 
what you want of maybe them” (line-150), the chent withdraws/transforms her 
account by re-describing ‘having a go’ at others as a description of how she 
feels she is behaving rather than as a portrayal of reahty:
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Extract 8, Dyad C
162 C: Because I’ve never done it before I feel as though Fm snapping and
163 having a go at people all the time (.) and I don’t actually think that I am
Thus she invokes her own personality/tendencies and lack of objectivity to 
position her-self as unable to pronounce upon (judge) her own actions -  thereby 
calling her self-blame into question. This serves a useful purpose in positioning 
her as a victim -  as someone who is so used to victimising herself that she 
perceives herself to be victimising others if she moves from that ‘state of being’ 
(position). This move imphes that she has an objective perspective to see that 
‘in reality’ she is not being hostile but that, nevertheless, she is blinded by her 
tendency to self-blame. She warrants the former by citing others’ reactions to 
her, saying “they’d say something if I was doing it” (line-167). Blaming others 
is thus constructed as a strange new dialogical possibihty that is liberating (and 
warranted) through being reahstic/rational. The move also illustrates how a 
reflexive distancing, in which the client adopts super-ordinate positions in 
relation to him/her self generates morally preferred positions by making 
possible the disavowal of selected actions/behaviours and their consequences. It 
is also a discursive move that has transformational potential in that the client has 
constructed him/her self as multiple and contradictory yet as having a 
unified/accountable speaking position/self. There is thus the possibility not only 
of dialogue between irmer selves but also of taking a position upon and 
orchestrating that dialogue -  a self of selves.
A similar process of reconstruction takes place in Dyad E, where the 
interpersonal is relocated intra-personally and the self is constructed as both 
unitary and multiple. The chent initially formulates the problem in social terms 
-  that he hasn’t supported others in the past so caimot expect support from 
others now. This brutal conclusion -  that he must simply take these social 
consequences -  is countered by the therapist, who uses a formulation that the 
client’s fundamental self is in conflict with his actions and that, on the basis of 
this self, he deserves love and care from others. That this formulation requires 
discursive work to make it plausible illustrates the centrahty of the concept of a
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unified self, the actions of which stem in a consistent manner from core 
characteristics. The construction of the chent’s behaviours as contradicting this 
core self thus requires explanation (discursive ‘work’):
Extract 9, Dyad D
216. T: And you’ve put yourself in a position where you weren’t expected to
217. give very much emotional support (.) emotional support to other people
218. C: yes
219. T: and you couldn’t expect much back either
220. C: And so (.) yeah so it’s justifiable
221. T: so it’s
222. C: it’s a catch 22 situation
223. T: it seems a strange position for someone like you to put yourself into
224. C: mm. I don’t think I consciously did it (.) I think I (.)! think it just
225. happened um and so it’s so convoluted and so comphcated and so
226. impossible to escape fi'om
227. T: Perhaps it felt as if all of you (.) if you ignored all those things and
228. got on with a different sort of relationship (.) those needs would just
229. vanish (.) or you could forget them (.) or sit on them (.) or pretend
230. they weren’t really there
231. C: mm (.) But I think the same situation is at work (.) I think I’ve done
232. just the same at work
233. T: so you make things difficult, or in a position where it’s difficult for
234. people to be helpful (.) supportive or loving (.) or where those things
235. aren’t shown
236. C: mm
237. T: and then when you need them they’re not available for you
238. C: Well then I can blame them for it I think (laughs) whereas I want to
239. blame myself all the time I think.
The reconstruction of his rejecting actions towards others works in accordance 
with the premise of a unified, predictable self, and with the principle that the 
client is not to blame for these potentially blameworthy actions. Initially the
client claims to have chosen to reject others to fulfil his own wants and needs.
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The therapist responds by constructing this behaviour as out of character, and 
then the client invokes unconscious processes to distance himself from his 
action and remove personal responsibility for it. This appears unsatisfactory 
through putting the client’s behaviour beyond understanding and reason, and 
beyond his power to change, and the therapist remedies this by offering a 
motivation/explanation for his action -  that the chent has forcibly pushed his 
‘real’ needs (to be close to others) out of awareness. This constructs the client as 
involved in a conflict with himself, and as being in a paradoxical position - that 
is, as rejecting relationships as a result of needing relationships. The therapist 
suggests that the chent renders others unable to help him by constructing a 
situation in which they caimot show affection -  a reconstruction that accounts 
for his rejection of others and their rejection of him and that not only releases 
him from blame but, through introducing dilemmatic positioning, renders 
possible alternative ‘meanings’ for the position he had initiaUy constructed.
The chent’s remarks in line 238 are interesting. The first statement appears to 
fimction as a demonstration that he is hard on himself (judges himself harshly) 
and that he is not tiying to avoid blame or reponsibihty -  an imphcation that 
supports his subsequent comment that he fimdamentaUy wants to blame himself, 
this comment serving the purpose of explaining and excusing his behaviour and 
positioning him as a victim. He later develops this position by stating that the 
“underlying” problem is “I just don’t like myself at all, I think this is it” (line- 
240). The use of “want” (line-238) invokes personal inclinations to support a 
construction of himself as a good person and distance him from his sociahy 
rejecting (bad) actions and prima facie lack of responsibihty /accountability. 
Likewise, he cites not liking himself as a reason for his ‘un-likeable’ 
behaviours. It seems, then, that paradoxical explanations are useful resources 
that can be used to re-position the chent by radically reconstructing his/her acts, 
and that despite operating within constructions of a unified/centralised self-hood 
they require multiple and reflexive positionings in which these paradoxes can be 
played out and made meaningful.
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The conflicted self
As illustrated in the examples already discussed, one way of moving from a 
blamed position is to ‘internalise’ the blamer -  by constructing the self as 
voicing blame towards itself and thereby constructing the self as occupying 
diverse positions. This discursive move is one that is achieved in many of the 
texts through constructing the self as (or as in) conversation/dialogue (as 
being/having different ‘voices’). Dialogical ‘movement’ allows the client to 
sustain personal accountability and responsibility for ‘blameworthy’acts whilst 
distancing him/her self from those acts. This ‘reflexivity’, expressed as the 
selfs relationship to the self, allows interpretative movement across a range of 
discursive possibilities.
For example, in Dyad E the client uses her feelings towards herself to justify her 
hostile and punishing wishes towards another -  thereby ‘indirectly’ holding the 
other ‘to blame’ (for how she is feeling), and by constructing his actions as 
destructive of herself she warrants the intensity/compulsion of her wish. She 
positions herself as profoundly conflicted and morally tom, conveying this 
through ‘externalised’ dialogue with herself, saying “oh god. I couldn’t...! do 
and I will, I really will” (line-399). Here she constructs herself as shocked by 
her own wishes and intentions but as also impelled to stand by them. Through 
positioning herself dilemmatically, according to opposing voices, she is able to 
hold a reflexive and morally responsible position -  her shock fimctioning as a 
disclaimer against her actions and constmcting her as potentially self-blaming.
Throughout the texts self and other blame are intimately woven together. This, it 
seems, protects the client from potential accusations that they are blaming 
others. The ‘intemahsation’ of both these positions (blamer and blamed, self­
persecutor and victim) allows the client to manage the implications of his/her 
constructions of the blameworthy act by switching positions.
In Dyad F the ‘intemahsation’ of blame through discourses of emotion 
functions to allow the therapist and client to discuss self-blame without 
implying fault (in other words, intemahsation using discourses o f ‘feeling’, as in
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Dyad E, takes the focus away from the act and towards the effect of self-blame 
upon the self):
Extract 10, Dyad F  
399. C: if it wasn’t my fault
340. T : mm (.) if there was no (.) if you felt blameless (.) if you felt
The therapist explicitly encourages the client to have dialogues with himself, 
asking “what would you say to someone else in your situation?” (line-441), 
“how would you help someone who felt like you do, what would you say to 
them?” (line-442), again stressing that the problem is ‘internal’ -  it is about how 
the client is talking to himself -  but that it is resolvable by a shift of positioning 
in relation to himself through a reflexive conversation in which he achieves a 
super-ordinate position.
Therapeutic moves
Blame of self and other in the therapeutic dyad
Not only are self-blame and other-blame ‘topicalised’ in these sessions as issues 
to be worked with and remedied, they are also negotiated and managed as 
features of the ongoing interaction. In Dyad G the therapist asks a series of 
questions related to whether the chent has fulfilled the commitments he had 
previously made. For example:
Extract 11, Dyad G
483. T: have you been hstening to the tape at ah
484. C: no I haven’t to be honest (.) no (.) um (.) again (.) like I said last week
485. (.) the feel (.) I don’t feel as though I (.) I just feel so ultra relaxed at the 
486 moment
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525. T: did you um (.) get anywhere with talking to [name] about Relate or
526. anything
527. C: no (.) no I’m afraid (.) I must confess I haven’t
The client orients to the possibility of blame and signals this by the use of the 
apologetic statements “to be honest”, “I’m afraid”, “I must confess”. Thus he 
positions himself as taking responsibihty for these failures and as committed to 
the relationship (orienting to the importance of having ‘let down’ the therapist). 
He uses mitigating accounts and promises to give weight to his sincerity and 
commitment and avoid a construction of himself as blameworthy. Thus he 
demonstrates his awareness that he is in a weak/culpable position. It is notable, 
however, that by the end of the session the situation has become problematic for 
the therapist, and she appears to counterbalance or ‘solve’ the tension with a 
claim of fault upon her part, saying when they are unable to agree upon friture 
session dates:
“this is my fault for taking too many holidays” (line-588).
The client has consistently constructed his utterances in a way that closes-off 
dialogue -  operating within a convention of confession for wrong-doing that 
positions the therapist as required to ‘forgive’ him. In other words, it is a 
formalised/routine kind of dialogue in which the participants are constrained by 
rigid interactional conventions. That the therapist eventually reverses her 
position is also a feature of such a routine, in that by constructing herself as 
equally guilty she removes her right to blame him and repairs the relationship. It 
also, however, positions her in a more powerful way -  as someone who is an 
agent/cause of the situation. Thus self-blame in the therapist offers a position 
according to which she can ‘make sense of/explain the behaviour of her client, 
claim some power and alter her problematic positioning in the relationship.
Prohibited and sanctioned discourses -  discursive constraints and potentials
In some of the sessions the therapist and client become involved in negotiating 
blame between each other, within a conversation ostensibly ‘about’ blame and 
self-blame in relation to the chent’s life outside the session.
169
In Dyad E the therapist appears to ‘prohibit’ the ways that chent goes about 
constructing herself and her behaviour, and in so doing demands that she 
construct herself in more ‘appropriate’ ways. After the client constructs a 
narrative in which she blames someone else for her distress and ‘admits’ to 
wanting to punish him, the therapist responds that he “wondered how much [she 
was] out for revenge” (line-399). The client invokes a series of interpretative 
repertoires in an attempt to repair the disjuncture created by the therapist’s 
potentially blaming remark. She attempts to justify her position of other blame 
by invoking seduction (“he has all these powers” line-360), fear (I’m terrified of 
being used” line-350), trauma (“there are all kinds of traumas” line-351) and 
personal vulnerability (“I’m fiightened...ril lose myself again” line-341) as 
causes of her blaming and punishing stance. To avoid the ‘vengeful’ label and 
position herself as separate from her other-blaming stance she constructs herself 
as overpowered by these assaults and as needing powerfiil ‘weapomy’ (blame) 
to keep the attacker at bay. The therapist persists in constructing her as having 
“[her] mind veiy much made up” (line-389) and, therefore, as being beyond his 
help, and he does so until the chent begins to position herself as confused and 
unable to cope. It seems that in this session the therapist provides a commentary 
on the effects of the client’s utterances in terms of the context (the therapeutic 
setting/context) -  a powerful message being that she must express her position 
tentatively and construct herself as being in doubt in order to warrant her need 
of help. The client repeatedly attempts to invoke the intensity of her feelings as 
an explanation for, and justification of, her position, and uses the expression of 
this feeling in an attempt to engage the therapist, but the therapist repeatedly 
rejects these attempts until at the end he ‘topicalises’ her confiision and doubt as 
a potential focus for the sessions. In this session the power differential between 
therapist and client is pronounced, the chent working hard to find a sanctioned 
construction of her problems in response to the therapist’s intransigence (that he 
cannot help her because she has made up her mind). The session thus becomes a 
struggle to negotiate appropriate speaking positions.
It seems that clients’ definitive/categorical assertions of blame (towards self or 
other), as in Dyad E, are frequently constructed by therapists as problematic, 
and are addressed as such using repertoires of ‘stuckness’, or ‘terminal
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positions’ (for example, as a ‘made-up mind’). In Dyad A the therapist 
constructs the client as seeking a monological position, through exphcitly 
formulating ‘the problem’ in terms of the client seeking an answer. The 
therapist states that “it’s somehow the stuckness that’s the difficulty” (line-336) 
after describing the chent as seeking a ‘solution’ to his hfe then as seeking “the 
solution to hfe” (line-346) (a phrase that is frequently repeated). It seems to 
position the chent’s dilemma (of whether he should give up work or not) as less 
relevant than his attempts to define himself through defining his act, and also 
perhaps constructs his attempts to change his life as erroneously focussed upon 
‘external’ circumstances rather than ‘internal’ processes.
Similarly, in Dyad C the therapist hypothesises that the client’s desperate 
feelings are a result of “clinging onto things, rather than perhaps letting go” 
(line-103), thus offering a construction of stasis as generative of pathology and 
distress, and the abandoning of interest in ‘external’ circumstances as a route to 
psychological movement. The pathologising of what has been constructed as the 
client’s need to meet unreasonable ‘external’ demands is used to warrant her 
potentially blameworthy acts -  acts of upsetting others and not meeting their 
wishes and demands. These acts are co-constructed as signifying personal 
growth through the taking-up of rights to self-preservation:
Extract 12, Dyad C
82. T: trying not to make mistakes (.) trying to do everything right
83. C: mm
85. T: it feels like there’s a kind of part of you that’s having to push yourself
86. to do that (.) having to fight (.) almost wondering whether there’s a bit of
87. you
88. C: I feel as though I’m getting to a stage where I’m going to say sod you all
89. T: that’s right
Similarly, the client’s expression of her negative feelings is co-constructed as 
releasing her from the ‘stuckness’ engendered by harbouring bad feelings:
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Extract 13, Dyad C
91. T: right (.) you feel better when you say what you feel
92. C: I’ve let it go
93. T: you let it go
Thus, potentially proscribed behaviours (anger and hostility towards others) 
become constructed as indices of the chent’s participation in moral/social Hfe -  
positioning her as, through looking after her-self, healthy and wholesome. Work 
is done, however, to construct this move as difficult -  that it is a struggle for the 
client to occupy this position -  thus guarding against accusations (blame) that 
she is acting expediently and upon purely selfish grounds. Thus self-blame 
(especially in terms of feeling bad about the self) is used to warrant behaviour 
from which the chent could be constructed as standing to gain, whereas it is 
elsewhere challenged as self-destructive and pathological. This highlights its 
dilemmatic status -  as an indicator of moral sensibihty and, alternatively, as an 
intolerable position brought on by or causing self-limitation or self-destruction.
Thus, the dilemmas voiced by chents are often reconstructed as problems of 
stuckness/stasis emanating from misperceptions of the nature of the problem 
and the avoidance of stasis is used as a discursive resource to warrant acts that 
are potentially constructed as ‘wrong’. Chents are often ‘guided’ towards 
dissipating the dilemma by reformulating it in terms over which they have 
control -  for example, as an expression of parts of the self (‘internalisation’). 
There is also an implication that ‘answers’ and the seeking for answers, can be 
limiting and pathological.
In some texts there is, conversely, an emphasis upon ‘objectivity’ and ‘reahty 
orientation’ that appears to make a focus upon ‘external’ features, and the 
pursuance and achievement of answers to specific problems, a primaiy element 
of the therapy. These answers, however, appear to be constructed as helping the 
chent to ‘move’ (to know how to ‘go on’ rather than remain stuck), and thus 
function in a similar way -  as ‘voices’, or positions, added to the client’s 
repertoire that can potentiahy be in a dialogue/interaction having 
transformational potential.
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For example, in Dyad B the therapist constructs the client’s self-blame as a form 
of victimisation through ‘internal’ voices and dialogues that have been carried 
forward from childhood. Not only does the therapist use this as an explanatory 
device, she also positions the chent as a child in the therapist-client interaction, 
saying “you’re obviously a very good learner” (line-273) and “he’s a hard 
person to argue with isn’t he” (line-275) -  and the chent accepts this 
positioning, saying “because he’s the daddy and he’s always right” (line-276). 
After stating that these beliefs of childhood are “difficult to apply logic to” 
(line277) (viz., irrational), the therapist constructs them as somehow 
‘possessing’ the otherwise logical and rational chent. The discursive move 
required of the chent is, according to the therapist, one of stating “I don’t 
believe in that anymore”(line-279). Thus, the childhood position is constructed 
as infused/overpowered by blind faith in dictatorial forces, release from which is 
a brave but simple matter of voicing dissent. The therapist constructs the chent 
as already possessing the ‘voices’ to contradict her self-blame, invoking these as 
“what [she] would say to [her] self’ (line-281) were she to feel that she could. 
The therapist thus constructs the chent as potentiahy agentic through making the 
decision that “that’s not how I want to be now” (line-280) -  thus as capable of 
choosing her dialogue with herself rather than being subsumed by ahen ‘voices’
Explanations constructed in terms of childhood experiences, especially 
treatment by parents, are common resources used to account for the presence of 
these intractable, unreasonable and dominant internal voices. Childhood is a 
very useful resource in that needs and vulnerabilities can be constructed as 
predominating over reahty, thus normalising ‘irrational’ thoughts and 
behaviours and rendering the child blameless. Throng constructing the adult as 
partly composed of voices from the past/childhood he/she can be positioned 
similarly.
Specific kinds of dialogue with the self, then, are advocated over others.
In Dyad F the therapist makes direct suggestions that the chent talks to himself 
in different ways (from alternative positions) in order to “really limit [his] own 
responsibility” (line-420) and invalidate his self-blame. He suggests that “if [he]
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can say” (line-421) alternative things to himself and reason with himself this 
might work to alleviate his self-blame. This seems to be a recommendation that 
the client argue with himself in order to challenge the plausibility of his self­
blame -  a recommendation that treats reahty as unproblematic (that reahty 
testing through hypotheses and evidence-gathering will show the chent that he 
cannot be completely to blame). The therapist constructs this unproblematic 
position as the outcome of taking “an objective outside viewpoint” in which the 
chent “can imagine [him]self...taking a bird’s eye view of it” (line-444). The 
therapist invokes dialogue with the self modelled upon dialogue with others as a 
technique for ‘persuading’ the self of that reahty, asking “what would you say to 
someone else in your situation” and “how would you help someone else who 
felt like you do, what would you say to them” (line-442). Internal dialogue, 
then, is frequently advocated or encouraged by therapists as a solution to self­
blame -  implying that self-blame is a stuck/terminal (monological) subject 
position that is potentially ‘solvable’ by dialogue with opposing/contradictoiy 
voices or positions.
An illustrative rift in the dyad
In Dyad H the ‘internalising’ constructions attempted by the therapist are 
resisted by the chent -  leading to a problematic interpretative ‘rift’. The chent 
constructs his ‘problem’ to be not knowing how he should behave regarding the 
death of a friend. He uses metaphors of being ‘lost’ and alienated to construct a 
sense of lack of social participation and legitimacy. The therapist attempts to 
reconstruct it as the chent not knowing how he feels, and when this is resisted 
invokes a paradoxical interpretation -  that the reason he doesn’t feel is that he 
actually feels too much and is therefore potentially overwhelmed by grief. As 
has been apparent in the analyses so far, this ‘internalisation’ positions the chent 
as being in conflict with him/herself as both the blamer and the blamed, and 
thereby offers the opportunity of re-positioning and reconstruction to dissipate 
the blame. In particular, blame becomes irrelevant because actions are 
constructed as peripheral to the self, as only partially expressive of the self, or as 
expressive of only part of the self.
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The client in this session, however, challenges this construction by invoking a 
reahty beyond ‘sentiment’ that vahdates his position. He constructs feelings as 
potentially being mistaken, or contradicting reahty (in particular, he constructs 
death as a given of existence, and feelings of grief as denials of the facts), such 
that his seemingly ‘inappropriate’ lack of reaction to death is actually a 
legitimate position in virtue of being reality-orientated. The therapist discounts 
this construction, re-asserting that what matters is how he feels. So here the 
chent manages to construct an account that potentially relieves his distress 
through positioning him beyond blame, but the therapist resists the ‘solution’ as 
inadequate. The ‘invested’ position of the therapist thus becomes clear -  that the 
stoiy created by the chent is not one that is sanctioned by the therapist because 
it is morally inadequate. The chent has failed to construct himself as embedded 
within the moral order and can only do this by voicing/asserting the ‘feelings’ 
that mark the “due sense of caring and responsibihty” that he claims for himself. 
Self-recrimination/blame in the chent is the feeling that the therapist appears to 
consider an appropriate one to mark his problem -  as is clear from the 
therapist’s comment that the chent’s disclosures are “hard things to say” (line- 
546).
Self-blame, then, for sociahy proscribed actions appears here to be a pre­
requisite for a sanctioned discourse with the therapist -  one that moves to 
oppose chent self-blame through alternative discourses/constructions that retain 
moral conventions.
Conclusion
It appears both from this analysis and previous research (Lewis & Coyle, 2002) 
that the greater the intensity of chent self-blame the less it is treated as 
warranted. This functions in a simple way -  the greater the exaggeration of 
negative judgements of the self the easier it is to position these judgements as 
unreasonable (disproportionate) and the chent as blameless. Without this 
resource it would be problematic to construct the chent as blameless for 
‘blameworthy acts’ other than by positioning him/her as non-agentic (as not 
responsible for his/her actions), thus compromising the status of the therapeutic
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process. The imphcation here is that avoiding blame is important for the 
maintenance of the therapeutic relationship, and this is evident from the 
instances in which the dyads orient to, and repair, blaming interactions. Self­
blame also appears to function as a resource for the chent to maintain a position 
of moral standing (responsibihty and accountability) -  constructing him/her-self 
as upholding moral standards through his/her stance upon personal acts and at 
the same time distancing ‘the self from the act.
The analysis shows how the occasioned/particular uses of self-blame in therapy 
sessions perform interactive work (positioning the chent and therapist in various 
ways) by drawing upon a range of discourses and repertoires, and how these 
resources (discourses and repertoires) delimit the constructive possibihties of 
the discourse. Self-blame is a useful resource in these sessions through allowing 
paradoxical, ‘dilemmatic’ positioning. Through the chent being constructed as 
‘blamer’ and ‘blamed’, for instance, he/she can ‘manage’ the blameworthy 
scenario as a feature of the self, and through being thus ‘internalised’ the chent 
attains all of the rights responsibilities and duties associated with each position 
and can use these dynamicaUy (for example, shifting positions as necessary to 
avoid blame from the therapist). Paradoxical explanations for the client’s acts 
are useful in radically re-constructing the act and re-positioning the chent when 
fine-grained shifts are unavailable or inadequate. Thus, the construction of the 
self becomes increasingly elaborate, and much work is done to maintain an 
accountable (unified and coherent) speaking position in the midst of the 
multiple and contradictoiy ‘selves’ that emerge. Moreover, the topics of self­
blame and other-blame become difficult to dissociate/isolate from each other, 
since the ‘other’ becomes an ‘internalised’ speaking position.
The construction of the chent as, or as in, conversation/dialogue with the self (as 
poly-vocal), alleviates self-blame through constructing the possibihty of 
dialogical movement using alternative discourses and repertoires. Given the 
interactional work that ‘content’ (discourses, repertoires and narratives) must 
achieve (as illustrated in this analysis), it is difficult to conceptualise therapeutic 
‘re-stoiying’ as the simple replacement of content. Rather, the deployment of 
discourses functions more as a moment-by-moment (fluid) reformulation
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process that requires a sophisticated interactional sensitivity (the ability to orient 
to interactional demands and possibihties). It seems that an important 
prerequisite for such interactional ‘fluidity’ is a degree of reflexivity -  or the 
abihty to bring positions (selves) into dialogue with each other whilst achieving 
an accountable and coherent speaking position (a self of selves).
Thus, as Gergen (op. cit.) maintains, the concept (theoretical formulation) of 
therapy as ‘re-stoiying’ is inadequate since it treats stories as static, 
decontextualised entities. The construction of therapy as a relational process of 
increasingly reflexive meaning-making appears to more adequately account for 
the discursive activities in these sessions. The imphcation for therapeutic 
practice is that attending to how a construction (for example, self-blame) is 
functioning for a chent is more likely to be therapeutic through encouraging the 
development of dialogical and reflexive processes than through delivering an 
alternative construction/understanding of the problem per se.
The use of self-blame as a discursive resource is, thus, subtle and varied, and in 
these sessions appeared to function as a way of achieving a coherent, 
accountable self whilst working within constructions of the self as multiple and 
contradictoiy. The use of varied discourses to account for and construct 
proscribed acts creates multiple, contradictory positioning possibihties, and the 
dilemmas raised become resources for constructing a ‘confhcted self. This 
enables the chent to function creatively (sometimes ‘paradoxicahy’), yet remain 
coherent in virtue of the taking-up of reflexive/super-ordinate positions 
regarding the conflicting aspects at issue. Thus, ‘terminal’ positions are avoided, 
and the possibihty of interpretative ‘movement’ generating instances of, and 
methods for, the dissipation of problems, is facilitated.
[Reflexive reflections
My personal, academic and professional interest in the topic of self-blame is 
interwoven with and arise fi*om a struggle and fascination with issues of the 
‘self. In my previous research I have explored the ‘locating’ of the self within 
the social/moral order, and was particularly interested in the extent to which
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‘selves’ are separable from contexts. This question is one that creates tensions 
within psychological theoiy. For example, it raises criticisms that therapy 
‘locates’ pathology and interpersonal problems within individuals rather than 
society or, conversely, fails to hold individuals responsible for their actions, 
instead ‘blaming’ for example: society, parents, abusers or others for the 
dispositions and behaviours of the individual.
These are issues with which I have personally grappled in the process of trying 
to account for my own experiences and actions, and assess my responsibility for 
them. The boundaries between ‘self, ‘other’ and ‘society’ are constructs that 
have come to be very important resources for me in making sense of my 
experiences -  this sense-making incorporating an experience of myself as an 
individual who is responsible for my actions and as part of an interpersonal and 
social context that ‘gives’ me self-hood and constrains my meaning-making. 
These positions are valorised differently by me at different times and have 
profound consequences for how I view my actions.
This leads me to the question of how it can be that I experience and understand 
myself to have freedom yet be deeply socially embedded -  a dilemma of the self 
that appeared intractable to me until I shifted my view of the problem. With 
exposure to and adoption of social constructionist theoiy and methodology 1 
began to conceive of the puzzle as ‘built in’ to ‘self-hood’ -  a dilemma that does 
not need solving but rather understanding in terms of how ‘selves’ function.
This raises the problem of how 1 position myself in relation to my research, and 
to the account 1 have just constructed. Being a social constructionist piece, 
taking self-blame as its focal construct, the notion of ‘self is to some extent 
problematised through its de-construction. In speaking of the use of ‘myself in 
generating and conducting this research, then, 1 must qualify the claim with a 
note about the construction of my ‘self as a discursive act that is itself open to 
de-construction and problematisation. Where the construction of the use of self 
as a feature of the work seems least problematic is where it functions to create a 
contrast with the kind of research that objectifies and de-contextualises the 
‘findings’. 1 have written this report in an academic style suggesting that as a 
researcher 1 am largely impartial. The account 1 have provided shows that this is 
not so. Moreover, it cannot be so, since my interaction with the text, like the
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partidpants’ interactions with each other, is action-oriented. If I have achieved 
an analysis that speaks to the reader, and is persuasive in the light of the extracts 
and arguments I have used, then I might claim to have constructed at least a few 
plausible ‘readings’ of that material -  readings that are not arbitraiy but have 
interpretative resonances. They can only have these resonances through drawing 
upon existing discourses and practices -  meaning that there is possible an 
infinite iterative process of de-construction. My hope is that I have managed to 
problematise self-blame in a way that allows a fi’esh understanding of it as a 
discursive resource that is constitutive of, and constituted by, the shifting 
interactions between therapist and client. In fore-grounding these interactions in 
the report I remain un-reflexive about my own relationship with the texts- for 
example, that my ‘readings’ are inter-animated with a conversational history 
and concurrent discursive agenda in/with which I actively position myself.
In taking a social constructionist (de-constructive) stance to these texts I am not 
questioning the experiences associated with self-blame, but construct these as in 
some ways products of interaction -  achievable and understandable in context. 
In making the transition to social constructionist research I struggled with the 
problem of how to ‘do justice’ to the accounts -  that is, how much I should try 
to include of what I could discern. I came to reahse that the attempt to be all- 
encompassing was futile and contraiy to the spirit of social constructionism, in 
that analyses are always selective and interpretations are to a large extent 
‘fluid’. The challenge then became to say something interesting and significant 
that others could recognise as justified by the texts. Thus, I have approached this 
project with the aim of achieving rich and coherent interpretations. My decision 
was to focus less upon content and the identification of discourses, and more 
upon commonalities of function and process. The danger in this is the imphcit 
suggestion that I have uncovered something ‘foundational’ about process. I find 
that I am always working with this tension -  that in wanting to say something 
important I begin to reify my analyses. Likewise, as a result of rejecting 
‘objectivity’ a reification of ‘subjectivity’ can arise, the ‘self coming to be seen 
as a source of foundational knowledge. It is, therefore, usefiil to engage in this 
reflexive process and construct my research as ‘situated’.]
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APPENDIX ONE
Table 1. Details of Participants
DYAD A DYADB DYADC DYADD DYADE DYAD F DYAD G DYAD H
Genders: Therapist F F M F M M F M
Client M F F M F M M M
Session number 5 8 10 5 9 9 5 7
Therapy Orientation IP CB IP IP CB CB CB IP
Key:
IP: Inter-personal
CB: Cognitive-behavioural
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APPENDIX TWO
UniS
12 March 2002
Ms Yvette Lewis
Counselling Psychologist in Training 
Department o f  Psychology 
University o f  Surrey
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 {0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 683811
Registry
Dear Ms Lewis
A discourse analysis of client self-blam e In psychotherapy sessions 
(ACE/2002/11/Psvch)
1 am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol and has approved it on the understanding that the Ethical Guidelines 
for Teaching and Research arc observed. For your information, and future reference, 
these Guidelines can be downloaded from the Com mittee’s website at 
http://www.surrev.ac.uk/Surrev/ACE/.
This letter o f  approval relates only to the study specified in  your research protocol 
(ACE/2002/11/Psych). ITie Committee should be notified o f  any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if  the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Date o f approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics:
Date o f  expiry o f  approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics:
Please inform m e when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
cc: Chairman, ACE
Dr A Coyle, Supervisor, Dept o f  Psychology
12 March 2002 
11 March 2007
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APPENDIX THREE
Document of agreement to abide bv securitv/confidentialitv constraints imposed 
under the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Project ethical guidelines.
Mainlaining secure confidentiality is of utmost importance to the clinic team at PTRC 
(previously based at SAPU in Sheffield), and we are continually reviewing our 
procedures. It is vital that any queries or difiiculties that you have concerning 
confidentiality be discussed fully. If you have reason to believe that the 
confidentiality of the materials is at risk in any way you must discuss this with your 
PI RC contact (Gillian Hardy) rather than ignore the problem or hope that it will go 
away.
C’onfidentiality issues will be a standing item for consideration each time you meet 
with your PTRC contact.
The following statements are issues of security and confidentiality for which you will 
be responsible.
Storage and transit o f tapes and transcripts.
* Access to the room where I will keep recordings and transcripts will be limited 
to myself and professional colleagues.
* When working on therapy tapes in a hospital/departmental setting, 1 will 
ensure that recordings and transcripts are locked in a secure place under ‘double lock 
and key’ (i.e. locked in a filing cabinet with a unique key in a room that is kept 
locked), when not in use.
* I will not make copies of any materials used in the project and after the agreed 
specific research use, I will return all recordings and transcript excerpts, to the PTRC 
Research Clinic.
* In order to reduce the security risk, I will negotiate with my PTRC contact 
each time the transportation of tapes between research locations occurs, so that the 
period of time when materials are not securely locked up will be kept to a minimum.
Working on tapes and transcripts.
* I understand that work using therapy tapes and transcripts will only take place, 
at an approved centre of research (such as a department or a hospital setting). I will 
not work on tapes in any setting other than that which is approved by my PTRC 
contact.
* When coding tapes within a hospital/department setting, I will ensure that all 
recordings will be heard in privacy using headphones.
185
* 1 undcTstanU tint meetings with pnqcct research colleagues hivoKing group
iistenhtg' to recordings will only take place in a pri\ ale and soundproof room.
Any materials, such us transcripts, used by colleagues in group analysis" will 
he remmcd lo me and destrowd or reiurned to the PI Rl' Research Clinic
{ ;(>nOdçnla>Iiîy o f  niatcnals on tape and jranscripl.
* If the client imolved in the therapy ease is someone known to me or il I 
suspect that I am personally acquainted with the elient, close Iriends or relatives of the 
client (a) I will immediately pass this htlbrmation my PTRC eontaci associated 
with the project, and th) I will undertake no lurthcr work on the tnaterials associated
* During the course of training and coding i will not reveal the contents ol
! understand that any discussiim about the content of materials used in the project will 
be limited to a ‘need to know" basis onk, and will he restricted to prolessinnal and 
research colleagues whose involvement in the proieei is agreed with the PTRC clinic 
team. Any discussion of material involved in the project w jihin Ibis group will he in 
accordance with the research ypecilleations of the pn^ect.
y nyrct fu ta r to //:e i un, ' ru towzwavnctva nv/A- '
une rehnmy to tun 'tV oôom 'cczmty cufph/enthnfO
 i,j/.jU i^ X A A jx S .
 J K S  -  S _ :.O Z _
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APPENDIX FOUR
Notes for Contributors
Psyctiofoiy and Pjychcihinjp)^ Theory, Rwewch ortd Practice (formerly The Brittîh 
Jwiriral o f Meâcot Psydiohgy) is an international joumsl with a focu* on riie 
psychological aspects of tnental health, psychological problems and their 
psydiothenapeutfc treatments. Its aim has been to  bring together the psychiatric 
and psychological disciplines and this is reflected in the composition o f the 
Editorial Team. Nevertheless, we welcome submissions from mental health 
professionals and researchers from all relevant professional backgrounds.The 
traditional orientation of the Journal has bMB toward psychodynamic and 
interpersonal approaches, which have defined Its core identity, but we now 
addttionaHy welcome submissions of original theoretical and research-based 
papers of any theoretical provenance provided they have a  bearing upon 
vulnerability to, adjustment to, assessment of, and recovery (assisted o r 
otherwise) from psychological disordert.The ^ m a l  thus aims to  promote 
theoretical and research developments in the fields of subjective psycliological 
states and dispositions, interpersonal attitudes, behaviour and relationships 
and psychological therapies including both process and outcome research) 
where mental health is concerned. Sutnnission of systematic reviews and 
e th e r  research reports which support evidence-based practice is also 
welcomed. Cllniod or case studies will be considered only If they illustrate 
partlculariy unusual (omw of psychcfsathology or Innovative forms of therapy 
which carry Important theoretical bnpDcadons.
Counselling PsychobgyiA special section on counselling psychology has been 
created In the journal In recognition of the Wportamce of this area within 
psychology and psychotherapy. This section aims to  promote theoretical and 
research developments in the field of coiuiselling psychology. Authors who 
wish to  submit tiveir papers for consideration In this section should state this 
in their covering letter.
I. Circulation
The circulation of the Journal Is worldwide.There is no restriction to  British 
authors; papers are invited and encouraged from authors throtçhout the 
world.
Z. Length
Pressure on journal space is considerable and papers should be as short as 
is consistent with clear presentation of the subject m atter Papers should 
normally be no more than 5.000 words,although Aie Editor retains discretion 
to  publish papers beyond this length.
3. Befereeing
The journal operates a policy of anonymoia peer review. Papers vdfi normally 
be scrutinised and commcnted on by a t least two Independent expert referees 
(in addition to  the Editor) although the Editor may process a  paper at his or 
her discretton.Tha referees will not be made aware of the identity of the author. 
All information ibout authorship including personal acknowledgemenu and 
Institutional affiliations should be confined to  a removable front page (and 
the tex t should be free of sttch dues as identifiable self-citations ( In our 
earlier work...*)).
4, Submission requirements
(a) four copies of the manuscript should be sent to  the Editor (Professor 
Phi Richardson.JoiBtials Department,The British Ptychologcal Society, 
St, Andrews House, 48 Princess Road East, Leicester, LEI 7DR.LB<j. 
Submission of a paper Implies that It has not been published elstwlsere 
and that it Is not being considered for publication in anotlier journal. 
Papers should be accompanied by a signed letter Indicating that all 
named authors have agreed to the stibmtssion. One author should be 
Identified as the correspondent and that person’s title, name and 
address suppfied.
Contributions must be typed in double spacing with wide margins 
and on only one side of each sheet All sheets must be numbered.
(c) Tables should be typed In double spacing, each on a separate piece 
of paper with a self-explanatory tide. Tables should be corrynwhensibfe 
without reference to  tlie text. They should be placed a t the end of 
the manuscript with their approximate locatkins indicated In the text.
(d) Figures are usually produced direct from authors' originals and should 
be presented as good black or white images preferably on high contrast 
glossy paper, carefully labelled in initial capital/lower case Icctafng wW» 
sjnnbols in a form consistent with text use. Unnecessary background 
patterns, lines and shading should be avoided. Paper clips leave dMnagit\g 
indentations and should be avoided. Any necessary Instructions should 
be written on an accompanying photocopy. Captions should be listed 
on a separate sheet.
(e) AB articles should be preceded by an Absp-act of 200 words, giving 
a condse statement of the intention and results o r conclusions of the 
article.
(f) Bibliographic references In the text should quote the author's name 
and the date of publication thusrSmltl) (1994). Multiple citations should 
be given alphabetically rather than chronolcsgically. (jones, 1998: King. 
1996; Parker, 1997) If a  work has two authois, d te  both names In the 
tex t throughout f^ge uadW fute (1995). In the case of reference to
three or more authors, use all names on the first mention and e t  al. 
thereafter except in the reference fist.
( ^  References cited in the text must appear in the list a t  the end of the 
article.The list should be q/ped in do ttle  spacing In the following format; 
Herbert, M (1993). WwWng with cfitWren ond the Children Act (pp. 76- 
IM). lelcester:Tbc British Psychological Society.
Neeleman.].,& Persaud. R-(l995).Why do psychiatrists n^ lec t religion! 
firitish Ja m a l of Afcdicof f^iofegy, 68,169-178.
Particular care should be taken to  ensure that references are accurate 
and cw ple te . Give all Journal titles in fuR.
(h) SI units must be used for all measurements, rounded off to  practical 
alucs if appropriate, with tite Imperial equivalent In parentlteses (see 
The British Psychological Sodety Style C iije achttp J/wwwiips.org.uk/ 
publications/(Author.cfrn).
(i) Authors are requested to  avoid the use of sexist language.
(j) Autfwrs are responsible for acquiring written permission to  publish
lengthy quotations. Illustrations etc for which they do not own copyri^iL
5. E-mail submissions
Manuscripts may be submitted via e-mail.The main text of the manuscript, 
including any tables or figurât, should be saved as a Word 6.0/95 compatiWe 
flle.The file must be sent as a MIHE-compatihle attachment. E-mails should 
be addressed to  joumats@bps.org.uk with ’Manuscript submission' in the 
subject Ilne.The main body of the e-mail should include the following: tide 
of journal to  which the paper Is being submitted; name, address and e-mail 
of the corresponding autlvur: and a satem ent tha t the paper is not currently 
under consideration elsewhere. E-mail submissions will receive an e-mail 
acknowledgement of receipt. Including a manuscript reference number.
6. Brief reports
These should be limited to  lOCO words and may include research studies 
and theoretical, critical or review comments whose essential contribution 
can be made briefly. A summary o f no t more than 50 words should be 
provided.
7. Ethical cottsiderations
The code of conduct offhe British Psycholo|ÿcal Sodety requires psychofogisti 
'N o t to  allow their professional responslbiiitfes or standards of practice to 
be dintinished by consideration of religion, sex. race, age, nationality, party 
politics, social standing, class or other extraneous factors,The Society résolves 
CO avoid all finks with psychologists and psycfralogical organizations and their 
formal representatives tiiat do rvot affirm and adhere to  die principles In the 
clause of its Code of Conduct In cases of doubt, authors may be asked to  
sign a document confirming the adherence to  these principles. Any study 
published in this journal must pay due respect
to  die well-being and dignity of research participsnts.The British Psychological 
Society’s Edvcal Guidelines on Conducting Research with Human Participants 
must be shown to  have been scrupulously folIowed-These guidelines are 
available a t http://www.bps.org.Wdaboutfrules5.cfin
S. Supplementary data
Supplementary data too expensive for publication nay  be deposited with the 
British Library Document Supply Centre. Such material Includes numerical 
data, computer programs, fuller details of case studies and experimental 
techniques.The material should be submitted to  tlie Editor togetlter with 
the article,for sitnukancous refereeing.
9. Proofs
ftoofs are sent to  authors for correction of print but not for rewriting or 
the introduction of new material. Rfty complimentary copies of each paper 
are supplied to  the senior author, but further copies may be ordered on a 
form accompanying the proofs.
10. Copyright
To protect authors and journals against unauthorised reproduction of 
artkfeS.The British Psychological Sodety requires copyright to  be assigned 
to itself as publisher, on the express condition (hat authors may use their 
own material a t any time Without permission. On acceptance of a paper 
submitted to  a journal, authors will be requested to  sign an appropriate 
assignment of cc^righ t form.
11. Checklist of requirements:
•  A signed submission letter
•  Correspondent's titfe/name/address
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